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PREFACE
This research is providing a detailed analysis of the social, legal,
organizational and economic benefits of satellite meteorology. The multi-
disciplinary team at the Space Science and Engineering Center at the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin has undertaken to ascertain and isolate these benefits
in an in-depth research effort. This effort was begun in 1969 and a two-
volume interim report was issued in June 1971 consisting of some 890 pages.
The reports contained in the present two volumes include continued work
on economic benefits, legal implications, management systems, and agri-
cultural impacts. This research area which combines a working knowledge of
satellite meteorology with expertise in various related software areas prom-
ises to, for the first time, produce data on the practical effects and impact
of meteorological satellites.
We are grateful for the continued support of NASA and are looking
forward to further research which we hope will benefit the entire nation.
Verner E. Suomi
Delbert D. Smith
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A STUDY OF THE WEATHER SATELLITE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND
ORGANIZATION SYSTEMS
Andre Delbecq
Alan Filley
N73-15643
Introduction
The purpose of this study is to describe the management and organiza-
tional system utilized by the Meteorological Satellite Program at NASA. The
study focuses on the structure, process, and functioning of the program,
making possible the successful linking of multiple systems of space science
technology. By explicating the methods used and the conditions surrounding
their usage it is expected that the lessons learned from this program will be
of benefit to other organizations concerned with complex, developmental
planning.
Indeed, the relative newness of a science linking space technology
with meteorology parallels the relative newness of the management and organ-
ization systems utilized. The characteristics of nonbureaucratic organiza-
tions, on the other hand, have not been studied until recently.
The development of any science, including the science of organization,
tends to follow a natural development from description and explanation of
phenomena, to prediction of phenomena or events, to prescription of methods
leading to described results. The matrix organization and project manage-
ment methods utilized in space science and in other rapidly changing tech-
nologies today have not been adequately described and documented. Thus,
the present study represents part of the essential first step: description and
explanation.
Methodology
In keeping with the objectives of the study, the following steps were
taken in the development of this document:
(a) Orientation and background review. The historical evolution of
NASA and the Weather Satellite Program were reviewed in published docu-
ments. The general structure of the program was identified from these docu-
ments and from interviews with members of the Space Science Center, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin. Of particular interest at this stage was the identi-
fication of key administrators, major organization units, organization inter-
faces where coordination and interface mechanisms might be found, and
historical antecedents to the present structure.
(b) Comparison of organizational features with known theory and re-
search.
(c) Identification of critical issues for investigation. The features of
the weather satellite program were compared with other matrix and project
management systems. This process suggested five key areas of investiga-
tion: organization mission, interfaces with other units and agencies,
planning strategies, structural design, and participant characteristics.
(d) Preparation of interview schedules and data gathering. Using a
clinical interview schedule designed to probe the five areas mentioned above,
interviews were conducted with eleven people in NASA and twelve people
in ESSA (now NOAA) at both the headquarters and project levels. Interviews
all took place between October, 1970, and December, 1970, and lasted ap-
proximately one and one-half hours each.
(e) Data analysis and presentation. The report which follows contains
nine chapters. The first four are essentially theoretical, while the last five
are empirical. The theoretical chapters present the overview of matrix
structure, program management, and the program and project offices. The
remaining empirical chapters serve to illustrate the theoretical material by
presenting a case study of the weather satellite program. Since the focus is
upon project and matrix organization systems, the study focuses primarily
upon the program and project offices in NASA.
It should be noted that case material and other examples are used to il-
lustrate, not to prove. One can never prove a point by citing an example,
but one can clarify by showing how a concept exists in practice.
Limits of the Study
We have made an attempt to describe and explain the system. As such
we have been careful not to confuse the normative "ought" with the positive
"is. " That is, we are not suggesting how the organization should behave,
since to do so would be speculative and premature. In addition, the system
described here should be considered that of the satellite program, not the
system of all program management, nor necessarily the system of other pro-
grams in NASA.
The system described in this study exists concomitantly with a success-
ful technical program. It may or may not be causally related to the success
of the technical activities. In any case, no causation is claimed. Finally,
no study of this kind can be free from the dangers of interviewer interpreta-
tion. We have attempted to let the systems speak for themselves and to
avoid imposing preconceived models.
Chapter One
A PERSPECTIVE ON MATRIX ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE
Until the post World War II period, most organization structures could
be classified rather handily into a few types. These structures probably
devolved without much conscious planning and were most suitable for en-
vironments viewed as stable and predictable. In the later period, however,
newer structures had been developed which were less than the natural evo-
lution of an organization and more the result of conscious planning to meet
specific needs. With the advent of advanced technology, particularly in
the aerospace industry, and the requirements of short-term research and
development projects, organization planners have aided in developing struc-
tures which differ from their predecessors in kind as well as in degree.
Goal and Process Departmentation
Until recently there were two main alternatives available for organizing.
The first was by function or activity, the second, by goal or product. When
function or activity is the basis for grouping,one would find a business di-
vided into sales, manufacturing, engineering and the like. In a research
and development organization,one might find departments devoted to systems,
procurement, engineering, testing and the like. Such an arrangement per-
mits division of labor within a specialty (Filley, 1969; Galbraith, 1971)
since, for example, the engineering department could have both an electro-
mechanical engineer and an electronics engineer. By having departments
grouped by skill, there is an opportunity for specialists to advance within
their skill area. Such an arrangement also reinforces "professionalism"
since interaction is with other specialists of the same type.
The functional organization facilitates the time-sharing of specialists
on a variety of projects or products in the same sense that product batches
are scheduled in and out of the machine capacity of a drill press department.
The functional organization also has certain inherent problems. The
difficulty of scheduling and coordinating activities within and between de-
partments is severe. As Galbraith (1971) points out, "The problem of simul-
taneously completing all task son time, with appropriate quality and while
fully utilizing all specialist resources, is all but impossible in the func-
tional structure. " In addition, the emphasis on professionalism often causes
specialists to concern themselves with stature in the eyes of their profes-
sional colleagues rather than with meeting organization goals. Finally,
the sharp differences in activity, philosophy, and perhaps education and
jargon, between departments increases the likelihood of conflict and mis-
understanding between those organization units.
In contrast with the functional structure, the goal-oriented structure
groups activities into departments or divisions according to common product,
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common customer, common geographic area, or common project. In a busi-
ness organization this might mean that each product division would have
its own engineering, sales, and manufacturing activities. In the research
and development division it might mean that each project would have its own
engineering, sales and manufacturing activities, and its own
systems, engineering and test people. In the research and de-
velopment division it might mean that each project would have its own
systems, engineering, and test people. Under this arrangement all of the
work can be grouped under a single management and reliance on separate
division or departments is reduced. Such an organization makes schedul-
ing and coordination easier and facilitates completion on scheduled dates.
It increases attention to the goals of the division or department and re-
duces attention to professional role.
The chief disadvantage of the goal-oriented unit is the necessity of
duplicating skills or equipment in each unit. As such, the people or
equipment may not be fully utilized since, unlike functional units, work and
time are not scheduled against available capacity. Rather,they are present
because of simple need. A related problem stems from the fact that there
are not larger numbers of specialists grouped together, and consequently a
reduction in ability to develop a division of labor within the specialty. If
two projects are present, management must hire two electrical engineers,
reducing specialization, or four engineers (two electronics and two electro-
mechanical) causing duplication (Galbraith, 1971).
In the sense that goal-oriented units are directed to client service rather
to professional expertise, they are often superior to functional units in meet-
ing client needs. Since they are self-contained, however, they may sub-
optimize as far as the superordinate goals of the total organization are con-
cerned. The parent organization containing the project or product divisions
8may have difficulty controlling behavior in the units and in balancing re-
sources between divisions to the satisfaction of project or product divi-
sion leadership.
Given only the alternatives of functional- or goal-oriented units, then,
organization management has historically been faced with the choice be-
tween operations which maximized technical or professional skill but which
failed to meet schedules and deadlines, or operations which met scheduled
needs, but which failed to develop or utilize professional and technical re-
sources. As will be shown later, it was the matrix organization which
faced this dilemma and which attempted to gain the advantages of both goal
and functional units while avoiding the inherent problems in each.
Research on Goal and Process
Several studies shed further light on the difference between the two
organizing strategies. Kover (1963) describes the reorganization of an ad-
vertising agency from function to goal units. According to Kover:
. . . the existing services were disbanded and their personnel
were formed into heterogeneous marketing or creative groups to
help fulfill the goal of more tightly-integrated client service.
Service was now provided by formal, permanent, client-oriented
groups in place of less structured, shifting client assignments
in functional departments.
As a result, client-agency communication was greatly simplified, though
communication among specialists was severely reduced. Also, in changing
from technical supervision to project or client supervision, the specialists
were judged by nonprofessionals. The reorganization reportedly increased
efficiency in terms of coordination with fewer delays, mistakes, and omis-
sions. It made performance evaluation of specialists more difficult since they
could not be meaningfully compared with each other, and it changed from a
dual evaluation of work in terms of both profession and client to a single
client-satisfaction criterion. Organization members who were exclusively
"craftsmen, " i.e. oriented to profession) became alienated in the new
structure, while those oriented more to organization goals made the shift
satisfactorily. In short, the study indicates that a shift from function to
goal-oriented units increased customer service and reduced professional
emphasis.
The relative value of goal or functional emphasis probably depends
upon the degree to which institutional goals and professional goals are
similar. Glaser (1963) reports a study of 332 members of a medical research
organization. Using survey data, he found that where organization and pro-
fessional goals are the same, as might well be true in a medical research
institution, loyalty to the organization is accompanied by a high degree of
professional achievement. Unlike the craftsmen mentioned in the previous
study who had to choose between professional or institutional goals, the
professionals here did not face such a choice. Instead, the scientist was
rewarded by superiors for scientific expertise.
A third study (Brown and Shepard, 1956) is consistent with this view.
In this case a research organization changed from a process department
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structure to a goal-oriented structure, and a change in emphasis from re-
search to development. Under the new structure,goals were dictated ex-
ternally by a government agency and the members were less able to seek
their own goals. Those opposing the change felt the "pencil pushers" in
Washington were telling them what to do and that the change interferred
with their ability to do scientific work. Those who favored the change did
so for three main reasons: (a) they were professionally interested in devel-
opment, (b) they accepted Washington's right to set policy and felt a duty
to follow it, or (c) they expected personal gains in rank, salary, and con-
trol of personnel with the new arrangement.
The final study to be mentioned here (Walker and Lorsch) provides more
detail about goal and function. Comparing two manufacturing organizations
which were essentially alike except for their method of departmentation,
they found the following characteristics. In terms of the kind of goals em-
phasized, the functional plant emphasized professional goals, while in the
product division plant dual concern for professional and organizational goals
was expressed. Comparing time horizons in each, they found a general
concern for short-run goals and daily problems in the functional structure,
and a variety of time horizons in the goal-oriented structure. Comparing
the formality of structure, i.e. explicit job relationships and emphasis on
rules and procedures, they found the functional organization to be more
formal. There was a uniform structure and great emphasis on rules and pro-
cedures. Under the goal or product structure, arrangements were more varied
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with formality in some areas and loose arrangements in others. In all,
there were less clear differences between jobs or specialties in the product
division.
In considering integration and communication, Walker and Lorsch found
that the goal-oriented structure had better integration even among a wide
variety of skills and that communication among employees was more fre-
quent, less formal, and more often face-to-face than in the functional
structure. In the functional organization the formal boundaries between
specialized departments blocked communication. Comparing performance in
each, they found that the functional structure was better at maximizing cur-
rent output, but was far less flexible in terms of improvement or consolida-
tion of jobs. Finally, contrasting employee attitudes in each, they found
that in the goal-oriented plant there was more involvement in work as well
as more stress and pressure. In the functional structure people were more •
satisfied with work, possibly because of stability and less pressure to meet
deadlines.
In general the evidence is quite consistent. Given only the two alter-
native forms of organization the functional arrangement permits the greatest
use of technical knowledge but makes collaboration and control between
units a difficult task. The goal-oriented structure is less formal, makes
less efficient use of resources, but meets schedules and targets better.
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Modifying Factors in Goal and Process
Before turning to the matrix organization, it is useful to note certain
factors which seem to modify our generalizations about goal or functional
departmentation.
(a) Size of unit. It may be observed that the size of a pro cess-oriented
unit can affect its tendency to subgroup by profession. For example, a
large organization might have fifteen engineers in a functional department.
In reorganizing along project lines, three engineers might be assigned to
each of five projects. The effects of a goal-oriented unit described earlier
might be expected to follow. But, what would happen if a project group
grew sufficiently large to warrant fifteen engineers on a single project?
Very likely the engineering group would return to its focus on professional
values and norms.
(b) Client emphasis. Another factor which tempers the effects of goal
or process departments is the extent to which the unit is free from direct
influence or control by the client. As Etzioni (1964) has pointed out, an
organization is less likely to attend to client needs to the extent that it is
independently financed by other than the client directly and is a monopolis-
tic source of client services. Thus, if the unit is competing for a client
with other similar sources of service and depends upon the client for its
income, it will be more attentive to goals defined by clients. Where
opposite conditions are true, it will be more calloused toward its clients.
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(c) Work flow. The extent to which functional units are highly dif-
ferentiated depends on how mutually dependent units are on each other.
If the work flow cuts across units, then they must be more integrated and
the necessity for cooperation is increased. In the case of goal-oriented
units, if the work flow is highly programmatic in nature as in line-balanced
production or in straight line assembly, then the flexibility usually attributed
to goal units might be considerably reduced.
Without noting these modifying factors, one will generally suppose that
the answer to inherent problems in functional structures is merely a shift to
product, client, or project forms of goal-oriented units. Yet large goal-
oriented units where work flow does not encourage integration will not in-
duce the marked efficiencies and economies that may be desired.
Matrix Organization
It should be made clear at the outset of this discussion that a project
doth not a matrix make. In some cases a project may be a temporary or
permanent goal-oriented form of departmentation. For example, in the con-
struction industry it has been customary to establish a project to construct
a dam, air base, or a building. When project management is related to ma-
trix structure, it is a secondary organization, linking people and systems
who already have a defined position in a primary organization. That is,
while the primary organization may be functional in nature, the projects re-
late people from these functional units for purposes of goal achievement
(Davis, 1962).
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Certain characteristics appear frequently where project management is
used. First is the time priority of meeting scheduled dates. Second is or-
ganizational complexity involving two or more major elements or units in the
structures or technical complexity involving two or more distinct technical
disciplines. Third is a major dollar commitment to a project requiring cumu-
lative expenditures on a time scale. Fourth is a significant interest by a
power source external to the organization: Congress, a major customer, an
institutionalized group of people in the community.
Where these conditions are present, one can frequently trace an evo-
lution toward matrix organization in a functional structure. For example,
a scientific breakthrough may indicate program feasibility. Near-term
targets for schedules and longer-term commitments of money may be gener-
ated by an external power source. The functional organization may respond
by establishing a program or project "task force" composed of representa-
tives from several organization units. Such a task force will be charged
with determining the feasibility of a major organizational commitment, with
planning schedules and resources, and with pilot projects.
The usefulness of this approach is suggested by natural alternatives
to it. One alternative is for the chief executive to take the responsibility
for these activities himself. That is, since unusual issues tend to move to
higher levels in an organization, the executive may drop his normal duties
and deal with the immediacy of the problem. Even if he assigns the project
to a staff assistant, he still undertakes a major commitment of his own time
and resources.
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On the other hand, he may try to "decentralize" the issue by asking
functional units to investigate their specific interests as they relate to the
problem at hand. This has the advantage of closeness to the issue but
necessarily limits the scope of view by the specialists. Moreover, there
still is no coordination between plans generated from functional departments.
The task force is thus a natural solution to the need for action on such a
problem. Galbraith (1971) points out that the task force should be composed
of people who have enough authority to commit their units to action, but are
not so high in the structure that they do not have immediate technical knowl-
edge regarding the problem.
The label "task force" as it is currently used, generally refers to a
cross-functional planning group whose existence ends once it files its re-
port. Thus, a task force may be established to develop a cost reduction
program and ends its existence when top management takes over to imple-
ment the plan. Where a similar cross-functional group continues on a per-
manent basis, it tends to be labeled a "team, " a "coordinating committee, "
or a "project group. " Thus, a company may have a new products team with
representatives from several departments, meeting on a regular basis to
investigate and plan for new products.
Eventually an organization may find that temporary task forces or per-
manent project teams do not provide sufficient focus, balance, or predicta-
bility, causing the organization to shift into a full matrix organization frame-
work. A simplified example of such a structure is shown in Figure 1. At
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Figure 1
Matrix Structure
Program Office
I Program Coordinators |
Technical
Group
IProlect PI-
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the top of the chart are shown the executive offices. The program office
contains program managers representing project or product groups. These
are staff offices operating under the areas of the chief executive, and
chiefly concerned with planning, budgeting, scheduling, and control. The
program office has a long-range time horizon. It is chiefly concerned with
administrative coordination of technical departments and with maintaining
balance between project requirements and the needs of the technical groups.
Technical groups themselves are functional departments, much as de-
scribed earlier. They provide for association of specialists and the ad-
vancement of the state of the art in a specific functional specialty. The
project groups, on the other hand, are goal-oriented units. Individuals from
the technical departments are assigned to project groups, for all are part of
the project. Common patterns of assignment include the following: (a) full-
time assignment of technical staff member for the life of the project,
(b)full-timeassignment for project phase, (c) part-time assignment, and
(d) contract for services. Under the latter the project leader merely arranges
for services from the technical group and the technical group member never
really becomes part of the project team.
As will be discussed in a later section, power balances are subtle and
difficult to maintain in matrix structures. In some matrix organizations the
technical departments depend upon funds generated from assignment of per-
sonnel to projects. In other cases the technical departments are financed
independently and the project leaders must rely upon contractual agreement,
18
persuasion, or interest by a technical department member to get support
for the project. Administrative evaluation of technical performance on
projects may also enhance the power of projects vis-a-vis technical de-
partments.
The project manager's role is also that of balancing power
and resources. By representing the interests of the projects in the execu-
tive committee, the project director can preserve the needed support for
projects. Working properly, the matrix structure provides for both the co-
ordination and control formerly available in goal-oriented structures and
the professional depth available in functional structures.
Such a structure has many advantages. It specifies that a single indi-
vidual is the focal point for all activities related to a single project. It
permits flexible utilization of manpower since technical personnel may be
drawn from readily accessible sources in the functional departments, and
because such personnel may be shifted between projects. It gives the
technical personnel a home base in which they can get professional rein-
forcement and to which they can return between projects. It minimizes the
number and use of bureaucratic channels for communication. It contains
built-in checks and balances between money and cost considerations and
technical considerations throughout the project because of the functional
relationships (Cleland and King, 1968).
In the chapters which follow we shall enumerate both the theoretical
and the empirical considerations of matrix organization and project manage-
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ment. In Chapter 2, we shall look at program management as a subsystem
of matrix organization. Then, in Chapters 3 and 4, we shall deal with the
details of the program and the project offices. This perspective will pro-
vide the cognitive map for considering the Meteorological Satellite System
in NASA, the principal focus of Chapters 5 through 8. Finally, we shall
discuss the implications of the Satellite program experience as it might be
applied in social planning systems.
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Chapter 2
A PERSPECTIVE ON PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
The purpose of this chapter is to move away from the dynamics of
total matrix structure, to focus in detail on the program management (here-
after abbreviated PM) subsystem within matrix. The chapter itself will be
divided into sections, with each section containing a prepositional summary.
Two Semantic Clarifications
Two semantic confusions must be clarified immediately. Unfortunately,
the very name "program" introduces an ambiguity for many readers not familiar
with organizational literature. "Program" in contemporary systems argot is
often associated with a situation where the character of the problem or mis-
sion is understood, causation in terms of means—ends relationships has been
diagnosed, and a routinized solution strategy is available in a standardized
action path known as a "program. "
Paradoxically, the genotype PM to which we refer is an organizational
design for a directly opposing situation. We conceive PM to be a strategy
for organizing when the problem is only vaguely understood, solution strate-
gies do not yet exist, and resources are not yet organized. The output of PM
is the development of a program, rather than the management of a routinized
We are using propositions here to mean statements dealing with the
organic nature of PM, rather than the more restrictive notion of a proposi-
tion as the specification of a functional or casual relationship.
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program.
An additional problem secuanticaLly is the distinction between "program"
and "project" management. We define the genotype PM form as encompass^
ing both "program" and "project" functions and structures, an issue which
we will take up in greater detail at a later point.
With these semantic clarifications, we can.now proceed to discuss the
causes for the emergence of PM as an organizational design.
Causes for the Emergence of PM
We postulate that the underlying cause or need for PM is the need for
"integration" (bringing together); or put negatively, the reality of "fragmen-
tation. " Thus, we see program management emerging where the heavy cost
of an elaborate system of coordination must be incurred in order to facilitate
the development of a new program. The need for coordination may relate to
all or at least several of the following causes.
User Group Needs
Many times actual or potential user groups—the potential beneficiaries
of the program—are poorly linked and relatively uncoordinated. Each of the-
relevant user groups may have specialized concerns, but no mechanism or
umbrella for coordinated planning for these differentiated groups exists. One
By user groups we mean both intra-organizational and extra-
organizational groups who ultimately adopt the new technology developed
by the experimental program into their line or functional activities.
C,
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aspect of PM, therefore, is the function of serving as the agency for study-
ing the perceived needs of the varied user groups, and providing for compre-
hensive planning to meet these needs.
Institutional Focus
The presence of unmet user group needs of sufficient scope to justify
programmatic planning implies that the present allocation of effort by exist-
ing line or functional organizations is either inadequate or their mandate does
not focus attention on the need area. As a result, the initiation of PM im-
plies that new resources are to be developed or present resources are to be
reallocated. (Budgetary relations between program and line units will be
discussed later.) PM, therefore, becomes an agent for defining new funding
needs and/or a channel for reallocation of existing funding toward a new
mission.
Technological Changes
However, (re)allocating resources does not guarantee that innovative
technologies will be developed to deal with user group needs. The ability
of traditional, functional organizations to "repackage" old answers in order
to entice new funding is renowned. Therefore, PM is an organizational-de-
sign which seeks to assure that a "new" program emerges to meet the defined
mission or problem. By "new" is meant innovative or substantially different
X
from programs which presently can be or are being delivered by functional
organizations.
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Complexity
"New" programs are often complex from two standpoints. First, they
may be technically or conceptually new, which implies complexity in a
cognitive sense. Second, since no existing institutional arrangement is
meeting the need they often require pooling of existing resources and capa-
cities which implies "political" complexity.
With respect to conceptual complexity, it is almost trite to mention
buzz words such as "information explosion" and "multidisciplinary. " None-
theless, these buzz words exist and are in vogue due to the underlying
reality of conceptual specialization by discipline and function, and theoreti-
cal and empirical proliferation within disciplines and functions. Further,
the greater the complexity of the task and the greater the lack of integration
between specialized organizational units, the greater is the need for formal
integrating mechanisms such as PM (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967, p. 145).
Inasmuch as "new" missions often are not the focal orientation point of
s
"older" disciplines, or older line functions, a critical aspect of PM is the
development of a planning process which brings to bear on the development
of new solution strategies expertise from multiple disciplines and differen-
tiated functions.
However, disciplinary and functional experts are not free agents. They
are housed and supported by specialty and functional organizations who have
need for their services in connection with ongoing activities. As a result,
a second aspect of complexity which the program manager faces is the
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wooing of needed specialists from existent organizations, and the utiliza-
tion of this scarce specialist talent for temporary periods at discrete phases
in program planning.
As a result of this complex conceptual and political context, PM must
be a vehicle for penetration of existing specialty and functional groupings.
Experimental Character
Inasmuch as all of the above involve integration and planning around a
new mission, the character of PM must be experimental. However, experi-
mentation cannot be an end in itself, since PM is essentially mission-
oriented. Therefore, a conscious system of demonstration and spin-off must
be part of the PM design. In the absence of such a conscious system, there
will be increasing pressures to "bureaucratize" the PM structure, convert
it to an "operating" organization, or to perceive it as competing with other
functional units.
Given these underlying causes for the emergence of PM, we can now
turn to the basic mandate and guiding norms for the genotype PM design.
Guiding Norms and Basic Mandate for PM
Proposition 1: The primary function of aPM design is to provide an
integrative mechanism for bringing together resources
facilitating a program.
Proposition 1 summarizes the basic mandate for PM. The two essential
concepts in the above statement of mandate are integration and developmental.
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With respect to integration, the fundamental cause of developed PM
structures as we observe them relates to fragmentation of user groups, func-
tional and specialist groupings, resources, etc., as discussed in the prior
section. Therefore, the primordial feature of PM designs as reflected in
structure, roles, budgets and planning cycles is the necessity of creating
linkages across separated groups. If this were not the case, program de-
velopment would be assigned to an existent functional or specialist group.
Thus, we posit "integration" as the basic raison d'etre for a PM design
(Burns, 1970, p. 142; Anna, 1970, p. 6).
Proposition 2: The essential activity spheres of the PM organization will
be:
1. Problem exploration: bringing into a planning process all
critical user, scientific and technical groups who have
a contribution to make to problem definition;
2. Knowledge exploration: establishing linkages with
internal and external scientists and specialists who
have insight in order to explore alternative solution
strategies;
3. Resource development: legitimatizing and seeking
funding for the emergent program;
4. Project administration: division of the developmental
program into individual project groups, each responsible
for the design, development and testing of prototype
solutions, and control of these project groups; •
5. Project Spin-off: assistance to line or operating organ-
izations in adapting proven technologies.
We are using "integration" in the tradition of Lawrence and Lorsch
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). As such, it is consistent with the concept
of "linking" as used by Lynton (Lynton, 1969).
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The key sense of Proposition 2 is that PM is essentially a design for
the management of a developmental process, rather than the design for the
administration of an established program. Some exploration concerning the
above activity spheres will make the character of PM clearer.
Problem and Knowledge Exploration—There is both a proactive and re-
active aspect of the functioning of the PM unit with respect to activities 1
and 2 above. Reactively, the PM unit responds to and coordinates requests
from outside agencies, and sees that appropriate organizational resources
are brought to bear in order to respond to these outside requests. Further,
internally, the PM unit becomes the information center and intelligence unit
with respect to all matters surrounding the program mission.
^
However, and perhaps more importantly, the PM unit becomes a pro-
active force to create connections between internal and external groups who
possess important information or insight, but do not generally communicate
with each other (Burns, 1972). Some of these communications will take the
form of formal seminars, institutes or problem-solving sessions sponsored
and paid for from the operating PM budget. Other situations will be more
informal problem-solving meetings, task force groups, etc. However, such
communication linkages are not created without cost and these activities
imply that a significant portion of PM staff time is devoted to these com-
munication functions.
Resource Development—The very existence of the PM unit implies some
27
commitment of resources to the program. However, the PM budget itself as
4
a line budget often funds a truncated PM structure, rather than the cost of
specific projects. As a result, liaison with financial resource controllers
is another major communication linkage. In those instances where the fi-
nancial resources are external to the organization (e. g., legislative bodies,
foundations, etc. ), a major PM function is the articulation of the program
mission and specific funding requirements for individual projects and the
translation of the overall program and individual projects into a format com-
patible with requirements of the available funding sources. Since the de-
velopmental character of the program takes it outside line funds, this process
often involves the formulation of pooled funding arrangements and joint
ventures.
Project Administration—Once the problem has been generically defined,
alternative solution strategies explored, and funding feasibility developed,
the solution package conceptualized by program planning is normally divided
into discrete projects. The project unit itself is a unit dedicated to the
attainment of a limited and specific operationalized goal, which is but one
4
By "truncated" organization we mean an organization in which one level
of the organization—in this case the project level—is not permanently stored
within the organization (Becker and Gordon, 1966, p. 328).
Thus, "program" in PM refers to the entire related series of undertak-
ings which continue over a period of time, and which are designed to ac-
complish a broad scientific or technical goal. Included in these undertakings
are planning processes together with projects (Mandeville, 1969, p. 10).
28
portion of the total set of solutions encompassed by the program, generally
the successful completion of a developmental product on prototype service
on time, within a budget, and in conformance with predetermined perform-
ance specifications (Gaddis, 1959, pp. 89-97). Often the user group and
specialist personnel involved in the evolution of an individual project speci-
fication are quite a different reference group from the technical personnel
who develop the design details of the prototype product or service. There-
fore, in order to assure that a project group does not distort original speci-
fications, and in order to facilitate connections between projects, coordina-
tion between project groups and the total program is necessary. This, once
again, is a communication burden for PM.
Project Spin-off—Finally, a major concern is that successful program
innovations developed and tested by project groups are spun-off to operating
or functional organizations. This transfer of prototype products or services
to operational units is desirable for two reasons. First, presumably the
structural characteristics of functional organizations should be less organic
than the PM structure, and therefore should facilitate increased efficiency
in operations and/or duplication of new products or services. Second, if
spin-off does not take place, pressures for operational or productive effi-
ciency would tend to bureaucratize the PM structure itself. Therefore, it
is desirable that the relationships between ultimate user organizations and
the developmental program operationalized by project groups be attended at
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all phases of program and project development, in order to promote smooth
adaptation and transfer of successful prototypes to operating organizational
units.
Two key mechanisms for facilitating this spin-off are the involvement
of key personnel from user or operational organizations in program develop-
ment and project design and requiring the user or operating organization to
share in partially underwriting the cost of the developmental program.
Proposition 3: Effective PM avoids creating manpower or facility redundance.
At the core of PM design is the notion that PM substitutes cross-
functional integration for self-possessed resources (Ruedi and Lawrence,
1970, p. 78). Indeed, the fact that PM is responsible for and needs the
cooperation of people and facilities outside of its own direct control is prob-
ably the most singular characteristic of the design (Clelland and King, 1968,
p. 151). It is in this sense that PM is generally schematically diagrammed
as a horizontal rather than a vertical structure, which cuts across other
functional and specialist organizations.
Not to possess one's own resources or personnel is, of course, a dif-
ficult psychological position. As a consequence, a number of norms and
careful control over personnel and facility acquisitions are typically im-
posed on the PM organization.
In general, these guiding norms for PM can be summarized as follows:
a) Coordinative and liaison personnel must necessarily be the
primary "permanent" personnel for PM.
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b) In program planning (normally carried out by task-force or com-
mittee assignments), the primary labor force will be obtained
by utilizing released time personnel from administrative, spe-
cialist and/or functional groups.
c) At the project level, only the project director and certain ad-
ministrative support positions are directly budgeted as full-time
PM personnel. Other project participants are temporary full-
time or part-time participants.
d) Different personnel are cycled into program planning or project
implementation at different phases; therefore, assignments to
program or project groups on a permanent basis should be
restricted to coordinative positions.
Organizational Preconditions for PM
We will, of course, be taking up in detail the manner in which this
process of program and project administration is worked out when we dis-
cuss the role of the various types of personnel, and the inducements which
underlie individual motivations to participate in program and project assign-
ments. However, at the organizational level of analysis, the PM strategy
is predicated on a number of preconditions.
Proposition 4: The organizational preconditions for effective PM include:
1) the need for a mandate which legitimizes the PM organ-
ization as equal in status to functional and specialist
organizations; 2) an intermediate budget which assures
cooperation but not self-support; and 3) a style of conflict
resolution which bases exchange between PM and other
organizational structures on negotiation and problem-
solving.
First, the PM unit itself must be perceived both by top management
and by administrators of specialist and functional units as a critical and
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vital part of the organization. If PM is seen as an appendage or minor ad-
dition to specialist or functional units, PM will have a minimal effect upon
the organization (Lynton, 1969). Therefore, we would expect that a clear
statement of the domain of PM would exist to facilitate consensus within
and/or between organizational units (Thompson, 1967, pp. 25-28). Further,
we would expect that the status of PM would be reinforced by specifying that
the chief program administrator would report at an executive level equal to
the level at which line and specialist administrators report. Finally, we
would expect that some opposition from line and specialist administrators
would be co-opted by having key personnel from these organizations serve
on a policy review board for the PM organization.
Second, the budget of the PM unit itself must be sufficient, so it can
induce cooperation of specialist and functional groups on the basis of funds
which otherwise would not be available to these units' personnel. There is
no question that dollars are one of the key seduction mechanisms for elicit-
ing cooperation of functional and specialist groups. On the other hand, if
PM is allowed relatively unlimited resources and support, it will tend to
evolve into an independent unit, will try to hire its own permanent staff or
contract outside for services, and cease to be an Integrative organization.
The balance in funding, therefore, should be such that the PM has sufficient
funds to induce cooperation, but insufficient funds so that joint ventures
with functional and specialist units are necessitated.
Third, although a network of political affiliations and high interpersonal
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skills will be part of the inducement process, there also must be action
based on joint problem-solving and negotiation—not simply on smoothing
or resort to authority (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1970, p. 12). The mechanism
for manpower and facilities negotiations which we observe most often is a
committee made up of key administrators, functional and specialist admin-
istrators, and program administrators who confront differences of opinion
so that personnel assignments and facilities utilization in PM are the re-
sult of problem solving and negotiation, with no group having absolute veto.
Finally, we expect that the key instrumentality or vehicle for these nego-
tiations is a proposal, which when agreed upon becomes an internal con-
tract—more or less formal—specifying the nature, timing, and performance
expectations with respect to both manpower and facilities (Burns, 1951,
p. 151).
A Matrix Management Structure for Program Management
Figure 2 presents a typical matrix management structure for program
management. For those not familiar with such structures, some brief intro-
ductory comments are in order. However, the detailed dynamics of the
structure will become clearer as we describe the functional role of each
unit or position represented in Figure 2 in subsequent sections.
The Horizontal Matrix
Organization charts typically diagram PM units as cutting horizontally
Figure 2
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across functional and specialist groupings. The intent of this diagrammatic
matrix is to emphasize the fact that in planning, development and testing
new programs, the predominant mandate of PM is to work with and through
existing functional and specialist groups.
We are using "functional" here to mean units specializing in particular
operational tasks. (There is, of course, the possibility that the organiza-
tion will contain units based on process or geography as opposed to func-
tion. ) We are using "specialist" in the sense of scientific, clinical, en-
gineering, or technical units. Finally, we are deliberately avoiding the
notion of "line and staff" groups since either functional or specialist units
can contain the organization's core technologies and thus be the basic
utility-adding units to which the developmental PM structure must relate.
Structural Consistency of PM Across Technologies
The question will naturally arise as to whether one can develop an
"ideal-type" program management structure, since PM is found in a variety
of organizational settings. Would, for example, the organization chart for
PM in a physical technology be similar to or different from PM in a human
service technology?
We would suggest that the key features of the structure of the PM unit
(the left side of Figure 2) will occur because of the developmental mandate
of the PM unit itself. Therefore, these key features will not be eliminated
because of differences in the technology of the total organization, although
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secondary features (such as disciplinary backgrounds, career paths, con-
trol technologies, etc. ) will certainly be modified by the "core" technology
of the organization in which the PM unit is embedded. This is important,
since it suggests that the structural features of PM are a function of the
technological imperatives of planning, development and testing of experi-
mental programs, rather than a function of the technology which typifies
the "core" units of the total organization.
Once you assume that position, the interrelatedness of the norms and
mandate set forth earlier and the structural features of PM becomes apparent.
We would expect movement away from our "ideal-type" PM structure, then,
to reflect an organizational mandate for the PM unit at variance from our
earlier norms. The most probable mutation would be for the PM structure
to begin to operate or produce products or services which it earlier de-
veloped, as opposed to being a purely developmental organization. To the
extent that this occurs, we would expect changes in the PM organization
toward a structure which contained units that are less organic and temporary
than the project units in order to increase efficiency and economy for these
more programmed and operational tasks. One can speculate axiomatically:
1) the less experimental the PM mandate, or the more the PM organization
engages in operations, the greater the tendency for the PM unit to take on
characteristics consistent with the "core" technology of increasingly
routinized program; and 2) the less the PM structure has to rely on functional
and structural units for resources, the greater will be the tendency to take
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in permanent personnel, and the less integrative roles and functions will
be emphasized.
Our "ideal type" PM structure, then, flows from the developmental
character of the PM mandate, the emphasis on integration and communica-
tion required because of the complexity and newness of the program mission,
and the intermediate resources provided the PM unit in carrying on its task.
To the extent these organizational features follow our earlier discussion,
we can summarize our feeling about the consistency of PM across technolo-
gies by the following proposition:
Proposition 5: The central features of a pure-type PM unit will be
consistent across organizations, since the determining
imperative is the technology of development as opposed
to the technology of the organization in which the
developmental unit is embedded, or the "core" technology
of the prototype program.
Organizational Levels within Program Management
A final comment is in order concerning the levels within a PM structure.
In our view, the levels within PM are not uniquely different from hierarchy
in conventional organizations, although the manner of functioning will differ
due to the developmental character of the PM organization.
For example, James Thompson has elaborated upon Parsons' framework
of complex organizations having three inherently different spheres of re-
sponsibility: technical, managerial and institutional (Thompson, 1967). The
division of responsibilities in the structure sketched in Figure 1 is as follows:
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Proposition 6: The institutional and managerial service spheres will be
housed in the office of the program manager.
Proposition 7: Technical administration will be housed in the office of
the project manager.
Proposition 8: Because of the developmental nature of PM, status and
power differentiations between these two levels will be
modest, and the differentiation will reflect a hierarchy
based on division of responsibility rather than inherent
superordination-subordination.
By institutional responsibilities, we mean managing the boundary or
interface relations with policymakers, resource controllers, user organiza-
tions, and the executive structure of the organization in which the PM struc-
ture is housed. By managerial services we mean coordination between pro-
gram, functional and specialist groups, as well as services for the project
group. With respect to the project group, the program office concerns itself
with procurement of resources for technical subsystems, and certain control
functions relative to both the technical subsystem and resources partially
assigned to the program from functional and specialist groups. By technical
administration we mean management of the design and implementation of the
specific prototype products or services which are developed within the over-
all program mission.
Our speculation with respect to the moderate status differentiation be-
tween program and project levels reflects the fact that developmental en-
deavors will almost always require the most competent technical specialists.
As a result, the project office will have considerable power based on expertise.
On the other hand, since stable funding and resources do not surround
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developmental endeavors, considerable organizational and environmental
understanding must be brought to bear to legitimatize the program and its
component projects. Consequently, control over resources and legitimacy
places the program office in a strategic power position. As a result, it is
doubtful that either level of the total PM structure is in a position to exer-
cise "command" or "superordinate" power on all decisions, and the dia-
grammatic placement of the program offices "above" the project office re-
flects hierarchy in terms of "integration" much more than hierarchy in terms
of status differentiation. The exact character of the function, power, and
status of each position and unit in the PM structure can now be elaborated
upon.
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Chapter 3
A PERSPECTIVE ON THE PROGRAM OFFICE
Proposition 6 in Chapter 2 indicated that the institutional and mana-
gerial service function are housed in the office of the program manager
(hereafter program officer). In the following chapter we will detail the
functions performed by this office, the roles likely to be played by different
personnel in this office, and the relation of this office both to the total or-
ganization and to the project level of the PM unit itself.
Before beginning we should specify that we are assuming a sufficiently
large PM organization to warrant differentiation of roles within the program
office. Admittedly, in the very small PM organization, a single program
manager may perform all of the roles ascribed to a variety of personnel be-
low. In the larger unit, however, some differentiation of roles is likely to
occur, although the amount of role specialization is limited.
Indeed, Lynton suggests the character of the program office requires that
differentiation be intermediate, and distinctions between superiors and sub-
ordinates in a hierarchical sense be limited (Lynton, 1969, p. 410). With
respect to the two key roles, we will shortly^suggest that the distinctions
between the program manager and program coordinator which do exist reflect
There is also some disparity of titles between the private and public
sectors with respect to position in program management. The private sector
program manager is often called program director in the public sector. The
private sector assistant program manager is often called deputy director in
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a division of labor much more than differences based on command power.
The overview of each position which follows should make the differences
between the two key roles understandable.
The Program Manager
Proposition 9: The primary functions of the program manager are:
1) program legitimatizing, 2) obtaining of resources,
and 3) overall planning and coordination.
Program legitimatizing—With respect to program legitimatizing, we see
the program manager as the principal spokesman who legitimatized the de-
velopmental program to key reference groups. As the "top administrator, "
he must often serve as spokesman for the total program, or specific aspects
of the program, or for individual projects. The principal boundaries to which
he relates are policy-making bodies (both internal policy board and external
bodies such as Congress), resource control groups, key administrators of
functional organizational units, the top executive structure of his own or-
ganization, principal suppliers, scientific groups, and client or user organ-
izations. The program manager will share with other members of his staff
routine communication liaison activities with those constituencies. Hbw-
the public sector. The private sector program coordinator is often called
program manager in the public sector. These differences in title, however,
are not generally indicative of differences in functioning. The reader,
thus forewarned, will be able to make the translation without difficulty.
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ever, at critical stages of program evolution, such as termination or major
modification of program activities, he will serve as principal spokesman
(Cleland and King, 1968). ?
A recent study supports the primacy of this program legitimatizing func-
tion. Mandeville points out that making recommendations for final approval
and presenting these recommendations takes up a greater proportion of the
program manager's time than approving recommendations from below (1969,
P. 80).
Obtaining Resources—A second major boundary role of the program man-
ager is to facilitate the commitment of latent human and financial resources
to program activities. Thus, in addition to legitimatization, the program
manager must often cross the boundaries of critical reference groups in
search of support.
Planning and Coordination—The third primary function of the program
manager is planning and program coordination. It is important to recognize,
however, that this is planning at the policy or total program level. (Moni-
toring technical planning, together with coordination and control of individual
projects, will be delegated to the program coordinators.) The concern of the
program manager is the direction and thrust of the total program. He must
see that the development of individual projects progresses in a manner as to
Proposition 2 suggests nodal stages of program evolution in which
various reference groups must be brought into program planning.
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add up collectively the achievement of the PM unit's mandate or charter.
In carrying out these planning and coordination activities, the primary
mechanism of the program manager is the problem-solving or decision-
making conference—not the exercise of authority (Burns, 1970, p. 142;
Davis, 1965, p. 4). The reason, of course, is that decisions must be
based on detailed information not possessed by the program manager himself;
but bringing together key individuals at critical decision points to partici-
pate in overall planning is the obligation of the program manager.
Proposition 10: A secondary function of the program manager is to over-
see informational, administrative and personnel services
located in his office.
The PM organization, like any other organization, must contain certain
maintenance systems. The program manager, like most top administrators,
will tend to delegate administration of these maintenance systems to aides.
Information System—The program management office is the communica-
tion center or information depository for all information directly or indirectly
related to the programs which the program office coordinates. Information
concerns include theoretical knowledge, studies, and data relating to the
problems to which the program addresses itself, and information about re-
lated resources (including scientific, technical, organizational and financial
resources). A critical source of power for the program manager is control of
the flow of information with respect to all program concerns (Davis, 1965).
This is particularly true because of the developmental character of the
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program itself. Since the program relates to a new technology or service,
knowledge is likely to be a scarce resource and expertise a source of power.
The program manager, therefore, will be very concerned that his staff
keeps him up to date on all salient developments in fields relating to the
program. In addition, he will attend conferences and seminars and maintain
close ties with other organizations, so when he crosses boundaries to rep-
resent the program he is armed with the latest information.
However, certain responsibilities for obtaining this information are
likely to be delegated. Obtaining technical information will largely be the
responsibility of program coordinators and project directors. The program
manager will call upon the"se individuals for briefings where necessary, or
even take them with him to participate in boundary negotiations where their
technical knowledge is pertinent. In addition, the program manager will
want to maintain close contacts with the scientific community, and may
employ a science adviser. Finally, it is not unusual to find a librarian or
technical assistant whose function is to pass on to the program manager
critical information obtained from technical reports and literature reviews.
Administrative Services—Office services (e. g. reproduction, secretarial,
etc.) together with preparation of administrative budgeting will generally be
delegated to an administrative assistant. In like manner, an administra-
tive assistant will deal with personnel records and services, and necessary
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administrative documentation.
Control and documentation of projects, and administration of approved
project budgets, however, are usually the responsibility of program co-
ordinators. It is the program coordinator who prepares regular progress
reports relative to projects, analyzes the effectiveness of project opera-
tions, and prepares the rationale for revised project budget requests.
Based on these materials, prepared by subordinates, the program
manager negotiates with higher management relative to the allocation of
funds for program or project activities.
Proposition 11: An assistant program manager will often be appointed
as an alter-ego, but will focus somewhat disproportionately
on downward relations.
Program legitimation together with planning and coordination requires
that a great deal of the program manager's time will be spent dealing with
upward relations (top executive and policy board), outward relations (resource
controllers, scientific, and client groups), and horizontal relations (rela-
tions with functional organizational units). These outside boundaries will
be particularly critical since PM is a truncated organization not possessing
all its own resources. As a consequence, internal boundaries (relations
with administrative assistants, program coordinators, and project directors)
may suffer. Since the absolute number of meetings or liaison contacts may
Q
And in cases of maladministration, an executive director will deal with
the administrative assistant.
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exceed the capacity of a single individual, the program manager will often
have an assistant program manager.
The assistant program manager will appear together with the program
manager with sufficient frequency at external boundaries, so that he can
substitute for the program manager in these relationships when inevitable
scheduling conflicts occur. However, as upward and outward boundaries
absorb great amounts of the program manager's time, the assistant program
manager will serve with even more frequency relative to downward relations
so that internally "management by exception" can be practiced.
Proposition 12: The essential skills of the program manager are verbal,
interpersonal and political.
The critical feature of the program manager's role is his position as
top executive of a truncated organization, where the major concern is
garnering and coordination of resources assigned for a temporary develop-
mental period, rather than command over a stable resource. Further, we
indicated above that his principal obligations were directed toward inter-
facing with upward and outward boundaries. While attempts to specify
distinguishing career profiles have been only moderately successful (Mande-
ville, 1969), a consistent "clinical" description seems to emerge from the
9literature.
9We would hasten to add, however, that this profile is not uniquely
different from that associated with many boundary positions, particularly
at what Parsons refers to as the "institutional representation" level of an
organization.
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Verbal and Interpersonal Skills—Descriptions of individuals serving
integrative, boundary roles such as the program manager, often contain
words such as: poised, enthusiastic, spontaneous and talkative (Lawrence
and Lorsch, 1967). Since an essential function of the program manager
discussed above was his role in conceptualizing and articulating the pro-
gram mission to differentiated publics, it is hard to imagine an individual
being successful without his being relatively forceful, active, and verbally
aggressive (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967, p. 150).
What is particularly critical, however, is the ability to relate to a
number of differentiated reference groups. This requires flexibility—not
simply verbal aggression. What is needed is the ability to deliver and re-
ceive messages via a multiple and relatively noisy sound track system
simultaneously (Fisher, 1970). Each of the differentiated reference groups-
clients, scientists, resource controllers, functional administrators, policy
bodies, etc.—will have its own argot, style of relationships, value struc-
ture, and socio-emotional climate. Successful relationships across such
diverse reference groups will require both sensitivity and flexibility. The
essential challenge is for the program manager to secure resources from and
solve problems with each of these groups according to its own rules.
Therefore, descriptions of persons successfully playing this type of
role also include variables relating to flexibility along with verbal promi-
nence. Both Filley (1970, p. 20) and Lynton (1969, P. 410) talk about in-
tellectual breadth, a wide inventory of ways of thinking, and flexibility in
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shifting roles. Other writers, looking at norms or attitudes, show that the
role requires intermediate orientations with respect to need for structure,
time span of discretion, and interpersonal styles, when the attitudes of
the integrator are compared with the attitudes of the extremes of the mem-
bers of specialized departments or separated reference groups (Lawrence
and Lorsch, 1967, p. 147; Lynton, 1969, p. 410; Seller, 1963, p. 190-198).
Some indication of sensitivity to the need for differentiated behavior is re-
flected in Fisher1 s proposition that effective program managers will prefer
to meet with different reference groups at different times, rather than
simultaneously (Fisher, 1970).
Political Skills—The interpersonal skills and role flexibility al-
lows the program manager to move proposals successfully through the chan-
nels of complex systems. Several writers have commented on this skill
dimension.
Wrapp (1967, p. 93) writes that the successful program manager can
successfully plot the position of various persons and units*on a scale of
support to opposition, and thus move his proposal through "corridors of
support and indifference. " Further, he avoids futile efforts to try to push
total packages through a resistant organization; instead he attempts to
piece together incremental support into a program that moves at least part
of the way toward his objectives (Wrapp, 1967, p. 95). This sense of tim-
ing, gradual movement, and avoidance of unnecessary conflict is echoed
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in Baum's writing (Baum, 1970). Such a style of political behavior implies
low dogmatism, a tolerance for ambiguity, a long time span of discretion,
and emotional stability. The effective program manager must be able to
withstand the psychological strains and uncertainties of program develop-
ment (Lynton, 1959, P. 413; Fisher, 1970).
Proposition 13: The background of the program manager will be charac-
terized by: 1) a scientific or technical background,
2) a fairly lengthy stay of service with the employing
organization, and 3) prior experience in developmental
administration.
The upward and outward boundary role of the program manager set forth
above together with the required socio-political skills required suggest
some logical speculations concerning the career background of the program
manager.
Clearly, the program manager must have adequate technical and/or
scientific training in order to command the necessary expertise to coordinate
and legitimatize a developmental project. In particular, his horizontal re-
lations with functional managers and his liaison relations with the scien-
tific community require that this be the case. In addition, he must oversee
the progress of project directors who will generally be scientifically and
technically trained. All these requirements suggest an earlier career and
training in science and/or technology.
However, developmental activities,being high risk ventures,also require
organizational trust. It is unlikely that responsibility for such a venture
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will be given to someone new to the sponsoring organization. Thus, we
would expect the program manager to have been employed by the sponsor-
ing organization for some time.
Socio-political skills, however, are largely associated with adminis-
tration, not with task specialization. On the other hand the style of ad-
ministration of a developmental project is not the style of administration
of an operating line unit. It is much more dependent on collegial and
political processes, as opposed to command processes. Thus we expect
the program manager to have prior administrative experience in develop-
mental administration. This prior administrative experience, together with
prior tenure in the sponsoring organization, will help facilitate the neces-
sary internal organizational contacts.
Scientific and/or technical achievement and education, prior adminis-
trative achievement, and tenure with the sponsoring organization, are also
compatible with the salary and status of the office. When discussing the
mandate and status of the program management unit earlier, we mentioned
that the program manager should have a salary and status equal to key func-
tional unit administrators. It is unlikely that a very young administrator
would be acceptable in such a position from the standpoint of compensa-
tion equity.
This.career stage and background profile is quite compatible with
Mandeville's research which suggests the aerospace program manager had
been with his employing organization for eight years, is forty-four to fifty-
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five years of age, well-educated in science or engineering, and had had
prior experience in research and development (Mandeville, 1969, p. 72).
The Program Coordinator
The program coordinator position is primarily a coordinative staff po-
sition providing a linkage between the project office and the program of-
fice, and between the program office and functional and specialist units in
the organization.
The need for program coordinators reflects three characteristics of the
PM organization described earlier: 1) due to the developmental character
of the PM organization, the need for new channels of communication must
be developed; 2) the norm that the PM organization should contain a mini-
mum of its own permanent personnel; and 3) the need to garner resources
from multiple external sources. All of these features complicate the diffi-
culty of planning, coordination and follow-up for the PM structure necessi-
tating the establishment of a cadre of coordinative personnel we call program
coordinators.
Proposition 14: In the early phases of a new program, dealing with
problem knowledge, and design exploration (prior to
establishment of a project office), the essential
activities of the program coordinator are: 1) recruit-
ing resource people; 2) proposal documentation;
3) support services for committees and task force groups.
These early phases of program planning are described in detail under
Proposition 2.
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The "resource people" for planning in a truncated organization are
simply latent resources. While the program manager may legitimatize the
need for effort surrounding a new program sphere, someone must contact,
provide background information, recruit and coordinate resource people
from client, specialist, functional, and scientific groups, who eventually
become working members of various study groups involved in initial plan-
ning activities. Some of the follow-through and detailed coordination of
recruitment of these participants will inevitably fall to the program co-
ordinator who must take the time to meet with both individuals and interested
groups. It is true that certain key contacts and opening statements at initial
meetings will also involve the program manager. As soon as possible,
however, the activities will be turned over to the program coordinator for
follow-through. The complexity of this coordination of early planning ef-
forts is better understood if we re-emphasize that individuals being
recruited: a) are located in a variety of groups geographically disperse from
the program office; b) initially have only a vague idea of the connection be-
tween their skills and the problem, knowledge or design exploration meet-
ings being undertaken; and c) have many other claims on their time so that
careful follow-through and encouragement are necessary to secure their co-
operation. Since the program office has no command power over these re-
sources, the perceptual saliency of the emerging program activity depends
on interaction with personnel from the program office. Many writers have
underscored the importance of this face-to-face communication in getting
the new program activity underway (Davis, 1965, p. 4; Lynton, 1969).
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The problem, knowledge and design exploration stages of a new pro-
gram sphere are also complicated because the very nature of the develop-
mental activity requires the bringing together of personnel from diverse
backgrounds and multiple specialties. The difficulty of coordinating such
complex groups has been underscored by Hage, Aiken and Massett (1970).
Unless, however, client, functional and specialist groups are penetrated,
innovation is unlikely (Anna, 1970, p^ 15). The most effective program
coordinators, therefore, are those who structure their activities around
resource group personnel (not hardware or task characteristics) in the early
stages of a new program activity (Burns, 1970, p. 144). The essential first
a c t i v i t y in program management is the concentration of effort on devel-
opment of relationships with the key resource groups.
Personnel resources, of course, are not the sole requirement. There
is also the need for financial, facility and equipment resources. A critical
function of the program coordinator is to prepare the documentation which
supports requests from the program office to resource controllers for financial
support. The more effective new program spheres reflect a high percentage
of time spent in gathering information through outside consultation, staff
consultation and literature re search in early exploratory phases in order to
justify financial support (Allen and Andrien, Jr., 1965).
Finally, early exploratory phases of a new program sphere center around
meetings, conferences and seminars. Given the limited time available from
voluntary, or partial released time personnel, telephone contacts, background
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papers, visuals and handouts, agenda and minutes, and summary reports
are normally the responsibility of the program coordinator. Anyone familiar
with developmental task force groups recognizes that these support services
often are a major determinant of a group's success.
Proposition 15: The program coordinator will provide assistance to the
project director in recruiting the project group members.
Proposition 16: Subsequent to the establishment of the project group,
the essential activities of the program coordinator will
be: 1) monitoring the progress of the project; 2) pro-
viding summary reports of the project's progress to the
program manager, client groups and resource controller;
3) coordinating problem-solving meetings to cope with
emergent project difficulties; and 4) assisting in spin-
off or new developments.
The project manager will normally have been part of the early study
group activities. As the "manager, " he will have final say concerning hiring
of any members of the project group. However, the program coordinator, as
the result of his extensive efforts in developmental planning, will have
useful contacts which are normally helpful in recruiting activities.
Once the project group is established, the highly proactive phase of
the program coordinator's efforts has ended. The project manager will have
line responsibility for seeing that the goals or objectives of the project are
achieved. However, some monitoring of progress and review of reports is
necessary and the routine information flow moves through the program co-
ordinator.
In addition, given the developmental nature of the project, snags,
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unanticipated difficulties, delays, etc. are likely occurrences. The pro-
gram coordinator should be in close touch with the project director so that
these occurrences are known in the program office, and necessary contacts
with clients, resource controllers, and policy groups can be initiated to
structure problem-solving meetings to deal with the emergent problems.
As the project draws to a close, the implications for either extended,
new, or spin-off efforts will once again bring the program coordinator into
a proactive phase preparing for either the finalization or renovation of the
project activity.
Proposition 17: A critical judgmental feature of the program coordinator's
monitoring of the project is to see that the execution of
the project does not seriously deviate from the original
objectives and design specifications of the study group.
It is very easy for the project group, which soon achieves quasi-
autonomy from the program office, to begin to move away from the design or
goal specifications of the original study group. One important function of
the program coordinator, therefore, is to keep the project group "honest" in
the sense of not violating the intent of the original project mandate.
Proposition 18: During the quasi-autonomous project stage of a program
activity, the program coordinator will often be assigned
to new or additional planning activities.
Since the essential proactive stages of the program coordinator's in-
volvement are at the initiation and spin-off stages of projects, there is often
sufficient slack in the intermediate phases of a project dominated by the
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project director to allow the program coordinator to undertake other activi-
ties. The extent to which this is possible will largely depend on the docu-
mentation requirements, the interdependency of projects, and the amount of
reference group involvement with project progress, and the number of prob-
lems associated with the project. Since the program coordinator will be
largely responsible for keeping clients, resource controllers, and policy-
makers informed of project progress, the more intensive these information
demands are the less the probability that the program coordinator will be
able to undertake additional developmental duties. In like manner, the more
bugs or difficulties plague a project, the more the program coordinator will
be involved in structuring problem-solving conferences with key reference
group personnel.
Proposition 19: The skills of the program coordinator will reflect 1) an
adequate technical background, and 2) a high interpersonal
orientation.
The essential requirement of the program coordinator position is that
the individual playing the role must find his enjoyment in getting people to-
gether to work things through, and have skills in group processes. In the
early study group stage of program planning, the group is the vehicle for ac-
tivity, and a pleasant and enthusiastic personality is required to recruit
group members. We would expect program coordinators, therefore, to have
a high social-emotional loading. In several studies, effective coordinators
were found to pay more attention to others and to their feelings; try harder to
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establish friendly relationships in meetings; and take on more assignments
that offer opportunities for interaction (Lawrence and Lorsch, p. 50; Bass,
1970). They also possessed interpersonal skills that fostered a sense of
team accomplishment and commitment, and improved task performance
•
among project participants by relaying constructive information and imme-
diate feedback (Zajanc, 1961).
At the same time, the people with whom the program coordinator is
working will have strong technical backgrounds. Therefore, engineering,
scientific or technical competence is necessary for successful integration
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967, p. 147). Functional and specialist personnel
will otherwise feel the coordinator is lacking in competence. Further,
some similarity in technical training will help assure that the norms of the
program coordinator are not significantly different from the norms of the
specialists he is seeking to integrate (Burns, 1970, p. 147). What is re-
quired is not a technical expert, but a facilitator who is technically literate.
Proposition 20: The status of the program coordinator will be intermediate
so as not to threaten or compete with the program manager,
the project manager, or senior staff or functional special-
ists.
The role that we have described above is the role of a facilitator, or
process leader—not that of a focal person. As such, the expectation is that
one or several status clues will reinforce this facilitative character of the
role and eliminate any dysfunctional competition for status or power be-
tween the program coordinator and other key personnel. We would expect
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that program coordinators would earn less than the project manager, top
functional or specialist personnel, and of course, less than the program
manager. We would expect them either to be relatively young (thus seen
as administrative interns) or relatively senior (but not distinguished) mem-
bers of the organization. In social service organizations, we would expect
the individuals involved to see their role as "staff" rather than "line. "
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Chapter 4
A PERSPECTIVE ON THE PROJECT OFFICE
Proposition 7 in Chapter 3 stated that the technical administration of
a project would be housed in the office of the project manager. Normally
we would expect the project office to come into being at that point when
the preliminary problem, knowledge and design explorations of a study
task-force (under the aegis of a program coordinator) have been reviewed and
approved, and funding for further development authorized. Obviously, the
development of a complex project cannot forever remain the obligation of a
task-force group. Rather, an action unit with personnel assigned to carry
out the development must eventually emerge.
The project group is the action unit responsible for continuation of de-
tailed design planning, prototype development and testing, and spin-off.
The organization and control of this planning and implementation effort is
the responsibility of the project manager (Davis, 1962; Cleland, 1964).
Inasmuch as the above sequence implies that the project manager is
responsible for "action implementation" (Mandeville, 1969, P. 89), there
are parallels between the project manager and the functional manager. The
essential difference, however, is the temporary nature of the project group,
and the developmental nature of the project mission. Both imply a style of
management less command-oriented than in the case of the functional
group, and with higher degrees of uncertainty and instability. Not only
does the developmental task require more trouble-shooting and problem-
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solving, but the personnel themselves are functional and specialist per-
sonnel on temporary assignment to the project and therefore are less sub-
ject to traditional rewards and sanctions.
Proposition 21: In the early project stages the project manager's
major responsibilities are: 1) recruitment of the
project team; 2) coordination of detailed planning;
and 3) finalization of a proposal containing budgetary
and time bench marks, consistent with the level of
funding authorized earlier.
Implicit in the above proposition is the notion that most developmental
projects do not move from preliminary planning to implementation, but rather
from preliminary planning to detailed planning in preparation for implemen-
tation. Further, the key personnel who will be responsible for implemen-
tation will want to share in the operationalization of the action plan.
The first step, of course, is to put the project team together. Although
the program coordinator may have suggestions for individuals who might
serve on the project team, final selection and interviewing are the respon-
sibility of the program manager who will have to "live with" the members of
the project group and will therefore have to have confidence in their techni-
cal ability. Obtaining personnel is not simply a matter of requisitioning
people. Since the personnel being sought are presently assigned to func-
tional or specialist units, the process involves considerable negotiation,
juxtaposing the manpower requirements of the project with manpower require-
ments by functional and specialist units. These negotiations are often
carefully monitored and reviewed at the policy level.
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Once together, detailed operational plans will have to be developed
for each phase or aspect of the project. During this period of activities
the role of the project manager is much like that of senior investigator in
a research organization.
Finally, the final operational plans will have to be incorporated into
a document reviewed by various policy groups. The plan will contain the
design specifications, budgetary requirements, manpower requirements,
facilities needs, together with phased timing for critical stages of develop-
ment testing, implementation, and spin-off.
Proposition 22: Once operational plans are stabilized, the critical
functions of the project manager are: 1) coordination;
2) problem-solving; and 3) reporting and documentation.
With respect to coordination, the project manager is the focal point
of all project activities (Mandeville, 1969, p. 12). This opportunity to
influence the flow of information and to have superior knowledge of the
project is, of course, a source of power. However, it is also a heavy
burden since this is the final point of review for all drafts of reports, state-
ments and technical documents with respect to the project (ibid., p. 93).
In addition, he must frequently serve as a prime liaison person along with
the program coordinator interfacing with the program manager, for policy levels
of the organization, client groups, and scientific groups with respect to
the progress, success and significance of the project (Cleland, 1967).
Because of the developmental character of a project, many unpredicted
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difficulties will occur as efforts proceed toward final implementation and
spin-off. The project manager is the focal person in these problem-solving
meetings wherein technical solutions must be weighed together with time,
cost, resource and human constraint factors (Davis, 1965, p. 4; Mande-
ville, 1969, p. 10). Although he can and must involve related members
of staff in these decisions, the bulk of the responsibility for budget,
technical, resource and scheduling decision will fall on the shoulders of
the project manager. Davis, 1962, refers to this fact, as do Ramo, 1965
(p. 4), and Mandeville, 1969 (p. 10).
Further, in temporary project units with unstable membership, group
members report more need for leadership from the project manager because
of the limited time for clear-cut group structure to emerge (Fine, 1970).
Proposition 23: The requisite skills of the project manager are, in order
of importance: 1) socio-technical leader skills,
2) administrative skills, and 3) political boundary skills.
Sgcio-technical Leadership—The project manager is in an intermediate
power position as leader of the project group. First, the project team is
multidisciplinary. While the project manager must be comfortable with the
various disciplines he is seeking to integrate, he cannot pretend that he is
the team1 s expert in any one discipline (Hammerton, 1970, p. 55). Further,
as the number of technical experts increases, thereby increasing structural
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diversification, there is an inherent strain toward decentralization of the
power structure (Hage, 1965, p. 18). Second, since the functional and
specialist personnel are only temporarily assigned to the project, normally
control over rewards or promotion remains with their "back home" unit,
limiting the reward power of the project manager. In fact, the ability to
coordinate personnel over whom he has but limited direct control, is a
distinguishing characteristic of the project manager (Cleland, 1964, p. 84;
Hodgetts, 1968, p. 211). Third, because of the developmental character
of the work of the project group, a participative colleague relationship is
significant for problem-solving success (Davis, 1965, p. 20). All of
these factors result in the project manager emphasizing norms and skills
that facilitate collaboration and problem-solving as a -style of administra-
tion (Buchanan, 1967, p. 64).
One should not infer from this, however, that project managers are re-
active leaders. Quite to the contrary, the temporary and amorphic charac-
ter of the project group requires that effective project leaders be aggressive,
confident, and verbally fluent (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967, p. 150; Fisher,
1970). The manner in which proactive behavior is coupled with collegiality
is by means of problem-centered leadership.
The proactive function of the project manager is to keep the "eye of
the group" firmly focused on the project task, and make sure that problems
and difficulties are confronted rather than smoothed over. This may even
involve some forcing behavior to see that issues are addressed and not
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avoided (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1970, p. 12; Burns and Stalker, 1961,
pp. 87-89; Lynton, 1969, p. 410). The role of the project manager is to
see that effective problem-solving meetings are held at the functional level
of competence. In providing this problem-centered mode of leadership, the
project manager provides for mobilization of efforts to accomplish the project
mission and eliminate roadblocks, while at the same time incorporates the
ideas of others in the project; thereby rewarding contributors to the prob-
lem-solving with a feeling of greater satisfaction, a sense of accomplish-
ment, and an involvement in the emerging project (Bass, 1970).
Administration—There remains, nonetheless, the need for certain types
of administrative controls, particularly those emphasizing budgetary, per-
formance and time bench marks. This implies that the project manager
should be balanced between managerial functions and technical problem-
solving concerns. There is some evidence in the literature that the greater
the project director's expertise and interest in technical details, the greater
the risk he will overly involve himself in the technical details of the project
and fail to provide the professional judgement required for decisions related
to managerial coordination, particularly with respect to a) phased planning,
and b) control systems (Burns, 1970, p. 171; Blau and Scott, 1962, p. 185;
Wileman and Cicero, 1970, p. 277). The balance between technical involve-
ment, and the less rewarding but nonetheless necessary aspects of adminis-
trative coordination and control,is a constant problem of project management.
To a certain extent, we would expect the project manager to delegate
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some features of routine budget monitoring, progress reporting and docu-
mentation to an administrative aide, and practice administrative interven-
tion by exception. However, the need for control and intervention where
budgets, quality standards, or time schedules are slipping is inevitably
part of the project manager1 s role.
Political Interfacing with External Boundaries
The very early stages of the project office, particularly during the re-
cruitment and formation of the project group, require that the project manager
spend considerable time with functional and specialist administrators. In
these resource negotiation sessions, however, the project manager will
be assisted by the program coordinator and, where necessary, the program
manager. As the project proceeds, the project manager will more and more
direct his attention downward to the project group and its efforts to achieve
the project mission (Davis, 1969, p. 29). As a result, while the project
manager will often be present at meetings with outward and upward inter-
faces, much of the burden of these relationships will be taken on by the
program coordinator, as already described. Since the matrix structure of
PM sets up conditions to facilitate purposeful and continuing conflict be-
tween program and functional units, attention to these relations must never-
theless remain a part of the project manager's role (Cleland and King,
1968, p. 165).
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Proposition 24: Project managers will have relatively high status reflect-
ing high technical/scientific expertise, administrative
authority, and organizational seniority.
We would expect the profile of the program manager and the project
director to be quite similar. Both will have had extensive scientific/
technical training, have been members of the organization for some period
of time, will have had prior developmental administration experience, and
will be balanced between cosmopolitan-organizational orientations
(Mandeville, 1969; Davis, 1965, p. 19).
However, there are some specific differences. While the program
manager is likely to be a more permanent position, the project manager
may well occupy a position which is phased out at the end of the project.
This implies that some project managers in riskier project spheres will have
a very solid scientific/technical home base in either a functional or spe-
cialist unit. Thus, we would expect the project manager to be highly
committed to the project, but less committed to the program. Further, the
essential activity spheres of the program and project managers differ. The
program manager is oriented upward and outward; the project manager is
oriented downward toward his project group. The program manager may ap-
pear more political, and the project manager more scientific/technical in
terms of value or norm structures. The greater degree of direct scientific/
technical involvement of the project manager reflects the implementational
character of the project level of the PM organization.
Finally, the risks at the two levels are different. For the project manager
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the principal risks are: a) at the project level, failure of the project to
achieve its technical mission; and b) at the personal level, scientific/
professional obsolescence due to heavy involvement in coordination and ad-
ministration and absence from the functional or specialist unit. For the pro-
gram manager, the principal risks are: a) at the program level the demise of
the centrality of the program activities reflected in budgetary reallocations,
and b) at the personal level, a reduction of power centrality in the political
administrative system.
Thus, while looking at career profiles may indicate considerable simi-
larity between the two managerial positions, the world of the project man-
ager and program manager are quite distinct.
Project Participants
Proposition 25: The essential feature of the project participant position
is its temporary character.
The entire thrust of our earlier propositions is that the project group is
not a permanent "group, " but rather a fluid set of working teams, each team
focusing on a particular aspect of the project, and each team cycled into
existence and out of existence as specified subphases of the project are
completed.
Except for a few individuals assigned as staff to the project manager's
office on a quasi-permanent basis for the length of the entire project, the
remaining project participants are functional or specialist personnel assigned
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to a problem-solving team with a specific short-run technical problem to
solve, design to develop, or prototype to implement, test and evaluate
(Buchanan, 1967, p. 62). (Project participants involved in implementation,
testing and evaluation probably have the greatest identification with the
project since they are highly associated with the success of the prototype.)
The contribution of the project participant, then, is a focused
instrumental contribution at a specific phase of design, project development,
or implementation. As a result, the project participant's long-run allegiance
will be to his home functional or specialist group, and his basic organiza-
tional identification is away from the project. This creates a number of
unique personnel difficulties with which the project manager in collaboration
with the program office must deal.
Proposition 26: Project participants report a number of career risks asso-
ciated with participation in a project, all of which relate
to the temporary nature of the project organization.
Although there are persuasive justifications for the adoption of project
organizations, relief from human problems is not one of them (Reeser, 1969).
The literature on project organization lists a number of career difficulties
which project participants face as a result of ephemeral nature of the
project assignment. These difficulties can be briefly summarized as follows:
1. Fear of Obsolescence—Individuals assigned for relatively long
periods to project groups find themselves removed from developments in
their functional field or area of specialization. Therefore, project partici-
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pants on long assignments report fears that they will become obsolete if
they stay in the project organization too long (Reeser, 1969, p. 466).
2. Fear of Inadequate Rewards—Since the long-run career and reward
structure for the participant is in his back-home functional or specialist
group, project participants fear that their contribution to the project may
not be reflected in future rewards once they return home. Since the project
is often askew from the priorities of the back-home career base, the con-
tribution which is invaluable to the project may be seen as a mundane sci-
entific, engineering or production accomplishment to the home group.
3. Uncertainty about Future Assignments—Project participants have
several fears concerning future assignments. First, they fear the possi-
bility that their "spot" may be filled by someone else in their absence from
the back unit. Second, they fear a make-work assignment of frustrating
duration between project phase-out and re-entry to their functional or spe-
cialist unit, or to another project group. Third, they fear the risk of joining
a proposal team negotiating for a new project, since there is always the
possibility of becoming attached to an unsuccessful proposal.
In essence, the exact situation at phase-out of their project team and
re-entry into their functional or specialist unit or lateral movement into a
new project is often seen as uncertain at best.
4. Project participants holding joint assignments both in their back-
home unit and in the project face a different problem. While this multiple
career base may provide some insurance that their back-home position is
69
not jeopardized, it also creates considerable ambiguities of another sort,
and role overload. Individuals assigned part-time to projects are forced to
have a divided loyalty to their functional or specialist group and the project
group. Further, both groups try to seduce the participant to give greater
attention to their needs, resulting in role overload (Reeser, 1969, p. 462).
As a result of the above difficulties, the more successful project or-
ganizations are careful that the above issues are surfaced before participa-
tion in the project group, and satisfactory solutions are negotiated between
the project, program, functional and specialist managers prior to project
participation. Indeed, effective project management identifies and assigns
the next position of the project participant prior to his involvement in the
project, if possible, and avoids "make-work" assignments after project
phase-out (Avats, 1969, p. 82).
Proposition 27: The essential inducement for participation in a project is
the opportunity for association with an exciting, develop-
mental endeavor.
The above difficulties concerning career risks might seem to imply that
it is difficult to recruit individuals to participate in project endeavors. In
fact, they are mentioned first because in the excitement of project develop-
ment recruitment proceeds vary rapidly, and often easily, and the above dif-
ficulties may surface only toward the end of project involvement. That is to
say, the career risks tend to be perceived only after involvement in the
project is near to its completion. The important thing is for the project
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manager to anticipate some of the difficulties which will emerge at a later
point in time, rather than try to sort out the difficulties when it is too late
to negotiate creative solutions.
What, then, are the inducements for participation in a project? To
begin with, the project itself is normally a source of excitment if early pro-
gram planning has been carefully conducted. The problem, knowledge, and
solution explorations will have achieved high visibility for the project, and
the organizational mandate and supporting resources will indicate the cen-
trality of the project in terms of broader organizational and inter-institutional
values. As a result, considerable prestige often accrues to the project and
to personnel associated with it.
However, the individual participant is normally interested in a specific
technical or select aspect of the project. For the senior specialist or func-
tional expert, project participation is often the opportunity to test advanced
models or skills. For junior specialists, the project offers the opportunity
for his support in advanced work and collegial interaction with a prestigeful
set of colleagues. For everyone, the developmental character of the project
normally provides greater flexibility and opportunity for experimentation than
might be found in the back-home unit. Many participants see the project as
a means to test ideas which are not funded in their own unit.
Finally, the project often is able to put together pooled funding which
makes it possible to develop prototype programs of greater sophistication
than would be possible within the back-home unit.
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Thus, recruitment of project participants normally proceeds with rea-
sonable smoothness (provided adequate career safeguards are built in to
avoid the risks specified under Proposition 26).
Proposition 28: The essential payoffs making the difficulties of utiliza-
tion of temporary personnel worthwhile are: 1) oppor-
tunities to obtain the most competent personnel; 2) utiliza-
tion of personnel at appropriate points of time; and
3) avoidance of resource redundance.
In concluding the discussion of project participants we should mention
three benefits of temporary assignments for the project organization. First,
making use of temporary personnel allows the project to obtain the most
competent functional and specialist personnel (Anna, 1970, p. 15; Reudi
and Lawrence, 1970, p. 63). In many cases, these individuals would not
be willing to leave their functional or specialist units on a permanent basis,
but are willing and able to do a short "tour of duty" with a project group.
Second, by cycling in personnel at different stages of project develop-
ment, individuals are involved at points where their skills are most relevant.
This avoids the unwieldly organization form which tries to hold all types of
competence simultaneously since "sometime we will need someone with that
skill. " Such organizations underutilize individuals whose timely interven-
tions are only intermittent.
Finally, temporary personnel assignments allow the project group to
make use of skilled personnel in functional and specialist groups without
creating resource redundance.
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Chapter 5
THE METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE PROGRAM OFFICE
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize our observations of the
Meteorological Satellite (abbrev. Met Set) Program Office at NASA Head-
quarters. The overall question to which the chapter directs itself is: Does
the Met Set Program Office function in accordance with our theoretical over-
view presented in Chapters 1 through 4?
The Organization of the Program Office
Figure 3 presents an organization chart of the Space Science and Ap-
plications Office of NASA. The Met Set Program is a portion of the Earth
Observations Programs Office. It includes the Experimental Satellite Pro-
gram (Nimbus): the Operational Meteorology Satellite Program, the Meteor-
ology and Sounding Rockets Program, and the Global Atmospheric Research
Program.
Our interviews of program personnel included the Deputy Director of
the Earth Observations Program, M. Tepper; and the program managers of
each of the four program areas listed above: B. Schart, M. Garbacz, N.
Durocher, and W. Spreen. In addition, for overview purposes, we will
quote from interviews with J. Clark, director, Goddard Space Flight Center;
and the Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications, J.
i 11Naugle.
The actual interview schedule is contained as Appendix I.
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Obviously, given the limited number of individuals interviewed, our
observations will have to be clinical and impressionistic, rather than sta-
tistical. Nonetheless, a sense of the organization, its method of opera-
tion, and its spirit were clearly communicated in the interviews. Our hope
is to share this experience in abbreviated form with the reader.
Our first sense of the difference between the various positions in the
program office was formed when studying the reactions to the question:
"What is the overall mission of your organization?"
Both the Associate Administrator, John E. Naugle, and the Deputy
Director of the Earth Observations Program, M. Tepper (the senior program
personnel), responded to this question in a very generic fashion.
In a low-keyed factual fashion, the associate administrator replied:
There are three goals. First, to conduct research in meteorology
to develop new instrumentation and techniques so that ultimately
we can provide a model or theory of the dynamics of the atmosphere.
Second, to support the work of ESSA by developing the prototypes
for operational satellites, and to procure, launch, and check out
these operational satellites. Third, a related objective is to ful-
fill the needs of GARP (Global Atmospheric Research Program).
The NASA titles are not directly parallel to our theoretical outline.
The translation would seem to be as follows: The Associate Administrator,
John E. Naugle, would roughly be equivalent to program vice-president in
Figure 2, Chapter 2. The Deputy Director of Earth Observations Programs,
Mr. Tepper, would roughly be equivalent to program manager of the Met Set
Program. The program managers of the four programs would be equivalent
to program coordinators in our theoretical perspective. For the remainder of
this chapter we will use our theoretical titles rather than NASA titles for
clarity for the reader not familiar with NASA positional structures.
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In like manner, Dr. Tepper responded in terms of global mission ob-
jectives. In the terminology of our theory chapter, Dr. Tepper who is
deputy director of the Earth Observations Program serves as the program
manager for the entire Meteorological Satellite Program.
Dr. Tepper responded:
We are a research and development organization. In the broadest
language, our mission is to develop and apply space technology
for applications to meteorological problems.
Further, both of these respondents talked about the strengths and weak-
\
nesses of the Met Set Program relative to overall scientific goals. For ex-
ample, Dr. Tepper said:
We have two weaknesses. One, our own scientific resources within
NASA are limited. By contrast, our technological resources are tre-
mendous. In terms of instrumentation and engineering systems, we
can conduct tests with high reliability and confidence. However,
scientific people who understand the scientific requirements behind
the instruments are relatively limited within NASA. The scientific
personnel we do have are excellent but there is little depth in this
area. Second, we do not have an in-house feedback mechanism for
data analysis. When we do experiments there is the need for data
analysis and,feedback in order to conduct further experimentation.
We do not have this data analysis capability in terms of scientific
results so as to produce a new generation of instruments. At the
present time, even the depository of data that we have is under-
utilized. Under our present agency mandate it is not likely that this
situation will change. It would require the establishment of a center
which might be called a Center for the Research and Analysis of Satellite
Data. This would require probably fifty senior scientists and fifty
visiting scientists willing to invest their careers in this area. There
does not seem to be any momentum for this type of development at the
present time.
The critical point of the above quotation is that the associate adminis-
trator and the program manager directed their comments concerning mission
to the overall program and its relationship to broad scientific concerns.
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Indeed, Dr. Tepper's remarks show concern for further scientific develop-
ments building on the present technological capacity.
By contrast, each of the program coordinators in our theoretical
language, restricted his discussions of mission to individual projects. For
example, the program coordinator in charge of the Operational Meteorologi-
cal Satellite Program would respond that:
The mission is to launch, test and check out operational satellites.
The manager of the Experimental Satellite Program indicated:
The mission is research and development in experimental
meteorology.
It was very clear that our division of focus between the program man-
agement level and the program coordinator level did indeed exhibit itself at
NASA. The program manager spoke of the global mission of the program and
of new developments which should build on the present accomplishments.
By contrast, the program coordinators suboptimized and were concerned only
with the mission of their particular subprogram.
There was additional amplification of these separated orientations in
the discussion of resources. The program manager and the Space Science
and Applications administrator were concerned with the relationship of their
programs vis-a-vis the Apollo program. They exhibited sensitivity to Con-
gressional funding and the relative importance of earth observations vis-a-
vis the other NASA activities. By contrast, the program coordinators talked
about the technical issues surrounding their narrower program responsibility.
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Not only were they less generic and societal in allusions to their mission,
but they were also quite technical in terms of resources needed to achieve
their more narrow program objectives.
It should not be inferred that this division of conceptual focus is a
negative feature. Quite to the contrary: both Dr. Tepper and Dr. Naugle
expressed their high reliance on the program coordinators for technical de-
tailed information concerning the individual programs.
I am not inclined to deal with details. I deal only on a review
basis. I do not provide close monitoring of the individual pro-
grams. My policy is to rely on the program (coordinators)
to provide me with detailed and up-to-date information concern-
ing individual projects. (J. Naugle)
Quality program (coordinators) could be considered technical spe-
cialists. Their function is program control and inter-unit coordina-
tion and communication within a particular narrow program area.
They oversee what is going on and they alert myself and other
headquarters personnel to important issues. They are key communi-
cation links in a particular technical program area. The strength of
my staff is the excellence of each of the four program (coordinators)
who function as a close team and who provide me with specific
information when it is needed. (M. Tepper)
In conclusion, there is clearly a division of labor with respect to mis-
sion orientation between the program staff members. While the program
manager is concerned with the total program and its scientific and societal
accomplishments, the individual program coordinator sees his role as pro-
viding up-to-date communication concerning the specific program under
his jurisdiction.
Thus, overall institutional program legitimization, overall planning
and coordination, and overall review of resources is funneled through the
&
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Deputy Director of Earth Observations Programs, M. Tepper (program man-
ager). This is consistent with our theoretical Proposition 9.
An Organizational Mandate
Proposition 4 indicated that the successful program mangement organ-
ization needed a mandate which clarified its relationship to the operational
units or organization.
In the case of the program, the operational organization is NOAA. The
function of NASA is to design, build, launch, and test operational satellites
that are then turned over to NOAA for continued operation.
A clear mandate of the relationship between NOAA and NASA was worked
out and formally agreed upon since 1963. The Secretary of the Department of
Commerce and the deputy administrator of NASA signed the agreement which
also covers the relationship to the Bureau of the Budget.
It was very clear in all the interviews with program personnel that this
was a keystone document around which relationships with the operating agen-
cy (NOAA) were structured. It was also apparent that the agreement was
reached with some considerable difficulty and that all parties felt that it
was important to honor both the letter and the spirit of the agreement now
that the agreement is established. In essence, the agreement makes NASA
the research and development organization and NOAA the operating organ-
ization.
The agreement also provides a formal mechanism for coordinating the
activities between the two agencies:
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The predominant reason that the relationship between NOAA and
NASA works smoothly is because the role of each agency is clear.
Thus, there is no competition between the agencies. The char-
acter of the role of each agency is spelled out in a formal docu-
ment.
The formal agreement also provides a mechanism whereby two
agencies carry out the National Meteorological Satellite System.
This mechanism is the Meteorological Satellite Review Board.
The board meets once a quarter or occasionally more frequently.
The agenda is prepared jointly. The purpose of the board is to
coordinate programs for the coming budget period and to discuss
the relationship of the program to GARP. (J. Naugle. )
There has been a formal agreement since 1963. The Secretary
of the Department of Commerce and the deputy administrator of
NASA have signed this agreement. This clearly indicates that
the Department of Commerce will coordinate meteorological pro-
grams. NASA's role is the design, development, launching, and '
testing of meteorological satellites. (M. Tepper.)
The importance of the agreement can be better understood when one
examines the relative funding of the two agencies. The Meteorological
Satellite Program is a small portion of the total budget of NASA. By con-
trast, the meteorological satellites are a very large portion of the budget of
NOAA. As a consequence, the Department of Commerce (which houses
NOAA), in effect, buys hardware developed and tested by NASA.
While NASA experiences pressures to enlarge the scientific engineer-
ing character of the satellite program, NOAA is concerned with minimizing
the cost of effective operational satellites. The importance of the mandate
is that it provides NOAA with the clear veto role concerning the character
of operational satellites.
The Meteorological Satellite Program Review Board was mentioned by
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everyone as the ongoing mechanism for maintaining the essence of the
agreed upon mandate.
The MSPRB is the main vehicle for coordination. It functions
very well on a regular basis. Each agency reviews the agenda
and has the option to make suggestions for the agenda. Key
individuals in each agency are present. It is a heavily
attended meeting with twenty to thirty people. All program
managers, functional specialists relevant to issues to be dis-
cussed, and scientific personnel with pertinent insight are wel-
come to attend. Each agency reviews all agenda items carefully
and rehearses its presentation. Prior differences are openly
discussed ahead of time. Issues that can be resolved at an
appropriate scientific or technical level are resolved at lower
levels and simply endorsed formally by the board. On other oc-
casions, high administrative involvement is necessary where
the matter is budgetary. The meeting is highly attended because
of the visibility of the two principal agency directors and because
it has become a key mechanism for the exchange of overall pro-
gram information. (M. Tepper)
Proposition 4, dealing with the need for a mandate and a mechanism for
conflict resolution together with a shared budget, seems to describe the
situation which has emerged at NASA. There is a formal agreement between
the agencies, the Meteorological Satellite Program Review Board provides
a mechanism for formal resolution of differences, and both agencies share in
the budgetary development of operational satellites.
Obtaining Resource Support
There are two principal areas of resource support with which the program
office concerns itself (excluding the involvement and liaison with scientific
personnel which will be discussed in a later chapter dealing with project
planning). These two areas are funding from the Bureau of the Budget
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and Congress, and functional and specialist support from Goddard Space
Flight Center.
With respect to relationships to Congress and the Bureau of the Budget,
the very clear allocation of responsibility in this area is that funding is a
program office function. The description of the relationship with Congress
is perhaps best expressed in the words of the program staff themselves:
We have been successful in making our case with the Bureau of the
Budget for three reasons. First, the success of the program itself.
The U. S. now has an operational Meteorological Satellite Program
with great technological proficiency . . . . Second, there is inter-
national enthusiasm for the program. We have worked very closely
with the international meteorological organizations to assure that
the scope of our program is not simply national, but international.
Third, we have established cooperation between the various agen-
cies so that the Bureau of the Budget finds mutual support between
programs. We do not play one agency against another. The
Meteorological Satellite agencies jointly evaluate program pro-
posals. Each fall the full programsof proposals are exchanged
between NOAA and NASA and formal letters commenting on these
programs are also exchanged. Further, because of the close co-
operation at the field level between NASA and NOAA, when examiners
from the Bureau of the Budget visit the program and project levels,
they find a unified picture. (M. Tepper)
The close joint planning and collaboration between NOAA and NASA was
mentioned at all levels in the program office. Clearly, the vehicle of the
MSPRB is an important mechanism which makes it possible for the two
agencies to iron out their difficulties before approaching the Bureau of the
Budget and Congress.
However, it is not simply the legitimatizing mechanism of the MSPRB
which makes relations with the Bureau of the Budget and Congress smooth.
It is very clear that all levels of functional competence are invited into formal
testimony before Congress.
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We believe in having functional specialists and scientific personnel
testify at hearings before the Bureau of the Budget and Congress.
(M. Tepper)
It is not simply in the formal proposal development and testimony
that relationships with Congress are important. Much of our time
is taken up providing information to Congress about particular pro-
grams and giving them information about the relationship between
our program and activities in their district. For example, recently
a Congressman asked me for information concerning a program in
his home state. I spent a considerable amount of time and was able
to obtain information that provided an indication of the relationship
between our activities and his state. It is this type of service to
individual Congressmen that is important in maintaining relation-
ships. (N. Durocher)
That the Met Sat Program has maintained a stable level of funding as
a result of skillful management of relationships with Congress, a very suc-
cessful program, international prestige in the area of internal resources, and
continuous, dynamic programs for the Goddard Space Flight Center
was articulated by all personnel.
In the NASA setup, projects themselves as well as scientific and func-
tional organizational units are located in the Goddard Space Flight Center.
All program staff were concerned about the number of functional and scien-
tific personnel assigned to their individual program. Some representative
quotes follow:
The changes at the Goddard Space Flight Center into a matrix
organization has had some impact on meteorological programs.
They have taken the original group of functional and specialist per-
sonnel assigned to meteorology and merged it with other programs
in order to fuse the talent. By removing personnel, they have detracted
from the singular thrust of the meteorological program (M. Tepper).
One of our problems is that the meteorological satellite program's
signifiance vis-a-vis the other projects is not always recognized.
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In particular, many of our programs suffer in comparison with
glamorous programs such as the Apollo program when it comes to
assignment of personnel resources. (M. Garbacz)
I'm not sure we're adequately funded and supported in terms of
personnel and resources. We haven't done enough to build on the
strengths of the early meteorological prototypes for other types of
operational satellites. The division between the manned space
program and scientific satellites means that oftentimes we do not
receive the manpower resources that we need.
It1 s difficult to get functional support. Of course, every program
and project will cry that it doesn't get enough support. Every
project manager would prefer to have functional specialists assigned
full time to his staff. The next best thing is to have them live with
the project even if they are not assigned to it full time. This is a
classic problem. To a certain extent, the role of the program office
is to help the project group in a struggle to obtain financial
support. (B. Schardt)
The character of the struggle for resources between functional and
specialist groups at Goddard and the program office will become clearer
when, in a later chapter, we deal with the project level. At the present
time, however, these dynamics can be better anticipated by listening to
the director of the Goddard Space Flight Center.
In 1965 the Goddard Space Flight Center was reorganized. The
reorganization was based on the recognition that the center now
had many more projects. This was the end of the maximum growth
period of individual projects which had been permitted to develop
according to the preferences of the project managers. Several
projects, e.g. NIMBUS, had 100% assignments of functional and
specialist personnel to the project. This meant that they could
command in a line sense all the skills they needed.
As funding became tighter and more projects emerged, it was ob-
vious that we could not afford such an arrangement. Projects tied
up functional specialists full time, even though the functional
specialists were under-utilized.
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The result of not assigning personnel full time to projects has
resulted in more realistic early estimates of personnel needs by
the project, an honest commitment of released resources from
functional groups.
This has resulted in the need for firm negotiation and realistic
manpower estimates in planning. Our norm is to sharply fix the
situation by manpower estimates due to the limitations in total
manpower resources at the center.
Without this manpower estimate, the functional and specialist
groups tend to take on more work than they can handle and indi-
vidual projects tend not to ask for what they will really need for
fear the project will seem too expensive.
The program office is not concerned with Goddard as an institu-
tion. It thinks in terms of the Office of Space Science and Ap-
plications Programs.
On the other hand, headquarters cannot adjust manpower unilaterally.
Thus, Goddard, in practice, budgets people and headquarters
budgets dollars. Headquarters tries to persuade us they need more
people in their program on individual projects. We try to persuade
them we need more dollars for manpower resources. Each program
is sure to do a better job with just a little larger manpower pool.
Each of us has a veto. I can indicate we have too much work al-
ready. The program can reply they will take their work to another
center. Thus, we are faced with the need to negotiate honestly.
(J. Clark, director, Goddard Space Flight Center)
A very clear role, therefore, consistent with our earlier theoretical
Proposition 14, is for the program office to actively enter into negotiations
with respect to manpower resources. As M. Tepper stated:
Where necessary, the individual program (coordinator) will make
sure that I and other headquarters' people enter into negotiations
concerning resources when someone at our status level is neces-
sary.
It is obvious that the trade-offs between the basic research activities of
functional and specialist units at Goddard, the amount of resources allocated
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to an individual project, a total set of projects in a program, and between
programs are major concerns at the program office.
\
The program office, therefore, is a focal point in the early phases of
proposal building in terms of obtaining resources both from the Bureau of
the Budget and Congress, and later in obtaining functional and specialist
support for a particular project. The program office will also necessarily
be reinvolvedv if changes in resources are necessary.
The continuous dynamic between the functional and specialist resources
housed in functional groupings at Goddard and the project and program office
is a creative conflict which seeks to avoid manpower or facility redundance
(Theoretical Proposition 3). It is interesting that the inevitability of these
conflicts is dealt with, if not with pleasure, at least with grace. All parties
indicated that the mode of decision-making, where possible, was problem-
solving meetings. Harmful and destructive conflicts are generally avoided.
Where the issue eventually becomes one of resource allocation of priorities,
top administrators are involved in the clarification of these priorities.
Interpersonal and Political Skills of Program Staff
Obviously, the role of the program staff is not simply technical. Earlier
studies have shown that the backgrounds of both program and project person-
nel show a high degree of scientific or technical training. Indeed, Mande-
ville's research shows little difference in the background of project managers
and program managers. In our interview we asked each program manager to
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indicate his background, to specify areas in which he felt additional train-
ing was desirable, and skills he would look for if he were hiring someone
to take his place. In each instance, a balance between scientific engineer-
ing and technical proficiency in a relevant field together with interpersonal
and political skills were mentioned. A sense of the political and inter-
personal skills necessary can be obtained from the interviews.
The program manager had better be a flexible and patient guy. He
has little real authority but great responsibility because he has
to be the middleman in negotiations. It is the program manager
who has to arrive at the total objective and obtain funding by
Congress. He is also the middleman who must bring together the
various user groups, scientists, and experimenters in arriving at
an agreement about the payload.
Obviously, these tasks mean he must operate in a political arena
to sell headquarters, the Bureau of the Budget, Congress, and
technical people in project organizations. His sailing is never
smooth. Dollars are cut by funding sources, objectives are shifted
by technical or political developments, and priorities are changed
at headquarters.
A program manager must know when to give up or go with half a
loaf. Persuasiveness, technical knowledge, personality, ability
to sell—these are his tools. (J. Clark)
Relations between all the groups—Congress, people in the project,
external scientists, liaison committees, the headquarters' resource
controllers, and people at NOAA—take the majority of my time.
Whenever problems arise, the unfavorable aspects of things focus
on me. I'm the individual called and the trouble-shooter who is
supposed to find a mechanism to resolve these differences. (B.
Schardt)
If you were hiring someone to be a program manager, the first pre-
requisite would be an individual who could work well in a situation
of limited structure. You have to be diplomatic. You have to have
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a sense of timing. You have to have a well-rounded technical
background. But most of all, you have to have a balanced per-
spective. (M. Garbacz)
A good program manager has to have a degree of aggressiveness.
He is an individual who has to be comfortable working independently,
knowing when to call for help, when to push things up through the
system, when to bring in someone of higher status in order to
resolve a difficulty that can't be dealt with at the functional level.
There's no magic formula for handling most of these problems. It's
a matter of negotiation and give and take. (N. Durocher)
Not only did all the program staff members articulate interpersonal and
political skills as being important but the character of these skills was
readily apparent to the interviewers themselves. An aura of political and
stylistic emphasis was a characteristic of all the personnel in the program
office. By contrast, the focus on technology and engineering was much
more characteristic of the project staff. All these observations and comments
are consistent with our emphasis on interpersonal skills in the program office
(Theoretical Propositions 12 and 19).
Liaison Activities of the Program Coordinators
Program coordinators are clearly men on the go. In order to be the mid-
dlemen as described above and maintain contact with all the various consti-
tuencies, their life is filled with communication richness. In the early
stages of the project, the program coordinator is concerned with monitoring
meetings dealing with selection of the payload, the funding of the payload,
and early design activities. Once the individual project is funded, his work
does not end since continuous monitoring of the project and reports to
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Congress and the Bureau of the Budget, together with problem-solving
meetings to deal with emerging difficulties, keep him in a position of hyper-
activity.
The life of the program coordinator is one of frequent contact, the
maintenance of proximity to projects by constant visitations and
easy accessibility to people. (M. Tepper)
We operate on the principle of no surprises. Our informal communi-
cation system makes sure that if anything goes wrong,the program
coordinator is immediately contacted and initiates necessary con-
nections between headquarters project and scientific personnel.
In the past, there might have been days before problems were identi-
fied. Now we know about it within the hour. The reason for this
success is that these individuals (program coordinators) spend a
great deal of their time in the field. They define their role as being
close to field people. They have the knowledge of technical argot,
they understand the technical requirements of the field, but they
are also in a situation where they understand fiscal and headquarters
requirements as well. (M. Tepper)
My life is a series of continual meetings. Meetings with headquarters,
in the centers with scientific panels, and steering group activities.
(B. Schardt)
Being a program manager is to be the focal point of all activities
concerning experimental satellites. When the phone rings it can be
a Congressman, a member of the public, a member of the project
group at Goddard, a committee member from headquarters concerned
with some problem with the payload, or a citizen who wants informa-
tion about our program. My job is to have the information that is
necessary ready for each of these parties and to find an appropriate
way to structure meetings for us to get together. (B. Schardt)
Program coordinators clearly work at staying on top of important infor-
mation. They are, so to speak, the vortex through which all information
concerning their project is passed.
An important role articulated by the program coordinators was the role
of protecting the original design specifications of consumers.
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The problems we have between user organizations and the project
level are healthy problems. Projects, after all, are run by strong
people who are very talented. From time to time, there is neces-
sarily conflict which arises out of the short-run job dedication of
the project personnel. Project personnel don't like to compromise
in terms of technical and engineering issues. At times like this,
it's the role of the program coordinator to arrange a meeting to re-
solve issues so that unnecessary costs or unnecessary scientific
excellence is not built into the program.
The essential way for carrying out these activities is to make sure
that destructive conflict does not emerge. My role is to bring all
the important people together, to make sure that communication is
adequate, to make sure that personalities do not become the focus
of attention rather than technical and scientific issues, and to
make sure that all important hierarchical levels are involved early
in the problem solving. (B. Schardt)
One of my major responsibilities in the early stages of a project is
to get my handle on user requirements. It is my responsibility to
formulate some kind of a program which meets these user needs and
to explain this situation to headquarters, the Bureau of the Budget,
and Congress. It is also important that I represent these needs to
the engineers at Goddard who have -a tendency to develop things
more with a research orientation than an operations orientation.
(M. Garbacz)
It is also the program coordinator who becomes a focal person in the
development of new technologies. Each of the program coordinators men-
tioned thoughts for further, technological extrapolations based on the
present thrust of their program.
Finally, it is the program coordinator who provides the day-to-day
information concerning changes in schedules or costs both to headquarters
and to Congress. All of the program coordinators expressed some dismay at
the amount of time taken up by documentation and formal reporting.
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The Status of the Program Coordinator
It is interesting to understand the way in which NASA defines the rela-
tive status of the program coordinator and project director, and the role of
the program coordinator to the program manager and headquarters staff.
With respect to the latter (internal relations at headquarters) there is
indeed intermediate status between the program coordinators and headquarters
personnel and the program manager. It is quite apparent that the program co-
ordinator is expected to be a full participant in any headquarters discus-
sions concerning his program.
My office is a team and the success of my office depends on the
excellent work of each of my program (coordinators). They are
really the experts in their sphere of responsibility and I rely on them
for the detailed information concerning their particular program. Only
when it's important to have someone with higher status or where ad-
ministrative interventions are critical do I intervene. Further, I
intervene in their presence and we solve the problems together.
(M. Tepper)
Program coordinators , however, are defined by NASA as the highest
level staff officer whereas the project director is defined as the highest level
line officer associated with the project. This "line"/"staff" distinction is
really a bit murky, as usual. What is really at work is a division of labor
with the program staff being responsible for mission definition, funding and
information monitoring, and the project staff being concerned with the tech-
nical development, building, and launching activities. In many ways, this
is much more a division of labor than it is a difference in status. It has
not, however, been a division of labor that has always been comfortable.
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It used to be once funding was approved that we had very little
contact with the project people. Indeed, they would often try to
exclude us from developments at the center. It's only been with effort
that we have arrived at the point at which new developments are
communicated to us immediately. (B. Schardt)
One of the mechanisms for dealing with this intermediate status is for
the program coordinator to involve other headquarters personnel in problem-
solving meetings^
I obviously cannot direct a project manager to do anything. I
have to bring in headquarters personnel if there is going to be a
redirection of funding. I have no authority to command and only the
authority to recommend. The way you handle this is to involve
people who do have appropriate authority rather than pretend that you
yourself will be the agent for the resolution of difficulties. (M.
Garbacz)
In the case of one program coordinator, whom we will not identify, this
position of ambiguity caused great problems.
It1 s very difficult to see the effects of your actions. In fact,
you don't really have any real authority. Sometimes I think people
are hostile towards me. I would prefer to be back in the field where
I would have line authority.
The successful program coordinators were people who could move com-
fortably in an arena where they had great responsibility but only limited
authority. The character of this relationship is quite consistent with our
early theoretical propositions concerning the intermediate status of program
office positions. (Theoretical Propositions 8 and 20)
Summary
How can one summarize the character of the program office at NASA
with respect to the Met Sat program? Clearly, the operations of the Met
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Sat Office are consistent with our early theoretical development. The pro-
gram manager is the generic institutional representative for all activities
in the multiple programs under his direction. As a result, his orientation
will be to headquarters and to the broad scientific community.
By contrast, the program coordinators are concerned with their individual
programs. In the early stages, they are the proactive agents for the devel-
opment and funding of a program proposal. Once the proposal is funded
and assigned to a project group at Goddard, they are the key day-to-day
liaison officers concerned with project developments. These developments
involve problem-solving meetings, monitoring of progress, and changes
in schedules and funding. In addition, the program coordinator is concerned
with spin-offs from individual projects for future program activities.
The subtle feature of the program office at NASA is not so much in its
structure, which is quite consistent with the literature and theory in the
field. It is, rather, the spirit of the program office. First, one cannot help
but be impressed with the sense of teamwork that exists both within the
program office,and between the program office, the user agency (NOAA), the
scientific community, and the field project center. In our first interview
with M. Tepper we asked whether there was a philosophyof management that
stood behind the success of the Met Sat Program. He indicated that there
was no particular philosophy nor had anyone articulated the structural rela-
tionships in an orderly fashion. He then went on to say:
The reasons the Met Sat Program works is that we're all devoted
to making it work.
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At the time this particular comment seemed gratuitous. By the end of the
interviewing, the sense of what was meant by that comment became clear.
In earlier stages in the evolution of relationships between project offices
and program offices, user agency and the scientific community there has
been a history of considerable stress and strain. Everyone alluded to prior
times when communications were guarded, when individuals did not cooper-
ate, when information was withheld, and when unfortunate surprises between
groups occurred. As the Met Sat Program evolved, the high cost of under-
communication became apparent to everyone. The sense of, "We make it
work, " is portrayed in the day-to-day relationships between all the con-
stituencies by a conscious effort to maximize everyone's information about
present developments. The first and pervasive norm then of the program
system at NASA is one of involvement of all parties in all issues. The in-
formal maxim is "A principle of no surprises. " To a very great extent, the
burden of maintaining this communication richness falls on the program co-
ordinator. He facilitates communication intensity by hard work, constant
phone calls, and moving out into the field to be close to where activities
are taking place. This requires long hours, a mature individual who is will-
ing to invite himself in, and a great deal of sensitivity.
The second success of the Met Sat Office seems to be related to the
division of labor between the technical people at the project level and the
liaison people at the program level. Very clearly, one speaks to Congress
in a way one does not speak to fellow scientists. The program coordinators
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and the program managers are, indeed, individuals who can speak the mul-
tiple languages of diverse reference groups in garnering resources for the
Met Sat Program.
Finally, a key element of success in the Met Sat Program is the norm
of problem-centered meetings. One reads a great deal about "problem
centeredness" in discussions of creative problem-solving. NASA is an ex-
ample of problem-centered communication. Over and over, people indicated
that tensions between the various units in the Met Sat Program were
meliorated by many informal problem-solving groups, and more formal
liaison groups such as the MSPRB. All of these meetings provide vehicles
for honest confrontation of problems as early as possible. In one sense,
the physical technology of NASA makes the problem centeredness easier
than is probably true of program management in social agencies. Nonethe-
less, personality differences could easily intervene and become destructive.
It is by great dedication to the broader social purposes of the Meteorolgical
Satellite Program, and by a sense of teamwork and good will between the
various offices that petty personality variables are relegated to at least a
position that does not seem to be central in the management of disputation
within the Met Sat Program.
In this sense, communication intensity, careful monitoring by the pro-
gram coordinators, a multiplicity of problem-solving group situations, and
a dedication to an objective task all contribute to "Making this program
work. " Thus, the statement by M. Tepper was not simply a gratuity.
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Finally, the amount of effort required to maintain these communication
links could easily be underestimated if one focused simply on technology.
The work of the program coordinators is to provide the communication value
between headquarters, the project office, and the user agency. Thus, the
program coordinator1 s position is a vital link in achieving the connections
between the various reference groups that are part of the Meteorological
Satellite Program. The importance of this link, we feel, has been under-
estimated by other researchers such as Mandeville who came to the con-
clusion that there was considerable duplication between project and program
personnel. Our clinical understanding based on our interviews is that the
program office and the project office are clear and distinct separable divi-
sions of labor and that this division of labor is one of the strengths of the
NASA system.
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Chapter 6
THE PROJECT OFFICE
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the characteristics of the
project teams as it is found in the Meteorological Satellite Program. We
shall discuss the composition of the project team with particular attention
to the project manager's role, the interfaces experienced by the project with
other parts of the organization, and the characteristics of a project as it is
defined in the satellite program. We shall also describe common bases of
power and then describe the subtle balances which exist between project
groups and technical groups at Goddard and in other matrix organizations.
Finally, we shall describe the changes which have taken place in project
management matrix organization structure in recent years at Goddard.
NASA Project Team
A project team may be constructed in a number of alternative ways.
First, it may be simply a loose and informal group primarily housed in func-
tional departments which is coordinated by a project manager functioning as
an assistant to a line executive. Secondly, it may be a temporary task
force directed by a project manager serving as a staff support person for
functional members. Finally, it may be a group of technical and support
people assigned for all or part of the project development under the direc-
tion of a project manager who has line authority over the team's direction.
This latter case is to be found in the Meteorological Satellite Program at
Goddard.
97
Figure 4 illustrates the various members who may be assigned to the
project team. In general, one will find the following types of personnel:
a. The project manager
b. Staff support personnel
c. Liaison personnel
d. Subsystem managers
e. Research and development personnel.
In Figure 4, arrows directed toward the project manager line signify
assignment to the project by some outside administrative or technical depart-
ment. An arrow is directed to the team member, indicating that the project
manager himself makes this assignment. As illustrated, subsystem managers
and personal staff of the project manager are generally assigned by his judg-
ment and request. Most other administrative and staff support people are
assigned to the project with the project manager exercising approval or
veto power.
(a) The Project Manager—The project manager is the highest line offi-
cial dealing with the project. He is nominated by the appropriate assistant
director at Goddard and that nomination must be approved by the director
himself. The responsibility of the project manager is described in the project
manager's handbook (Goddard, 1968) as follows:
The project manager is responsible for assuring the performance
of all functions necessary for management of the project. In
particular, he is responsible for project-wide planning and evalua-
tion, systems engineering and design, systems integration, tests,
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reliability and quality assurance, scheduling, budgetary and
financial planning, technical monitoring of contracts, and project
reporting. The project manager has full authority to carry out these
functions subject to limitations established by the director of GSFC.
The project manager coordinates project requirements with other
activities of the Center.
As suggested earlier in this report, the project manager's major con-
cerns are development of the project team, coordination of detailed planning,
and finalization of a proposal containing budgetary and time bench marks con-
sistent with the level of funding indicated by the program office. In the
words of Dr. Clark, "The project manager is concerned with the day-to-
day life of the project, with its contracting, its cost control, and its
scheduling. "
The project manager probably performs a wider variety of skills than
that normally found in middle or lower management in a bureaucratic hier-
archy. His role clearly violates the classical prescription that responsi-
bility should equal authority. He becomes the focal point for feedback loops
from subsystems and staff activities, taking corrective action where neces-
sary. He is the social facilitator of people from a wide variety of techni-
cal or administrative backgrounds. The relative importance of this latter
activity is suggested by an interviewee who indicated that the technical
problems are not particularly serious in projects but that the human prob-
lems are of major concern.
The project manager also provides some technical leadership though
this appears to be nominal. As other descriptions of project management
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indicate, a technical background seems to be a basis of legitimization in
the eyes of project team members rather than a necessary prerequisite for
project success. The project manager is responsible for maintaining time
and cost milestones during the project life cycle. He is relatively inde-
pendent in the implementation of the project, being unable to pass on
responsibility to someone higher in the hierarchy as is the case in the
bureaucratic structure. Finally, the project manager is engaged in bound-
ary negotiation both within the matrix structure at Goddard and outside the
structure with various contracting agencies.
Personal evaluation of the project manager as the ongoing project ad-
ministrator is minimal. He is evaluated much less by style than would be
the case in a bureaucratic structure and much more on the basis of accom-
plishment—accomplishment both in terms of operating within constraints
and according to milestones within the project cycle and, particularly, ac-
complishment in terms of meeting the well-defined goal to which the project
addresses itself. For example, asked how his work is evaluated, one project
manager responded, "I am judged according to whether the launch is suc-
cessful or not. "
(b) Staff Support Personnel—The staff support group for a project in-
cludes administrative and management support such as the procurement of-
ficer and project schedule personnel, scientific staff support such as the
tracking scientists, and engineering support such as quality or reliability
engineering. These people may serve a number of projects and serve to
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integrate the individual project under consideration into the larger systems
at Goddard. The authority base for these personnel, therefore, lies outside
the project itself.
(c) Liaison Personnel—In addition to individuals assigned to the
project for liaison purposes from other agencies, the project may have an
assistant project manager and a project coordinator who operate at the dis-
cretion of the project manager but who frequently serve in a liaison role
within units of the project and with offices outside the project.
(d) Subsystem Managers—Subsystem managers are managers of sub-
projects and represent the second level of line authority below the project
manager, supervising technical and functional personnel associated with
the project. For example, the spacecraft systems manager or experiment
systems manager will direct activities of technical staff members and will
be assigned to those positions at the recommendation of the project manager.
(e) The Functional and Technical Personnej.—People from specialist de-
partments (functional or technical) in Goddard are assigned on a full- or
part-time basis to the project. The kind and degree of association depends
upon the project phase as well as policy of the center. Some personnel
may be assigned to the project on a full-time basis. In other cases, the
project manager negotiates with a functional department for their services.
Where attempts to obtain services from technical departments are frustrated
or where such services are not available, the project manager may hire
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project team members from outside the center or may contract out to other
institutions.
The degree to which project personnel are involved in the project prob-
ably depends upon several factors. One is the attention to the project by
top management. Given extreme interest and minimal budgetary constraints,
project personnel can be as signed on a full-time basis to be available as
needed. Another factor is economy. As suggested in the first chapter of
this report, it is much more economical to schedule against available man-
hours in a functional department than it is to assign project members on a
need basis to the project itself. Thus, budgetary constraints are probably
paramount in determining the relative extent to which personnel are more
or less part of the project team. Another factor affecting degree of involve-
ment is the extent to which the project manager himself can develop interest
on the part of personnel in the project and its goals. Finally, personal
interest of project members in the nature of the project or its personnel will
be important. As indicated earlier, the individual participant in a project
is normally interested in a specific technical or specialized aspect of the
problem; thus, projects are probably characterized more by the degree of
stress and involvement of participants rather than by the particular satis-
faction with participation. We shall return to this issue of involvement
later in this chapter.
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Interfaces with the Project
Upon viewing the extent to which the project management interfaces
with other agencies, one discovers how much the project manager must rely
upon personal skills rather than utilizing organizational power and authority.
He is guided and constrained by the program office from which he gets
project proposals and approval documents, budgets, experimental con-
straints, and other controls. He must report administratively to the man-
agement of his center and look to it for reasonable allocation of personnel
to his project. He must depend upon client agencies such as NOAA for
money and statements of need. He must interface with scientific adminis-
trative and engineering groups for their approval and support. He must
deal with contract agencies outside of his center and, finally, he must
negotiate with managers of technical'departments and skill groups within
the center to obtain personnel and to accomplish certain work objectives.
Little wonder, then, that the project manager is described by Dr. Clark
as "someone who must be flexible and patient; an individual with little
authority and much responsibility, and as someone who must be relatively
untroubled by, though responsive, to the demands of his various interface
groups. "
Project Definition
The project with which a team must deal may be characterized accord-
ing to certain criteria. First of all, it has a definite objective such as
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placing a satellite containing specified instrumentation in a specified orbit
at a particular date within certain budgetary constraints. Secondly, a
project generally has a time priority: that is, the emphasis on a project is
more that of time than it is of money. Where, on the other hand, money
constraints are predominant and time is less important, it may be scheduled
through the normal channels of an organization. Thirdly, a project is gen-
erally supported strongly by one or more interest groups. This may be top
management within the organization or the program office itself, but it will
frequently be an external power group such as Congress, the Administration,
or some organized segment of the population. Fourth, the project is gener-
ally characterized by cumulative expenses over time. Thus, the longer the
project moves into its time cycle the greater the investment and the greater
the cost of failure. Fifth, a project is generally characterized by its
interdependence among several organizational units or several distinct
disciplines. Finally, a project is often characterized by its difference from
prior experience within the organization. That is, the project experience
is often unique in the history of the organization.
Since a project builds momentum both in terms of expenditure and
interest of personnel, certain problems are characteristic of project man-
agement. First of all, the necessity for control and minimizing the danger
of spending money on a failing project requires that projects be divided in-
to stages. These are described elsewhere in this report. On the other
hand, by developing stages one finds an increase in paperwork and a de-
crease in the momentum leading to high morale.
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A second problem endemic to project management is that of getting
and keeping teams. As suggested earlier, project participants generally
join because of their interest in the task, yet they risk professional obso-
lescence or inadequate rewards if they do not remain active local partici-
pants in their technical departments. Administrators, too, are reluctant to
assign personnel on a full-time basis to projects when there is a possibility
that such people will not be fully utilized.
Another problem faced by the project manager is that of dealing with
contractors. Where the project can perform necessary work with its own
staff, it can save a great deal of time and insure performance according to
schedule needs. Where work must be contracted out, there is the necessity
of negotiation, the requirement of paperwork, and the need to assure that
requirements will be met. Finally, conflicts between project participants
are to be expected since project members are present from diverse disci-
plines and with varying degrees of involvement. Specialists from different
disciplines all have different expertise, jargon, philosophies, and behaviors
and must work through these differences if a cohesive group is to be
developed.
Power, Conflict, and Balance in Project Management
A major issue of project management and the relationship between the
project and other units is understood more readily if we first identify the
bases of power, authority and influence. As the terms are used here, power
means the maximum ability of a person or group to bring about change in
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another individual or group. Influence refers to the actual degree of
change induced by a person or group with power. Authority refers to legiti-
mate power; that is, power which is generally acceptable to members of an
organization and which is within the values and purposes of the institution.
Both theoretical (Simon, 1957; French and Raven, 1959; Bierstedt, 1950)
and empirical (Filley and Grimes, 1967) attempts have been made to identify
the bases for sources of power and organization. The following are frequently
mentioned or identified:
a. Responsibility, i.e. the particular functions or types of decisions
to be performed or made by a designated individual or group.
b. Authority, i. e. the legitimate area of discretion exercised by an
individual or group in issuing directions and expecting compliance.
c. Control of resources, i.e. the ability to control information, money,
or personnel, or other resources needed by one or more organization
members.
d. Expertise, i. e. possession of superior technical knowledge which
is valued by one or more organization members.
e. Control of rewards and sanctions, i. e. the ability to provide or con-
trol the provision of values desired or avoided by organization mem-
bers.
f. Association, i. e. power derived from being near and interacting
with another legitimate high-power source, e. g. a personal staff
assistant.
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g. Rapport or personal appeal, i. e. the personal liking of one or
more organization members for another individual or group.
All of these bases of power may be observed in any organization. In
a stable structure, the more formal bases of power such as responsibility
and authority tend to be well defined. Role conflict is minimized by hav-
ing each organization member report to one superior and by minimizing am-
biguity of task expectations. In the stable environment levels of authority,
channels and job definitions tend to be quite explicit. The only conflict
endemic to such structures seems to be between line and staff employees.
Line employees have legitimate authority, but staff employees lacking
much formal authority have power derived from control of needed resources
and expertise. Also, staff units are often closer to formal centers of
power and derive influence through association with legitimate power sources.
In the matrix structure, the situation is somewhat changed, however.
Typically the environment is unstable, and innovation by the organization
is valued highly. Greater tolerance for ambiguity is required by members
of the organization. As pointed out earlier in this report, matrix organiza-
tion requires dual authority. Since members of technical departments as-
signed to projects are influenced formally by the heads of their technical
units and by project managers, matrix organizations also minimize distinc-
tions between line and staff employees reducing that source of conflict.
In the matrix structure, when specialized (functional or technical)
departments rely heavily for resources upon the project groups, then the
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power of the project balances the power of the technical units. That is,
where most people in a technical unit are assigned to projects and where
the technical unit therefore gains its income and legitimization through
project work, then the resources gained through the project assignments
balance the power through expertise coming from the technical units.
Where, on the other hand, the technical groups are funded sufficiently on
their own, then they might be expected to serve project groups less
attentively.
A shift in this regard has apparently taken place in the Meteorological
Satellite Program at Goddard. According to Dr. Clark, at one time most
members of technical or functional departments were assigned to project
work. Now 20% of members of technical departments are on a project, and
80% simply work for their functional unit. This shift might be expected to
take place as economy takes priority over time schedules for project activi-
ties. Judging by interview data, the project managers are less able to
bring in permanent members for the project and must rely more heavily upon
negotiations with technical groups to obtain a service. That service is
performed within the technical group rather than on a man-assignment basis
to the project.
The coping mechanism of the project manager given this imbalance of
power then becomes one of hiring project team members from outside Goddard
or contracting outside of NASA. The latter strategy gives the project manager
power (money) to control performance according to his needs.
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The extent to which functional units uncontrolled by project client
needs reinforce professional interest may also be illustrated here. One
project manager described an incident in which he approached a technical
unit in Goddard requesting a piece of equipment to be used on a series of
satellites. The technical unit replied that they would be willing to make
a single prototype since such an item had never been built before and rep-
resented a technical challenge. However, the department was reluctant to
make the item in multiple units since such activity was merely a production
job. Frustrated, the project manager turned to a supplier outside of Goddard
for his equipment.
It would appear that another attempt to balance the power of projects
with respect to technical units has occurred organizationally in Goddard
by having a director of projects as a legitimate (responsibility and author-
ity) scource of power equal to the power of the directors of functional units.
The extent to which this has been operational is questionable, since
program personnel never mention the director of projects when they describe
the process by which project requirements were balanced with technical
unit requirements.
It would seem that the emphasis in the Goddard Space Center and in its
matrix organization has shifted to strong support for the technical or func-
tional departments. As explained in Chapter 1, the result may be an in-
crease in economy of operation but will be done at a cost of involvement in
projects and emphasis upon meeting tight schedules for client needs.
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Chapter 7
PROCESSES FOR COORDINATION AND CONTROL
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the various processes for
coordination and control which are to be found in the Meteorological Satel-
lite Program and in NASA's relations with clients and other agencies. In
clarifying these mechanisms it is possible to indicate values and dysfunc-
tions associated with each and to suggest their appropriate applications.
Within the past decade a number of studies (Burns and Stalker, 1961;
Woodward, 1965; Hall, 1962; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) have indicated
that where the organizational environment is stable and predictable, the
traditional mechanistic or military model of organization is most appropriate.
On the other hand, where the environment is characterized as having rapid
changes in products and technologies, then flexible structures with less
emphasis on channels, levels, and formal job definitions, and more em-
phasis on problem-solving teams should be used.
In a recent paper, Galbraith (1969) has suggested that the degree of
information processing is a useful proxy for variability and that the amount
of information to be processed is a function of (a) uncertainty concerning
task requirements, (b) the number of decision-making elements (depart-
ments, occupations, products, clients) involved, and (c) the amount of
connectedness or interdependence among these decision-making elements.
Thus, if the task can be preplanned and if actual execution required little
or no adjustment based on new information, the structure will be more
mechanistic.
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Further, if decision-making elements are independent and not inter-
connected, then information processing is relatively less and the structure
will be simple and stable. The interdependence may vary in kind as well
as degree. Some tasks may require element groups to draw from a common
pool of money, personnel, or other resources. Some element groups will be
related in a sequential task basis, with goods or information moving pre-
dictably from one element group to another. Finally, some tasks require
an interactive and reciprocal relationship between element groups. It ap-
pears likely that as one moves through these three types he finds a decrease
in mechanized relationships and an increase in informal group-oriented re-
lationships.
We can explain much about structure, then, if we can determine the
extent to which various element groups need to relate to each other and the
way in which they do relate. The need to relate as has been suggested may
be procedural or personal. Where groups draw from a common pool, then
their relationship may be competitive for those resources until mechanisms
are established to allocate resources according to some procedural mechan-
isms. For example, as Blake and Mouton have pointed out, if the parties
do not see agreement as possible and yet must work together, then for im-
portant issues they will engage in win-lose battles and for less important
issues they will resort to arbitration of the dispute by a third party. Minor
issues under such conditions are resolved by leaving the resolution to the
whims of fate.
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On the other hand, where disagreement is present but the parties be-
lieve that agreement is possible, they will rely upon problem -solving con-
ferences if the issues are important and will use compromise strategies
where the issues are less important. Where the issues are unimportant
then they are smoothed over and ignored.
Sequential tasks require agreement on the sequence, that is a division
of the labor and the ordering of that division. Interactive tasks generally
involve decision-making or problem-solving. Again, if the parties must
deal with each other yet do not feel that agreement is possible, they must
resort to power plays or arbitration. If they do feel that agreement is pos-
sible, they will rely upon problem-solving conferences to find mutually
agreeable solutions or compromise to find a reasonably acceptable solution.
In any interactive situation between element groups there will also be
a tendency to routinize the relationship. That is, to leave things in ques-
tion, or to leave issues ambiguous is to encourage stress and confusion.
So the parties will establish policies and procedures which make the issues
themselves predictable and manageable,or policies and procedures which
make predictable the way in which issues will be dealt with in the future.
Finally, where element groups disagree and have neither the expecta-
tion of agreement nor the mechanisms for resolving their disagreement, and
where the element groups can operate separately, then they may be expected
to withdraw from further interaction with each other.
To summarize, in discussing mechanisms for coordination and dealing
113
with real or potential disagreement, we shall identify three strategies.
The first, formalizing, is an attempt to routinize the content of relation-
ships. The second, interacting, is an attempt to routinize the process of
relationships. The third, isolating, is the separation of the parties, issues,
and activities.
Where the parties do not believe that agreement is possible but must
deal with each other, we would expect them to rely upon power conflicts
or arbitration for resolution; where the parties do believe that agreement is
possible we would expect them to rely upon problem-solving meetings and
compromise. Where agreement is seen as impossible and one or both
parties can withdraw, we would expect to find isolation of element groups.
Coordination Mechanisms in the Program
Role conflict and role ambiguity have similar effects in individuals and
groups: felt pressure, anxiety, confusion. Not surprising, then, that the
Meteorological Satellite Program evidences what might be called the
doctrine of no surprises. Whether it is NASA-NOAA relationships or pro-
tc »gram-project relationships, one observes a pattern of checking things out in-
formally before any document is tendered. For example, if a NASA repre-
sentative sends a request for action to the Weather Bureau, a personal con-
tact is likely to be made prior to sending it, inquiring whether such a re-
quest would be viewed favorably and making sure that the intent is clear.
If the informal contact is cleared to the satisfaction of the sender and the
receiver, then the formal document will be sent.
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It is useful to speculate about the reasons for this "doctrine of no
surprises" since it may well be endemic to matrix organizations or situa-
tions in which two element groups are relatively autonomous from each
other. First, it seems to suggest an equality of power on the part of the
parties. Where one is clearly subordinate to the other, the superordinate
may more easily assume acceptance of its directives without question.
Secondly, it demonstrates the intent of communication, both in terms of
substantive material sent, and in terms of desire for mutual respect and
openness. Third, it is concommitant with the degree of information pro-
cessing required in organizations with changing environments. That is,
such organizations have been shown to have more people employed in inte-
grating capacities (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Finally, it probably re-
flects a maturing of relationships in terms of conflict-resolution strategies.
The parties apparently feel that agreement is possible and desirable, rely-
ing more upon problem-solving than upon power plays or arbitration.
The latter point is clearly consistent with our observations of con-
flict resolution strategies. At the program and the project level, we were
interested in determining the extent to which program participants utilized
resolution by (a) appeals to higher authority, (b) bargaining and negotia-
tion, (c) mediation by outsiders, (d) problem-solving meetings, and
(e) smoothing over real differences. Clearly, the greatest use is made of
problem-solving meetings and, secondarily, of bargaining and compromise.
Other methods are used infrequently, if at all. Given the history of conflict
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among element groups in the satellite program, the strategies now used
suggest a desire and ability to reach agreement.
The doctrine of "no surprises" is to be found in the various mechanisms
of coordination, to which we now turn.
Formalizing
If one differentiates task units in organizations, one can identify four
principle types: the routine unit, the engineered unit, the craft unit, and
the heuristic (or diagnostic) unit. The first two are highly formalized, re-
quiring control by the system and a group of planners to develop the system.
In the routine task unit, operations are highly specific and repetitive. In
the engineered task unit, operations are also specific but are repeated as
required. Routines are established indicating that if one does the job, it
must be done as prescribed.
The craft and heuristic task groups, on the other hand, are person-
controlled rather than system-controlled. A goal is specified and the mem-
bers of the unit use their skills to meet process and task requirements.
In the usual bureaucratic structure, one finds task units ordered roughly
from routine to heuristic as one moves upward in the administrative struc-
ture. One may also find these types if one moves across the organization
structure as with repetitive task groups and staff or planning groups. The
hierarchical ordering appears to be present in the NOAA structure since it
is operational in nature but is not to be found in the matrix structure of the
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Figure 5
Source and Type of Control by Task Unit
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Code: AS — Control from Administrative System outside task unit.
TU— Control from Task Unit itself.
MS program or its constituent units. At the project level, it is difficult to
routinize activities because they are seldom recycled and at the program
level the issues change frequently.
The primary difference seems to be a sense of closure at the project
level that is absent at the program level. For example, one individual in
the program level commented on the sources of dissatisfaction in the pro-
gram level: "I like working in the field better. One never finishes at head-
quarters. You can't see the results. There isn't enough time to dig into
anything. " On the other hand, at the project level project managers com-
mented about the peak of morale at a successful launching followed by a
decline for a period after that.
The usual formalizing methods, then, are altered in the matrix organize-
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tion to be found here. We shall discuss three of these: hierarchy, rules
and plans, and division of labor.
(a) Hierarchy—The usual notion of hierarchy is that routine work is
programmed at lower levels leaving higher levels to deal with exceptions
to routines, with balances of organization resources, and with long-range
issues. To a great extent the hierarchy represents a ranking of legitimate
power in the structure, legitimate power being the authority to exercise
direction and to expect minimally defined performance.
If one takes the distinction between the program and the project office
as two gross levels in the hierarchy, one should be able to distinguish dif-
ferences expected and found in other organizations. Yet, this proves not to
be the case. Differences depend much more upon expertise, personality,
and a division of activities than upon authority. In fact, the program office
defines its role as staff, which implies a lack of formal authority and resort
to cooptation and persuasion as means of fulfilling expectations.
While this difference is common to matrix structures, it does seem to be
exaggerated in NASA. Perhaps it grows from the tradition of the earlier Na-
tional Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA) which was a loose amalgam
of research centers with minimal control at the top. The role of headquarters
had been to insulate the research centers from intrusion by outsiders, to co-
ordinate activities, and to obtain money. Technical responsibility was
vested in the Goddard Space Flight Center itself.
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(b) Division of Labor—For cohesion to take place between groups or
individuals there must either be a homogeneity of values, personalities,
work, and roles, or there must be a mutual need by the parties or groups,
i. e. each must depend upon the other for resources that it does not have
itself. The latter is clearly the case in the MS program. For example,
comparing program managers and project managers, Mandeville (1969, p.
84, 86, 93, 94) found the most important activities for program managers,
which were not shared with project managerSjto be outside and buffering in
their orientation: communication (e.g. "handle inquiries made personally
by members of Congress or their staff"), budgeting (e. g. "prepare an an-
nual budget"), and review (e.g. "analyze effectiveness of operation").
Similarly, judged as most time consuming were reporting (e. g. "submit regu-
lar progress reports to higher management or to the customer"), budgeting,
and review.
In contrast, the project managers were inside- and operations-oriented:
supervising (e.g. "review decisions that are made by subordinates"),
expediting (e.g. "expedite completion of critical project tasks"), and
gathering pertinent technical information (e. g. "keep informed about the
latest research and development relevant to project activities"). Judged as
most time-consuming project managers described trouble-shooting, super-
vision, project review, and reporting to higher levels.
Thus, unlike a conventional hierarchy, the division of labor in a matrix
organization in the levels supplants an authority structure, and this division
C
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seems to be functional as long as the levels are equally dependent upon
each other.
The cohesion of element groups based upon division of labor rather than
upon homogeneity of values and programs may also be seen in the relation-
ship between NASA and the Weather Bureau. As suggested earlier, for such
arrangements to work effectively there must be a belief that the units can
cooperate and resolve differences, and there must be a balance of power
between the units. Where units do not believe that agreement is possible
and where power is not balanced, one would expect the units to engage in
win-lose disputes or resort to arbitration. The hierarchical arbitration
mechanism is not possible in the case of NASA and the Weather Bureau be-
cause they are separate agencies, leaving the costly mechanism of dispute.
The exact nature of the relationship and the various historical disputes
need not concern us here, yet it is of value to note that the exact resolution
of a division of labor was at issue from I960 when the Panel on Operational
Meteorological Satellites was convened, through the Congressional program
and budget hearings of 1961, through the 1962 NASA-Weather Bureau Agree-
ment on the division of labor, and, finally, the 1964 interagency agreement.
Both now appear to be equal partners with research and development work
done in NASA and operational work done in the Weather Bureau. The letter's
small size and relative political isolation is offset by its program funding,
its control of communication through pooling user needs expressed by other
agencies, and its demonstrated ability to withdraw support from NASA's ac-
tivities.
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(c) Rules and Procedures. The third method for formalizing relation-
ships between units is to specify rules and procedures. Such mechanisms
reduce or eliminate the need for communication or problem-solving and
provide for coordinated activities throughout an organization. Once es-
tablished, however, they make the system closed upon itself and enhance
the danger of not adapting to the external environment. Rules become stand-
ing orders and by their very existence suggest that they will be repeated.
Thus, they insure reliability of behavior but detract from the validity of
the system as soon as conditions change.
The advantage of rules and procedures for insuring reliability (and,
therefore, economy) in a system is also offset by its effects on the extent
to which people identify with organization goals. When projects are well-
funded, with extensive staff, and with an exciting goal which enhanced
participant expectations, then motivation and morale are at a high level.
There is some evidence now that by using project stages defined by strict
procedures and documentation, the momentum and morale of projects has
been reduced. In effect, procedures have depersonalized what was a
highly personal group achievement.
As expected, we do not find the weather satellite system to be charac-
terized primarily in terms of rules or procedures. Instead, problem-solving
and task groups deal with issues as unique. The primary rule behavior
seems to surround planning, budgeting, project proposals, and purchasing.
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Interacting
As indicated earlier, interacting mechanisms formalize the process of
relationships rather than their content. While hierarchy, division of labor,
and rules are to be found as mechanisms for coordination and control, they
are much less useful in matrix or project organizations. Rather than being
enforced more rigidly and extensively as one moves down the organiza-
tional hierarchy—a characteristic of a bureaucratic structure—these formal-
izing mechanisms are distributed throughout the program and project level.
The nonhierarchical emphasis in the MS program, as is the case in
other matrix structures, places much stress on integrating mechanisms, the
principal ones being (a) coordinating committees, (b) liaison personnel, and
(c) representatives in residence.
(a) Coordinating Committees—While coordinating committees will oc-
casionally function as sources of negotiation, arbitration, or compromise,
their primary responsibility is to act as a legitimate and known source of
approval for agreements. It is here that the doctrine of no surprises func-
tions most effectively. Following an informal exchange of information and
opinion and an informal agreement, representatives make a formal presenta-
tion of request in the coordinating committee followed by a predictable formal
acceptance.
The most important coordinating committee in the MS program is the
Meteorological Satellite Program Review Board. The MSPRB was established
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in a 1964 agreement between the Weather Bureau and NASA. The agree-
ment stated:
A Meteorological Satellite Program Review Board is hereby established.
The Board is composed of two members each from NASA and Doc - WB
with the Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications
of NASA and the Chief of the Weather Bureau serving as co-chairmen.
The Board will meet quarterly or at the request of either co-chairman
to review the program and consider any substantive issues which may
arise. It may make recommendations to the DOC - WB on the resolu-
tion of issues concerning the operational programs, and to NASA
concerning the responsiveness of the NASA R&D program to the needs
of NOMSS. Either chairman may refer any issue to the Associate Ad-
ministrator of NASA and to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Science and Technology for resolution.
The structuring of the committee is of more than passing interest.
Where two bodies, groups, or organizations differ in size or power, nego-
tiations between the two may be somewhat equalized by having the same
representation on coordinating committees. Were voting to occur in a com-
bined membership of both organizations, one would always win.
The equality of relations in MSPRB is stressed by (a) equal representa-
tion, (b) rotating chairmen, and (c) opportunity to appeal to superiors in
either system. The latter provides for a system of appeal which prevents
buffering of information by committee representatives.
The MSPRB is much used and quite effective. It meets every six weeks
to deal with an agenda which is agreed upon in advance. It is heavily at-
tended, generally having twenty to thirty people present, apparently because
of the presence of two principals —Dr. Naugle and Dr. White. According
to Mr. Tepper, its main functions are "legitimation" of agreements and ex-
change of information.
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(b) Liaison personnel—A second interacting device is the use of liaison
personnel. Other writers (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Galbraith, 1969)
have pointed out that where the environment is unstable, adaptation and
innovation are valued, and the needs for information processing are great,
one expects to find integrators or integrating departments in the system. If
the system attempts to maintain responsiveness without integrators, it must
do so (a) through formal executive positions at a high level in the system,
or (b) through delegated responsibility at lower levels.
Where executives attempt to do their own liaison work at top levels,
they do so at a cost of regular task demands. Since the degree of routinized
activities is greater in a matrix structure than it is in a bureaucratic hier-
archy, the absence of liaison personnel at that level would be more costly
in the former system than in the bureaucratic system. On the other hand,
to push liaison activities to lower levels in the system is to increase the
likelihood of suboptimization. Each project and each technical department
has the interests of its own project or specialty in mind, making a circum-
spect view of the entire system less likely.
The ideal arrangement, then, is for the program office to have liaison
or integrating personnel whose primary function is that of acting at the
interface between organizational units to:
—pool task requirements from multiple sources
—initiate and receive communication on a daily basis with other units
—insure adherence to time and money constraints
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—insure adherence to program constraints
—maintain a neutral party position at organizational interfaces.
Both the Weather Bureau and the MS program at NASA have such a
liaison position. Interviews with the members of these two positions and
with others about these two positions suggest their activities. First, they
receive direction from many people. That is, they transmit or convey in-
formation from and to a variety of sources within and outside the program
office, e.g. the liaison person in NASA receives direct supervision from
five people. Second, as expected, they are process rather than content
specialists. Both liaison people had some technical background, but both
expressed a major interest in system accomplishment rather than technical
accomplishment. Both saw organizational accomplishment and problem
solving as major sources of personal job satisfaction, vis-a-vis money
rewards, use of technical skills, or friendships.
Third, liaison personnel engage heavily in pooling program requirements
from constituent groups and incorporating requirements in detailed plans.
For example, the NOAA liaison person mentioned responsiveness to needs
of nine different units within and outside of the Weather Bureau. These re-
quirements were included into a five-year plan. At NASA, while a five-year
plan is followed, detailed time and money planning is on a one-year basis.
Fourth, liaison personnel seem to evidence skills of problem-solving
and conflict resolution. As such, they are seen as neutral parties who de-
termine how to meet the needs of constituent groups rather than as protag-
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onists for a single position of their own program office. They also engage
in selling or persuasion to get constituent groups to cooperate:
The goal of my position is to get a handle on the program, then to
sell my management on the various needs. I help my management
get the support of Bureau of the Budget and from Congress. Then,
I sell the people who will implement the program, making sure that
they meet user requirements. (Garbasch)
Finally, most of the time of liaison personnel is spent on short-term
tasks. Much like assistant-to positions in conventional organizations,
the liaison person engages in a variety of nonrecurring short-term tasks
rather than on project work or in tasks which would require work segments
of more than two hours to perform.
Before leaving the discussionbf liaison personnel, it should be em-
phasized that such roles are a function of the type of organization structure
employed, not merely a function of organization size.
(c) Representatives in Residence—The third interaction mechanism to
be seen in the MS program is temporary or permanent exchange of personnel.
Since the matrix structure of the MS program cannot rely upon formal author-
ity through channels for its operation, greater emphasis is placed upon
personal interaction and problem-solving. Interaction is facilitated between
two parties when each sees the other as "someone I can talk to" and "some-
one who understands my problems. "
One finds occasions where permanent transfers of personnel from one
unit to another makes interaction easier and reduces the likelihood of sub-
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optimization. For example, Dr. Clark, director of the Goddard Space
Flight Center, went to Goddard from NASA Headquarters. Thus, he has the
perspective of both the program office and the project office. As will be
pointed out elsewhere in this report, this perspective seems to balance
requirements of the program and the project groups, while not pleasing
projects themselves. His interest in program economy is quite consistent
with the earlier discussion of values in the functional structure, though it
does affect the freedom of project offices.
Other examples of permanent movement may be seen in Dr. Tepper's
experience in the Weather Bureau for thirteen years before joining the MS
program or in Dr. Townsend's activities as deputy director in NOAA after
being a division head in NASA. Such experience might be expected to fa-
cilitate communication between NASA and NOAA and to increase headquarters'
understanding communication between the two agencies.
A related strategy for improving coordination is the temporary assign-
ment of personnel from one unit to another. For example, NOAA maintains
its own personnel in residence at Goddard. They can insure that opera-
tional requirements are being maintained in project development and serve
as liaison personnel at the project level. While we did not interview rep-
resentatives in residence, we heard frequent reference to military or NOAA
representatives in the project level at NASA. It is likely that they serve to
integrate both technical and personal relations between diverse organization
units.
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The three interacting mechanisms described above may be expected
where the content of relationships cannot be detailed. Instead, parts of
the system are linked by formalized process mechanisms.
Isolation Mechanisms
Coordination within a system cannot always be accomplished by formal-
izing the content of relationships (formalizing strategies) or by formalizing
the process of relationship (interacting strategies). In some cases, ele-
ment groups in a system will simply try to minimize or eliminate coordina-
tion requirements by the withdrawal by one or both element groups or by at-
tempting to make each group autonomous from the other.
We have seen elsewhere in this report how project managers will seek
assignment of full-time technical people to their projects in order to make
themselves autonomous from other projects or departments. For goal-oriented
units to do this is to underutilize personnel and equipment and to increase
the duplication of resources among the units. In much the same way there
is a natural incentive for agencies to make themselves autonomous from
each other where possible, even at a cost of duplication. Thus, even
though NASA is concerned with research and development for the MS pro-
gram, NOAA has its own people concerned with the design and development
of satellites. Similarly, although the scientific input is presumably that of
users outside of NASA, there is such talent within NASA and an expressed
need for more.
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^ Perhaps the most dramatic example of withdrawal occurred in 1963
when NOAA withdrew from the NIMBUS program. It is unlikely that NOAA
could have developed its own satellite, but it is possible that the Depart-
ment of Defense could have developed and orbited a satellite which would
have met NOAA's needs. While the historical details of the dispute need
not concern us here, the situation does demonstrate that when one or both
parties in a relationship see the situation as unfair or unrewarding, they
may withdraw and attempt to sever ties.
Both at the project level and at the interagency level the use of isolat-
ing and withdrawal strategies was most popular at a time when interest and
money were focused on the weather satellite program. With the tightening
of resources, isolation and withdrawal become academic considerations.
Instead, the natural tendency is for an organization to draw toward its
functional structure.
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Chapter 8
THE PLANNING SEQUENCE IN THE METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE PROGRAM
Rationale for Focusing on the Planning Cycle
Thus far we have largely focused on the structural configuration and
program and project roles of NASA's Meteorological Satellite Program.
However, by looking only at the structure and roles of NASA, it is difficult
to understand the dynamics of the organization, in terms of the way plans
or programs evolve and move through the structure. Therefore, in this
chapter the interrelationships within the matrix structure will be illustrated
by examining the process phases of the planning sequence. In particular,
we are interested in the extent to which the planning cycle parallels
Proposition 2 in our theoretical Chapter 2.
An important variable affecting the dynamics of the planning sequence
is the extent to which an organization is an open or closed system. In an
open system conscious attempts are made to integrate various constituen-
cies during each planning phase. In a closed organization system, formal-
ized procedures prescribe a particular reference group as the sole and domi-
nant locus of influence at any phase of the planning sequence.
In the illustration below of the program development process followed
in the Meteorological Satellite Program, the critical feature to note is how
matrix management develops process guidelines at each phase of the
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planning sequence to specify the character of participation of multiple
13
reference groups.
Division of Labor Between Program and Project Staff
There is a significant division of labor in the planning process between
the program office and the project office. The role of the program office
concentrates on relationships with Congress, relationships with client or-
ganizations, and on securing approval of developmental programs within
the NASA headquarters. Final decisions with respect to the selection of
payload on a particular satellite, the level of funding, and the relationship
Material used to describe the NASA planning cycle was obtained from
the following sources. A number of questions in the semistructured inter-
viewing related to the issue of organizational planning. Each NASA admin-
istrator was asked to describe the nature of the planning process, the ef-
fectiveness of the process, the types of problems that were connected to
planning sequences, and the ways in which various groups were involved
in planning. In addition, the planning processes in NASA have been par-
tially formalized by the initiation of specific guidelines dealing with a plan-
ning system called Phased Project Planning (hereafter abbreviated PPP).
PPP has been prescribed as a policy within NASA (NASA Policy Documents
7121. 1A). A detailed description of PPP is available in NASA Handbook
7121. 2, August, 1968, and is available from the Superintendent of Documents.
This guideline handbook describes PPP in greater detail than will be dealt with
in this review of the planning sequence. Finally, an earlier description of
PPP appeared as part of a discussion paper delivered to the Midwest Academy
of Management in 1968 by Carl R. Prattish, entitled: "The Evolution of
Program Management. "
It is, of course, difficult to describe fully the fluid dynamics of plan-
ning within an agency. Although formal guidelines or bench marks such as
PPP are promulgated, in reality phases overlap and processes are not as
clearly defined as PPP might suggest.
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of one project to another within the program, or one program to the other
programs within the space science applications area, are the responsibility
of the program manager. Thus, it is the headquarters program staff that is
responsible for determining the rate of activity within different fields.
By contrast, the role of the project office relates much more to the de-
termination and follow-through with respect to the technical characteristics
of a particular project. It is the project office which is involved in the
selection and monitoring of contractors, provides careful control over cost
and schedule commitments, and must see that the project objectives are
successfully operationalized within time and cost constraints. However,
even given this division of labor, one of the characteristics of the NASA
system is that (1) project staff freely enter into discussions with head-
quarters' personnel, and (2) program coordinators penetrate the activities
of the project group.
Figure 6 presents a flow diagram which illustrates the manner in which
a particular scientific satellite program is sequenced in terms of planning
processes. Although there are differences between the planning process for
operational satellites and that for scientific satellites (the latter being more
complex), and while there are necessary differences between each project
and program, in general the major features of the planning cycle summarized
in Figure 6 were described consistently by both project and program
managers.
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The Initiation of-a Particular Project
Steps 1—3 in Figure 6 indicate (1) that conceptions of new projects
might be initiated from a variety of sources, and (2) that any serious plan-
ning for a future project must be endorsed by headquarters early in the
planning process because of the complexity and high costs of the tech-
nology. For example, the initial mission idea (Step 1 in the flow chart)
may come from any of the following sources: 1) an internal planning group
in the NASA headquarters; 2) a spin-off idea developed by a project team
focused on earlier technology; 3) an idea or developmental area that has
been under discussion by some scientific group—either domestic or inter-
national; 4) a project building on new demands, suggestions, or needs of
user agencies. Typically, once the idea for a new project has been in
circulation, a working paper is developed and the new project idea is re-
viewed by an internal program planning panel (Step 2). There are a variety
of these panels, both within NASA and between NASA and user agencies.
If the internal planning panel recommends a feasibility study be undertaken,
the matter is referred to the program director for his approval (Step 3).
The Initial Feasibility Study
Steps 4, 5 and 6 in Figure 6 relate to the initial feasibility study which
begins with a formal approval document authorized in Step 3 by the program
director. At this point two activities tend to occur simultaneously, or tend
to occur with a considerable degree of overlap. (1) At the program level,
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the program staff begins developing detailed statements concerning the
project objectives (which are outlined for the Office of Space Science and
Applications) with the major thrust of the project reviewed by the Bureau
of the Budget. (2) At the project level, a task force under the guidance of
the program office is formed to do a Phase A study. Phase A is normally
not assigned to an established project team at one of the space flight cen-
ters, such as Goddard. Rather, it is a task force study which will involve:
people from the program staff, selected members from an earlier project
team, scientific and technical staff people from a space flight center, and
representatives of the important potential user groups such as NOAA. In
addition, contact and involvement of external scientific personnel at uni-
versities or research centers is normally a typical part of the Phase A study.
The purpose of the Phase A study is (1) to undertake preliminary analysis
to determine the overall mission characteristics of a project, (2) to explore
research and technology which relates to the potential product, (3) to de-
termine alternative approaches that are technologically feasible for accom-
plishing the objectives of the project, and (4) to determine the exact rela-
tionship of the project to other program missions. As much as possible, the
Phase A task force group communicates with those personnel, both "in house"
and external to NASA, who can lend insight and make contributions to prob-
lem-solving surrounding this general project definition. An important norm
in NASA is that all parties having technical or working knowledge should
have the opportunity to communicate and participate in the evolution of a new
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project. By the time the Phase A study is completed, some understanding
of both the technological characteristics of the potential project, as well
as probable funding implications, will be available for review in Step 6 by
the program director. Results of the Phase A study are then passed on to-
gether with his own recommendations for formal management action by
headquarters in steps 7 and 8.
Headquarters Action and Formal Authorization to Proceed
While the Phase A study should provide clear information with respect
to the technological issues surrounding the study, there is still the respon-
sibility on the part of the headquarters administrator to understand clearly
the relationship of the particular project to other projects within the program
and the generic focus of major program resource allocation within NASA. It
is also true that there may be differences of opinion between NASA and the
user agency. In the Meteorological Satellite Program, of course, the pre-
dominant user agency is NOAA within the Department of Commerce. As has
already been discussed, there exists the Meteorological Satellite Program
Review Board which would be involved in the review of the Phase A study.
If both the NASA headquarters group and the Meteorological Satellite Review
Board endorse the proposal, the project is taken by the program staff to
Congress for review and the determination of specific levels of funding for
the project (step 9).
It is important to note the character of the proposal when it is brought
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to Congress. A number of important preceding legitimatizing steps have
already been undertaken before it reaches Congressional attention. Earlier,
discussions with the Bureau of the Budget were undertaken by members of
the program staff. The Meteorological Satellite Program Review Board pro-
vided a vehicle for arriving at joint interagency understandings, shared
funding and endorsement of the central project objectives by both NASA and
NOAA. The Phase A study provided detailed information with respect to
the technical, engineering and scientific aspects of the proposed project.
All appropriate parties were asked to participate in the Congressional hear-
ings.
If approval is granted by Congress, hard funding will be allocated to
the project. It is at this point when the project is approved and a speci-
fied level of funding determined, that the project is transferred to a specific
project task group at the Goddard Space Flight Center.
Involvement of External Scientific Personnel
Steps 10 through 14 relate the sequences by which external scientific
personnel are invited to become participants in the new project.
After funding is approved by Congress and the project becomes a firm
reality, an "Announcement of Flight Opportunity" is released and sent to
several thousand scientists, engineers, and research centers both in the
United States and internationally. The Announcement for Flight Opportunity
describes the basic character of the forthcoming project and invites scien-
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tists and researchers to prepare proposals for experiments as a means of
becoming involved in the forthcoming scientific satellite.
It is important to notice that such an invitation is built on prior dialogue
with the scientific community. In the early days of the Meteorological Sat-
ellite Program, because of the newness of space technology, scientists did
not immediately respond to invitations for experimentation as a result of
the Announcement of Flight Opportunity. For example, meteorologists were
used to working with archive data, and the potentials for real-time data and
experimentation based on real-time information which was made possible
through space technology was outside the tradition of that particular scien-
tific group. As a result, as indicated by Step 11, dialogue has taken place
prior to Step 10. NASA has conducted seminars with various scientific
groups—physicists, meteorologists, etc. —dealing with major scientific
questions to which space technology can be related. In a sense, this has
been an educational program to acquaint the scientific community with the
potentials of space technology and to make them feel that their participation
in the meteorological satellite program is desired. As a result, the
Announcement for Flight Opportunities now goes to an audience which has
already been introduced to the program and which, hopefully, may have been
considering various types of scientific questions which could be adapted
for experimentation to one of the scientific satellites.
As indicated by Step 12, proposals from individual scientists or groups
of scientists are then received. Often as many as thirty such proposals are
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submitted by scientists external to NASA. These proposals are reviewed
competitively, as indicated in Step 13, by the Science Applications Steer-
ing Committee.
Earlier, NASA had functionally based review groups who received par-
ticular experimental proposals in light of a particular scientific functional
specialty. However, NASA found that a change to a more cosmopolitan
review body results in an appraisal of the experiments without the sub-
optimization and tunnel vision that had been true of the earlier functional
review group. Thus, the Science Applications Steering Committee is pres-
ently a cosmopolitan body made up of scientific members from various dis-
ciplines as well as multiple agency representatives. This committee,
after reviewing the various proposals submitted, passes on recommenda-
tions to NASA Headquarters regarding which experiments should be included
in the experimental satellite project.
/
Phase B Study—Project Definition
Simultaneous with these activities (Steps 10—14), the project task
group at the space flight center will have been engaged in a Phase B study.
This Phase B study (Step 15) integrates the contributions of in-house scien-
tific and technological specialists from NASA,specialists from the user
agency (NOAA), and members of the project group itself. The purpose of
the Phase B study is to refine the preliminary concepts from Phase A by
means of comparative analysis and preliminary design in order to select the
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optimal approach for the prospective forthcoming project. Phase B also
makes use of external private industrial studies which are contracted for,
in competition,by private sector firms. The output of the Phase B study is
a preliminary system design, reliability assessments and quality require-
ments, which serves as the initial basis on which actual contracts will be
let to prime contractors in later phases. As Steps 16 and 17 indicate, the
results of the Phase B study are once again reviewed by the program direc-
tor and passed on to headquarters in the meteorological satellite program
review committee for official action.
Phases C and D follow a comparable sequence, and Figure 7 presents
the details of Phases A, B, C, and D in somewhat greater elaboration.
Interqrqanizational Relationships within Phases
Although Figure 6 deals with planning phases, it is important to realize
that many of the interfaces between NASA and other groups are contained
within a single planning phase. The user group, in each instance, has
representatives who are part of the project team at the space flight center.
Normally three or four members of a project team are NOAA personnel.
Frequent problem-solving meetings of all parties (headquarters, pro-
gram, project, and user agency) are the major mechanism for the resolution
of differences except for those formal issues on which headquarters and
MSPRB approvals are granted. At the working group level, very little dis-
tinction is made between scientists from NOAA, scientists from NASA, and
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external scientists. The issue is the development of the most desirable
method for accomplishing the mission objectives, and this task focus was
described in interviews as the essential element in the relationship between
all groups. Repeatedly scientists and project personnel stated the fact that
jurisdictional and political issues were not the characteristic focus at the
working level and that NOAA scientists and NASA scientists were scientists
first.
However, not all issues can be resolved scientifically or technologic-
ally. Therefore the role of the Meteorological Satellite Review Board is
strategic and crucial in resolving policy or allocational disputes.
Strengths of the Planning Sequence
A number of features of this particular planning sequence outlined in
Figure 7 in our view contribute to the success of the Meteorological Satel-
lite Program. These can be summarized in the following prepositional form.
Proposition I. Division of labor between program and project staff
strengthens the adequacy of both the technological and the budgetary inter-
faces.
It is very clear that communication with the Bureau of the Budget and
with Congress is a very different matter than communication with scientists
and engineers. One of the strengths of this particular planning process is
the opportunity for program personnel to specialize in the more political
interface with Congress and the Bureau of the Budget. Some of the notorious
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weaknesses of scientific and engineering personnel in dealing with legisla-
tive and budgetary bodies in other fields are renowned and do not need
elaboration.
Proposition 2. The focus of program personnel on the basic mission
objectives of the project, on consumer needs, and on the relationship of
the project to the total program helps decision-makers to avoid projects
deviating from mission objectives.
Many planning agencies have experienced the situation where as a
project evolves, scientists or engineers begin to lose track of the original
objectives or mission purpose and begin to "scientize" the project. One of
the roles of the program staff is to ensure that both the objectives of the
user groups, as agreed upon in the Meteorological Satellite Review Board,
and the objectives of the project as it relates to the total set of NASA pro-
grams are honored. At any point in time, a program coordinator may plan a
problem-solving meeting which reviews particular changes as they emerge
technologically against the original objectives of the program and its time
and cost schedules. This monitoring function is extremely important in that
the scientists are tempted to suboptimize in terms of scientific excellence.
For example, engineers will be concerned with engineering efficiency with
little conscious concern for program objective or mission need.
What is not diagrammed in Figure 6 are the weekly meetings between
program and project staff, the daily telephone calls between program and
project staff, the formal monthly reviews, and the very formal yearly review
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at the headquarters level. This sytem of careful monitoring by headquarters
staff of activities at the project level is probably more significant than the
formal paper work support system. What is involved here is a very careful
day-to-day awareness of the evolution of the project so that changes of
technological developments which affect mission objectives, costs, and
schedules are noted and can be dealt with consciously.
Proposition 3. The program planning cycle penetrates and integrates
latent and not easily identified resources in each phase of program develop-
ment. The composition of the project team within the Goddard Space Flight
Center, which includes scientists from the user group, together with the
normal matrix of both external contractors and internal scientific and tech-
nological personnel from Goddard, maximizes the technological insights of
all reference groups.
Earlier we dealt with the strengths of the matrix structure, but these
strengths are latent unless potential relationships become viable within the'x/
actual planning sequence for the project. The planning sequence in Figure 6
ensures that all the various constituencies are involved at different phases
in the evolution of the project. Therefore, the latent strength of the matrix
structure is activated as the planning sequence moves through its various
phases.
Proposition 4. The planning cycle maximizes technological quality of
a project and motivates participation of the external scientific community
in educating scientific reference groups.
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Both nationally and internationally (through GARP—Global Atmospheric
Research Program) NASA has made conscious efforts to relate space tech-
nology to the scientific community. These efforts enhance the technological
quality of the program. In doing so, NASA has not taken a passive role. As
indicated in Step 11, it has initiated various week-long seminars dealing
with selected topics so that the interrelationship of space technology to
scientific questions can be understood more clearly by the scientific com-
munity. In addition, its policy of announcing flight opportunities and in-
viting experimentation operationalizes a conscious policy of NASA that the
meteorological satellite should be an international facility.
In addition, NASA has learned that the review of proposals by single
discipline oriented committee is not as functional as an interdisciplinary
review body. Step 13 suggests NASA values multiple agency and multiple
disciplinary resources as part of the process of reviewing individual pro-
posals.
Proposition 5. Successful program development units use their own
scientific and technological personnel to monitor contractors' performance.
One of NASA's strengths is that it does not simply turn over all respon-
sibilities to a contractor without careful monitoring by its own scientific
and technological personnel.
A frequent criticism of procurement policies of some government agen-
cies is that the procuring agency does not have sufficient technological
confidence to work closely with the contractor. NASA, however, has main-
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tained in-house R&D competence which gives it confidence to perform four
activities: (1) to know what to buy; (2) to know how to specify what they
want to buy; (3) to monitor whether or not the contractor is actually provid-
ing what is originally specified; and (4) to know how to use what they buy.
The Phase B study provides for this evolution in confidence on the part of
the in-house project team so that what occurs in Phases C and D is, indeed,
the purchase of technological instrumentation and resources from the private
sector which is consistent with the mission objectives of NASA.
Difficulties with the Process
The above propositions summarize the critical strengths of the phased
planning process and some of the dynamics of the planning process. How-
ever, there were complaints mentioned in interviewing with respect to the
planning cycle which should be mentioned in closing.
The major complaint was that PPP has been too highly formalized. The
cost of the formalization is predominantly one of time and documentation.
If the cycles were truly discrete and if headquarters performed a formal re-
view of Phase A before Phase B proceeded, and formally reviewed Phase B
before Phase C proceeded, there would be a considerable amount of "down
time" as perceived by the project personnel. Further, the elaborate pro-
curement procedure entails a considerable amount of time when procuring a
contract from the private sector. As a result, project managers feel the de-
gree of rigidity in formal PPP procedures has decreased the speed and
adaptability with which space technology can be applied to new problems.
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The project managers have also complained that the formalization
is "bogging them down in paper work. " In essence, their disenchantment
is not with the philosophy or spirit of PPP; rather with some of the require-
ments for documentation of individual phases of PPP.
It was not possible, based on our interview instruments, to determine
the validity or to detail the reliability of these complaints. On the other
hand, the pervasiveness of the comments made it clear that a planning cycle
that becomes highly rigidified, relatively inflexible, and encrusted with a
great deal of paper work may be self-defeating. The cycle, as we see it,
is one in which provision is made for the movement of various reference
groups into the planning process in an orderly and dynamic way, and there-
fore a process which would facilitate innovation. On the other hand, if
there is a great deal of "down time, " many delays and a great deal of un-
necessary documentation, then the innovative thrust latently present in the
planning cycle can be somewhat stultified.
In the last chapter of our report we will discuss some of the implica-
tions for this particular planning cycle for social system planning.
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Chapter 9
IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER PLANNING ORGANIZATIONS
It seems appropriate at the end of this manuscript which has (1) devel-
oped a theoretical perspective for a planning and development organization,
and (2) presented a detailed case study of one of society's most sophisticated
developmental organizations, to ask what the implications of this study are
for other types of planning endeavors in our society. Urban and regional
planning, health planning, environmental planning, social systems planning—
all these planning endeavors are societally critical. Are there clues in the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration1 s experience with the Met-
eorological Satellite Program that would be helpful to these other planning
endeavors ?
Figure 1 presents a summary of problems cited by Comprehensive
Health Planning and Regional Medical Planning Organizations. Without
being exhaustive, central dilemmas faced by these planning organizations
seem to cluster on the following issues:
1. There is no clear-cut mandate defining the character of the planning
organization and its relationship to existing operating institutions.
2. The character of planning itself is only vaguely understood.
3. The necessary staffing and organization patterns are, at best,
dimly perceived.
*4. The involvement of consumer and professional groups in the plan-
ning endeavor is fraught with difficulty.
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Organizational Mandate
It does seem to us that some of the lessons of the Meteorological
Satellite experience should be applicable to these planning situations. For
example, the character of the organizational mandate for the Met Set pro-
gram as a developmental organization was arrived at between NASA and
the user agencies only with considerable difficulty. At the core of the
present mandate is the notion that effective developmental structures should
avoid creating manpower or facility redundance. Therefore, the program
management structure for the Met Sat program is a truncated organization
which substitutes part-time project resources obtained from functional and
specialist units for self-possessed resources. The matrix of a program and
project structure together with functional and specialist structures empha-
sizes the fact that in planning, development, and testing new technologies,
the predominant mandate of the developmental organization is to work with
and through existing functional, specialist and user groups.
In order to succeed as a truncated organization, the Meteorological
Satellite Program had to clarify its mandate which legitimatized NASA as
the developmental organization in such a manner as not to threaten NOAA
as the operational organization. Further, coordination between the organ-
izations was supported by policy review boards involving administrators at
the highest levels of the involved organizations.
A key difficulty in social, health and regional planning observed by the
authors is that a similar mandate often either does not exist or is not clearly
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understood. Consequently, there is the fear that the planning organiza-
tion will in some way jeopardize or substitute for the existing organiza-
tions presently delivering services. Until these planning organizations are
able to obtain an understanding between themselves as developmental pro-
grams and the operating organizations which provide the type of security
that is presently represented in the agreement between NOAA and NASA, it
is likely that these social planning organizations will experience the same
troubled times that were present in the early days of the Meteorological
Satellite Program.
The Development of Clear Planning Cycles
Much of the misunderstanding between scientific groups, professional
groups, provider organizations, client groups, and planning agencies, how-
ever, relates not simply to the mandate of the planning agency, but also to
the manner in which the agency develops its plans. There still exists in
popular imagery that notion that someone isolated in his private office will
write a plan or, alternatively, that a small inside clique will develop a plan
which will some way jeopardize existing organizations, ignore existing
scientific knowledge, treat the needs of clients and consumers cavalierly,
or create a new organization which displaces present institutions. It is
only the latter point (i. e., the avoidance of a duplicate institution) which
is resolved by a mandate for developmental organization. To the extent
that the developmental organization is seen clearly as a planning, develop-
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ment and testing vehicle rather than a competing agency in the delivery of
services, the fear of displacement is lessened and the potential for collab-
oration is increased. However, the matter of cycling in important consti-
tuencies at critical phases of planning still remains.
In this respect, the phased planning cycle described in the Meteoro-
logical Satellite Case Study offers some important clues regarding pertinent
bench.mark e for a complex developmental planning sequence. One of the
remarkable strengths of the NASA program is the involvement of scientific
groups, technical groups, and user organizations, in the identification of
problems, and development of appropriate solutions. Until similar bench
marks and involvement techniques evolve in social planning, it is unlikely
that much trust will be accorded to planning agencies. This means that
client organizations, scientific groups, professional groups, etc., all must
be able to map critical evolutionary phases in major planning endeavors,
identify appropriate techniques for their involvement at appropriate points
in the process, and be able to identify decision-making structures that allow
them to review major decisions. In this sense, a close scrutiny of the plan-
ning cycle at NASA and at the mechanisms for involvement of multiple
groups at different phases of the planning cycle should be fruitful for social
planners.
The success of the Met Sat program, however, is not simply based on
the predictability of an orderly developmental planning cycle. There is also
a philosophy of communication which stands behind the cycle. The principle
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of no surprises, and the close monitoring of each planning phase by the
user organization means that cooperation and communication is not simply
an intermittent event for purposes of cooptation, but is rather a continuous
process which provides for honest confrontation of significant issues. It
is out of this communication richness that trust emerges and fears begin
to dissipate.
Since technical people involved in the developmental endeavor are
often loathe to take time to maintain this type of critical communication,
the role of the program coordinator staff is especially strategic.
Staffing
The pattern of a program manager who externally represents and inter-
nally coordinates a broad series of technical projects, of senior scientists
who become project managers, and of project personnel who are assigned
on a temporary basis to a particular technical endeavor is not unique to the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. What is unique is the addi-
tion to this matrix of the program management office. The NASA program co-
ordinator (in their language, program manager) is perhaps the strategic glue
in the system. Complicated matrix structures are only held together by
information richness. The project manager, however, is likely to be pri-
marily concerned with technical issues of the project, and may well be less
sensitive to the intraorganizational power dynamics and interorganizational
byplays, to say nothing of relationships with resource controllers. These
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relationships are the central province of the program coordinators. In our
view, no parallel position exists in most social planning organizations.
This facilitating, coordinating, communicating liaison role provided by the
program coordinator is perhaps the critical lubrication in the complex
matrix structure of the Met Sat program. Because the role of program co-
ordinator is a staff role, it is easy to make the mistake of judging that the
role is incidental to the project's success. Quite to the contrary—it seems
to us that in an organizational sense, it is the essence of success holding
together many of the tenuous relationships between headquarters staff,
research groups, the client organizations, and the functional or specialist
groups who must relate with the technical project team. Because the project
director and his team will be essentially concerned with the technical
achievement of the design objectives of a project, liaison and coordination
will probably depend heavily on the program coordinator position. This
underattended and often almost overlooked staff unit is as strategic to the
success of a project as is the technical and administrative capacity of the
project staff. NASA has achieved a synergistic division of attention and
responsibility between program and project levels. Similar situations are not
often found in social planning.
Conclusions
It is our feeling, then, that the meteorological satellite experience
provides an example of critical organizational features which must underline
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large-scale developmental planning. Core features of the NASA design as
exemplified by the meteorological satellite experience included:
1. A truncated program management organization which makes use of
temporary resources from functional and specialist units.
2. A clear mandate which legitimatizes the program management organ-
ization as a vehicle for developmental planning.
3. A creative division of labor and responsibility between the program
and project level, with institutional and managerial services per-
formed in the office of the program manager, and technical admin-
istration as the major responsibility of the office of the project
manager.
4. A proactive communication philosophy on part of the program office
in relating timely information to headquarters staff, resource con-
trollers and client organizations.
5. A style of planning that confronts problems by bringing together all
relevant parties in a problem-solving context.
6. A planning cycle which assumes that client, professional, scien-
tific, technical, and administrative groups are phased into decision-
making at different, predictable, critical times in planning.
Interestingly enough, when we began our interviewing no one could
answer the direct question: "What is the management system in the meteor-
ological satellite program?" The purpose of this manuscript has been to
share our perception of that system, and to put together our understanding
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of developmental program management of the Met Sat program, one of our
society's most unique and successful experiments in complex planning
can be studied by people engaged in social planning endeavors in other
sectors of our society.
It is our hope that this manuscript will provide useful and critical
insights as an appropriate spin-off of a space age adventure in planning.
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Appendix A
QUESTIONNAIRE
100 ORGANIZATIONAL OR UNIT MISSION
101 How would you describe the goal or mission of
Your organization ( )
Your unit ( )
102 Are there any differences of opinion with respect to these goals
or the means to achieve them?
Please summarize your answer to question 102 by circling
a point on the following scale:
Significant Very little
differences opinion
of opinion difference
103 What do you think are the weaknesses of the present program?
Please summarize your answer to question 103 by circling a
point on the following scale:
These are These are
major weaknesses minor weaknesses
104 What changes do you recommend in the program?
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200 RELATIONS WITH OTHER GROUPS
201 What groups does your . ! > have to please in|_umt ( ) J
order to be successful?
A
B
D_
E~
202A Name of Group (refer to 201)_
203A Please summarize your impression of this group's image of your
organization (unit) by circling a point on the following scale:
Image very good Image Relatively Bad
Explain:
204A What is the nature of this group' s relation with your organiza-
tion (unit)?
205A How are relations with this group maintained?
206A What are the recurring issues or differences of opinion between
this group and your organization (unit)?
207A How are these differences resolved?
208A Do you have any suggestions for improving relations with this
group ?
202B Name of Group (refer to 201)_
203B Please summarize your impression of this group's image of your
organization (unit) by circling a point on the following scale:
Image very good Image Relatively Bad
Explain:
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204B What is the nature of this group's relation with your organiza-
tion (unit)?
205B How are relations with this group maintained?
206B What are the recurring issues or differences of opinion between
this group and your organization (unit) ?
207B How are these differences resolved?
208B Do you have any suggestions for improving relations with
this group?
202C Name of Group (refer to 201)_
203C Please summarize your impression of this group's image of your
organization (unit) by circling a point on the following scale:
Image very good Image relatively bad
Z L / / / /
Explain:
204C What is the nature of this group's relation with your organiza-
tion (unit) ?
205C How are relations with this group maintained?
206C What are the recurring issues or differences of opinion between
this group and your organization (unit) ?
207C How are these differences resolved?
208C Do you have any suggestions for improving relations with this
group ?
202D Name of Group (refer to 201)
203D Please summarize your impression of this group's image of your
organization (unit) by circling a point on the following scale:
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Image very good Image relatively bad
Explain:
204D What is the nature of this group's relation with your organiza-
tion (unit)?
205D How are relations with this group maintained?
206D What are the recurring issues or differences of opinion between
this group and your organization (unit) ?
207D How are these differences resolved?
208D Do you have any suggestions for improving relations with
this group?
209 Do you have an advisory or policy board committee ? If so,
what is its composition?
210 To what extent do members of your board (committee) legitimatize
your organization (unit) to outside groups as opposed to simply
representing their own reference groups to the board (committee)?
Please summarize your answer to question 210 by circling a
point on the following scale:
Significantly help Serve only as a
legitimatize our representative
organization (unit) of own group
300 ORGANIZATIONAL (UNIT) PLANNING
301 What is the planning process in your organization (unit)? Out-
line steps sequentially)
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302 What types of problems are encountered in such a planning
process?
Please summarize the significance of these problems by
circling a point on the following scale:
Major problems Minor problems
303 How successful is your program in effecting and legitimatizing
new experiments away from traditional line programs ?
Please summarize your answer to question 303 by circling
a point on the following scale:
Very successful Not successful
304 What kinds of problems do you face when you seek to transfer
the learning from the experimental program back to traditional
line programs ?
Please summarize the significance of these problems by
circling a point on the following scale:
Very serious Only modest
problems difficulties
encountered encountered
305 How are clients or user groups involved in program planning?
306 Are there any difficulties with respect to client involvement?
Please summarize the significance of these difficulties by
circling a point on the following scale:
Very serious difficulties Only modest difficulties
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307 Are outside technical experts, task specialists and resource
people presently involved in program planning ?
Please summarize the extent of involvement by circling a point
on the following scale:
Great involvement Outside specialists
of outside almost never
technical specialists involved
308 What type of technical knowledge not possessed by staff would
be helpful if it were integrated into planning ?
309 What difficulties do you have when you involve outside techni-
cal specialists in program planning?
Please summarize the significance of these problems by
circling a point on the following scale:
Major problems Minor problems
310 How is your organization's (unit's) total set of programs evaluated?
311 How adequate is this evaluation?
Please summarize your answer to question 311 by circling a
point on the following scale:
Evaluation is
Very adequate inadequate
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312 Please indicate the extent of planning efforts and time focused
on the time cycles below:
Immediate crises:
Great extent very little
Short-run planning:
Great extent Very little
Intermediate-run planning:
Great extent Very little
Long-run planning:
Great extent Very little
313 What are the decision rules which determine which programs or
proposals will receive funding?
400 ORGANIZATION (UNIT) STRUCTURE
401 Please list the key units and positions in your organization (unit).
402 Describe how work and decisions flow through this structure.
Where does it enter? How is it processed? How does it leave?
403 What are the real problems of getting the job done in this system?
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Please summarize the significance of these problems by
circling a point on the following scale:
Major problems Minor problems
404 How would you describe the character of the personnel in the
unit (organization) ? Technicians, specialists, generalists?
(Identify each specialized group in terms of differentiated
skills or competence.)
.-_
 TT ,, . I (positions within the unit) I405 How are the various , .t _, , t, . ' I coordinated?LJunits within the organization^
406 Is there any information which some ... are not receiv-[_umts J
ing which they should receive in order to do a better job?
Please summarize your answer to question 406 by circling a
point on the following scale:
Present communication Present communica-
is excellent tion is poor
407 Which units in your organization (people in your unit)have the
greatest power over decisions?
408 Do you think this balance of power ought to be changed in any way?
Please summarize your answer to question 408 by circling a
point on the following scale:
Present power balance Present power
is excellent balance is poor
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409 What are the issues or recurring sources of stress between units
(people) ?
Please summarize the significance of these stresses or issues
by circling a point on the following scale:
Very serious Relatively
stresses minor stresses
410 When disagreement between units (people) arises, how is it
resolved?
411 How frequently are the following conflict resolution strategies used:
Resort to a higher authority:
Very frequently Infrequently
Bargaining and negotiation:
Very frequently Infrequently
/ / / / / /
Mediation by outside experts:
Very frequently Infrequently
/ / / / / /
Special problem- solving meetings:
Very frequently • Infrequently
/ / / / / /
Smoothing and ignoring the real differences:
Very frequently Infrequently
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412 How would you describe the morale of this organization (unit)?
Please summarize your answer to question 412 by circling a
point on the following scale:
Morale is very Morale is very low
high and positive and negative
413 Would you describe your organization (unit) as a team, or as a
, group of loners, or as a group of cliques?
Please summarize your answer to question 413 by circling a
point on the following scale:
Relatively separated as
Strong teamwork individual groups
414 How much confidence and trust do people have in each other?
Please summarize your answer to question 414 by circling a
point on the following scale:
Open, friendly, Closed, competitive,
trusting hostile
415 Is there anything else about the organization (unit) you would
like to see changed?
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500 POSITION CHARACTERISTICS
501 How would you describe the duties of your particular position?
502 In terms of the tasks that you perform, which do you like most
and which do you like least?
503 Briefly describe your education and career history.
504 How much freedom do you have to do things your own way?
Please circle the appropriate response on the scale below:
Great freedom Little freedom
Explain:
505 If you were hiring someone to take your place, what types of
attributes or skills would you look for when you screened a
candidate ?
506 How is your work evaluated ?
507 In what areas would you like additional education or training?
508 To what extent are the decisions you make each day similar to
the decisions that you face on other days?
Please circle the appropriate response on the scale below:
Decisions Decisions
very similar very dissimilar
Explain:
509 Could somebody be trained to make these decisions in a reason-
able period of time ?
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510 In the course of doing your work, how often do you come across
specific but important problems that you do not know how to go
about solving?
Please circle the appropriate response on the scale below:
Very often Very seldom
Explain:
511 What do you do in those cases where you encounter a problem
that you do not know how to go about solving ?
512 What types of mistakes do people in your type of work make?
513 What happens when such mistakes are made?
514 What kind of direction and supervision do you receive (from
supervisor; by negotiated goal; by system)?
515 How adequate is this direction and supervision?
Please circle the appropriate response on the scale below:
Very adequate Not adequate
/ / / / / /
Explain:
516 To what extent are there policies or rules which guide you in
making decisions ?
Please circle the appropriate response on the scale below:
Many policies and Almost no
rules policies and rules
Explain:
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517 What types of stresses are you exposed to in your job?
518 How much influence do you have in areas important to your job?
519 How much influence do you think you should have?
Please circle the appropriate response on the scale below:
More influence Less influence
Explain:
520 How much of your time is spent on the following types of tasks?
Tasks that can be completed in one hour:
Great deal Very little
Explain:
Tasks that can be completed in two to four hours:
Great deal Very little
/ / / / / /
Explain:
Tasks that can be completed in four to twenty hours:
Great deal Very little
/ / / / / /
Explain:
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521 To what extent are each of these a source of satisfaction to you
in working in your position?
Salary/Financial benefits:
Very important source
of satisfaction Unimportant source
Friendships and informal relations:
Very important source
of satisfaction Unimportant source
Satisfaction with organization1 s accomplishments:
Very important source
of satisfaction Unimportant source
Satisfactions from feeling you have solved difficult problems:
Very important source
of satisfaction Unimportant source
Technical and/or professional satisfaction in doing your own
job well and improving your skills:
Very important source
of satisfaction Unimportant source
522 Is there anything about your present position you would like to
see changed?
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523 Think back over the past year. I would like to have you tell me
something about your work which pleased you very much. And
something about your work which made you feel bad.
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TORNADO FORECASTING
Hans Rosendal*
Tornadoes have always been a threat to inhabitants of the United
States to the east of the Rocky Mountains. Our nation's early history
contains several accounts of the ravages wrought by these storms and of
lives lost during an epoch of a sparsely settled continent. The tornado
which struck Charleston, South Carolina on September 10, 1811 was the
first major tornado to strike a larger settlement and several hundred per-
sons perished in this disaster. Likewise, terrible destruction was wrought
at Natchez, Mississippi, on May 7, 1840;by a powerful tornado which,
during its brief visit, took the lives of 316 people and injured hundreds
more. These incidents and many others of lesser magnitude left a deep im-
pression on the early residents and stimulated research into the problem by
scientists of succeeding generations.
Over the relatively short span of time covering European settlement of
North America, about 10, 000 United States residents have lost their lives
to tornadoes. The worst single disaster was the famed Great Tristate Tor-
nado of March 18, 1925, which killed 689 persons in Missouri, Illinois and
Indiana. With the increased population and the spread of suburbs and mo-
bile home developments, the potential for future huge disasters looms large
Space Science and Engineering Center, University of Wisconsin.
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on the horizon. In addition, the subtle change of the earth's surface due
to man's activity may affect the frequency and intensity of tornado forma-
tion in several ways, nearly all pointing toward an expected increase in
tornado activity.
The tornado problem is mainly an American problem. The unique physical
layout of North America with respect to sources of warm and moist air from
the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea, and cold and dry air from the Cana-
dian Arctic, plus the effect of terrain on the so-called low-level jet, polar
jet and subtropical jet, all combine to produce the ingredients needed for
tornado formation in the central United States more often than anywhere else
in the world. Fortunately, the combination of meteorological parameters
which produce the really severe mass outbreaks of huge tornadoes, such as
occurred during the Palm Sunday outbreak of April 11, 1965, is rare and
does not occur every year. On that April afternoon and evening, at least 37
separate tornadoes struck in the fairly densely populated countryside of
Iowa, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio killing 258 people,
injuring 3148, and causing property damage estimated in excess of $250 mil-
lion. No large cities or metropolitan areas were in the direct path of the
Palm Sunday tornadoes. If any had been, the above figures would certainly
have been much higher.
Early attempts to learn about the climatology of tornadoes were helped
greatly by Lt. John P. Finley of the Signal Corps, who in 1881 published the
Signal Office Professional Paper No. 7 entitled "The Character of Six Hundred
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Tornadoes. " From these data it was learned that tornadoes form within the
circulation of a larger low pressure system in an area usually several hun-
dred miles to the southwest of the center within the warm and moist sector
of the storm. The destabilizing effect of solar heating of the surface seemed
important since a great majority of the tornadoes were found to form during
the late afternoon hours, though locations on the Gulf Coast were less in-
fluenced by this effect; many tornadoes were found to occur in this region
during the very early morning hours. The seasonal march of the areas of
occurrence northward during spring from a wintertime maximum near the Gulf
to a late spring and early summer maximum over the plains states was also
noted by the early investigators. Finley and others also elaborated on the
reasons for the coincidence of large hail and unusually intense displays
of lightning with tornado-producing thunderstorms.
Lt. Finley elaborated on the problem of issuing forecasts of tornadoes
to the public in the August, 1890 issue of the American Meteorological
Journal. Finley ended the fine article in which he summarized his work
with tornadoes with the following conclusion:
"The writer is of the opinion that the forecasting of conditions favor-
able to the development of tornadoes and designating the quadrant of a state
in which such conditions shall give rise to local signs that the inhabitants
of that section can rely upon, is entirely practicable. By this admission
he does not mean to convey the idea that the exact path of the funnel-shaped
cloud can be indicated in the dispatch, for that would be impossible except
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by chance. The average width of the tornado's track is only a few hundred
yards, and several of these storms may occur in the same county, with en-
tirely independent paths of destruction and distinct cloud formation.
"It doubtless appears that the quadrant of a state, especially the
larger ones, is a very extensive area to cover with a single tornado predic-
tion, but the fact must not be overlooked, that where the conditions are
favorable for tornadoes, local storms having various degrees of tornado
violence, the development of which it is very important to herald, occur
here and there over a large section of country. Therefore, the scheme of
local storm predictions for state quadrants would seem to possess the ele-
ments of success, for, while the peculiar funnel-shaped cloud might not
appear, the conditions are such that local storms of great violence would
very likely occur, and destruction to life and property ensue. Although of
course the area here indicated (statequadrants) is quite variable in extent,
yet it possesses the decided advantages of definiteness, familiarity to the
people who are interested, and brevity of expression in rendering a concise
dispatch. The local signs of tornado development are certain, easily ob-
served and well defined. With the people well informed concerning these
indications, and there appears no reason why they should not be, the pre-
diction of conditions favorable for local storms, issued from some central
meteorological office, would, if successful, supplement the local signs with
beneficial results. Failures in the official predictions would not only bring
out more distinctly the importance and reliability of local signs, thus
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creating an interest in their careful observance, but would obviate the
occurrence of serious results when wrong predictions were made, inasmuch
as the people would test their trustworthiness by an appeal to the local
signs. "
Attempts to forecast tornadoes did not prove very fruitful, and the
Weather Service actually discouraged any mention of tornadoes in forecasts,
since the art of predicting their occurrence had given such poor results and
the mere mention of the word tornado evoked fear in the populace. Basic
research, nevertheless, continued on the problem. The advent of plentiful
upper air data during and after World War II advanced research immensely.
The concepts of the vertical stability of dry and moist air helped to explain
the environment within which severe storms form and the rapid overturning
of the atmosphere experienced near these thunderstorms. The destabiliz-
ing effect of a low-level jet feeding heat and moisture into the cyclone at
low levels, and a strong upper jet acting as the outflow mechanism aloft
while also helping to transport cold and dry air in over the region, were
clues that meteorologists would look for when concerned with forecasting
the occurrence of severe thunderstorm and tornado development.
The U. S. Air Force's Air Weather Service increased its interest in
tornado forecasting after Tinker Field, Oklahoma, was struck twice within
a week in late March 1948 with losses to aircraft and hangars mounting
to more than $15 million. Lt. Col. Fawbush and Major R. C. Miller and
their associates at Tinker Air Force Base devised in 1952, after several
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years of research, a workable method of forecasting tornadoes which has
been improved from time to time as further investigations and experience
accumulate. Prediction of the extreme turbulence in the neighborhood of
severe thunderstorms with its implications for flight safety also attracted
Air Force interest.
The National Weather Service cooperated with the Air Weather Service
in this special attack on the tornado problem. A rash of severe tornadoes
striking populated areas in 1953 helped focus national attention and sup-
port, and the Severe Local Storms Forecast Unit (SELS) was established in
Suitland, Maryland to devote full time and energy to tornado forecasting.
The SELS unit later moved to Kansas City and with the organization of
ESSA in 1965 was included in the National Severe Storms Forecast Center
(NSSFC). NSSFC routinely issues the now-familiar Tornado Watches when
conditions are right for tornado development while local weather stations
follow through withTornadoWarnings when tornadoes are confirmed in the
area.
Our knowledge of the climatology of tornadoes has also improved over
the years. The Weather Bureau Technical Paper No. 20, "Tornado Occur-
rences in the United States, " published in 1952, has proven extremely in-
formative and useful to forecasters. The Weather Bureau Research Papers
No. 40 and 41 on the Dallas and Fargo tornadoes of 1957 also stimulated
research and interest. Such allied discoveries by Tepper concerning the
connection between barometric pressure jumps and tornado development,
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and by Vonnegut, Jones, and others with respect to the peculiar spherics
emission by tornado thunderstorms are improving our ability to detect and
track tornadoes. Spherics is another name for the annoying crackle of
static experiences on an AM radio receiver during a thunderstorm. Re-
search in this direction is in progress at the NOAA Environmental Research
Laboratories at Boulder, Colorado, and at Norman, Oklahoma. Much indi-
vidual research is also going on elsewhere, with important contributions
in recent years coming particularly from Professor Fujita at the University
of Chicago, Prof. Darkow at Missouri, Professors Johnson and Sechrist at
the University of Wisconsin, and the late Professor Bates at St. Louis
University. The personal efforts of the late Snowden D. Flora in writing
the popular book Tornadoes of the United States also bears mention.
The forecast techniques applied at the NSSFC in predicting tornado or
severe thunderstorm occurrences are based on surface and upper air data on
the wind, pressure, moisture and temperature distribution horizontally as
well as vertically. A day or two in advance the NSSFC can predict with
good reliability which areas will be susceptible to tornado or severe thun-
derstorm formation. This is particularly true of the very destructive fam-
ily-type outbreaks in the spring. Numerical weather-prediction charts
supplied by the National Meteorological Center (NMC) in Suitland, Md.,
are an integral part of this forecast support system and give twenty-four-
hour to seventy-two-hour prediction of the large-scale surface and upper
air flow patterns. NSSFC forecasters use these charts in their issuance
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of the convective outlook which covers forecasts for a larger area more
than twelve hours in advance. When it comes to issuance of tornado
watches valid for the same afternoon and evening, special attention is
paid to the most recent upper air and surface data. A typical tornado
watch is issued about noon local time for the afternoon and early evening
hours from 2:00 pm to 8:00 pm and covers an area about 150 miles wide
and 300 miles long.
Radar has been used for many years as an important tool in detecting
and tracking severe thunderstorms. Tall precipitation echoes can be
tracked with a high degree of accuracy up to 150 miles away from the sta-
tion. Radar meteorologists found at an early date that severe thunder-
storms usually were oriented into squall lines or similar groupings asso-
ciated with fronts or convergence lines in the flow pattern. Also noted was
the good relationship between echo height and brightness and the severity
and presence of hail. Any cell penetrating the tropopause automatically
was suspect. Echoes moving into a diffluent flow pattern with the divergent
movement of a few brighter cells to the right of the remainder also meant in
many cases that a tornado-bearing cell was present. Nearby echoes with a
hook-shaped appendix on their right rear flank or some which displayed an
unusual hole in the echo were often recognized as tornado-bearing cells.
The meteorological satellite was relatively slow in being put to use
in tornado research. The early TIROS series had few glimpses of tornado
areas due to the constant orientation in space of these vehicles precluding
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their looking at the surface of the earth directly below more than a small
percentage of the time. Also, the resolution of the vidicon cameras was
relatively poor for picking up details. The later earth-oriented polar-
orbiting ESSA and NOAA satellites gave once-daily coverage over the entire
earth in early afternoon local time, so the interesting very rapid late after-
noon and early evening growth in the huge cells which spawn tornadoes
was not often monitored. Nevertheless, several views of the large cirrus
canopies or blow-offs of the peculiar cells or groups of cells were obtained
and pictures of the "square" or "parallelogram" clouds containing tornadoes
underneath were investigated.
The launching of the ATS geosynchronous satellite viewing North Amer-
ica with a high-resolution spin-scan camera gave meteorologists their first
chance to observe tornado development in a sequential fashion with the aid
of pictures received fifteen to thirty minutes apart during daylight hours.
These satellite pictures, because of cloud screens and insufficient resolu-
tion, do not show the actual tornado funnel. They do, though, reveal the
unique appearance of the huge cumulonimbus clouds which have tornadoes
associated with them. These clouds appear a magnitude larger than the
ordinary thunderstorm clouds and their shapes have been variously described
as "diamond, " "oval, " "square, " or "cigar"-shaped. What the satellite
sees are the huge cirrus plumes, also commonly called anvils or canopies,
of these cells. The flat upper surface of these canopies will spread out
and grow in size at a rapid rate proportional to the vertical motion experienced
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within the strong updraft in the cells during their formative stage. There-
fore plume growth is a measure of the cells' vigor. The plumes or canopies
seem to reach a steady-state size after a time as several towers of rising
motion feed condensed moisture into them while sinking motion along the
sides and ends of the plumes causes heating and evaporation of the cloud
crystals or droplets. The tornadoes below often persist during this mature
steady state of the thunderstorm conglomerate and therefore can be tracked
as long as the canopy is visible, which may even be nearly an hour after
local sunset. Later, infrared capability can help monitor these cells dur-
ing hours of darkness. The infrared signature of these cells should be
equally obvious because of the extreme height and low temperature of the
cloud tops. The precise locations of the tornadoes under the canopies can
only be estimated at this time, but the upwind end, near the origin of the
plume, may be the logical place to expect to find the funnel. Protuberances
through the canopies may also be associated with the funnel below. Again,
more research is necessary to determine the location of the individual
tornadoes.
Study of the satellite pictures taken on April 23, 1968 during a tornado
outbreak in the Ohio valley has helped Professors Johnson and Sechrist at
the University of Wisconsin formulate a new theory concerning the factors
which initiate tornado development. It has been observed by many meteor-
ologists over the years that tornadoes and severe thunderstorms form just
east of the clear area which slices into the low pressure system from the
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southwest. The area of tornado formation is near the classical cold front
which is the leading edge of dryer and cooler air, the line along which sur-
face winds change (usually from southeasterly to southwesterly). Another
cold front, ahead of the advancing cloudy, cold polar air coming down
from the northwest, lags behind—perhaps another several hundred miles.
Seen from space this intermediate air mass of drier, clear air would appear
as a wedge or tongue curving into the center of the cyclone from the south
or southwest. The huge cells with large blow-off plumes discussed in the
previous paragraph would form along the eastern or southeastern flank of
this clear tongue. Johnson and Sechrist in their research traced the air
within this clear tongue back to a polar jet aloft curving southward and
southeastward over the Rockies. This clear tongue therefore consisted of
air from the middle and upper troposphere which was brought down to ground
level, usually helped by the destabilizing effect of solar heating of the
dry upper plains states. Johnson and Sechrist went on to show that the
dynamic effect of a jet sinking down into the cyclone at low levels would
be to destabilize the moist warm air pushed ahead of it and along its flank
and set off convection. The strong subtropical jet would act as the
mechanism sustaining this convection by removing the outflow aloft. Vince
Oliver of the National Environmental Satellite Service has suggested that
the subtropical jet also might be needed to supply the spin vorticity to
twist the thunderstorm echoes. Many tornadoes have been shown to be
associated with rotating thunderstorms. The clear tongue of an extratropical
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cyclone is one of the most striking aspects of the appearance of the storm
as seen from space. Locating or pinpointing the area of tornado activity
with respect to the clear tongue may therefore be of great value to the
operational forecaster using these pictures. The problem of forecasting
tornadoes within the circulation of a tropical cyclone or hurricane may also
be alleviated if it is shown that hurricanes with clear tongues in them are
also hurricanes with tornadoes.
Antecedent conditions outside the immediate area of suspected tornado
formation have also been checked in great detail by Fujita, Vince Oliver
and others. Clues as to the location and strength of the subtropical jet
are looked for over the data-sparse tropical eastern Pacific and over Mex-
ico. A cirrus veil accompanies this jet along part of its journey and cloudi-
ness patterns including cirrus blow-offs of underlying convection over warm
waters and mountain slopes give evidence of its location. The more
sharply-curving polar jet likewise often has an accompanying cirrus veil
to help delineate it.
The NSSFC in 1970 received access to ATS pictures on a real-time
basis and currently is developing techniques for the operational use of
these pictures. The 1970 tornado season was meager as such seasons go:
very few tornado outbreaks occurred. The May 16, 1970 Lubbock tornadoes
occurred before the NSSFC received operational use of the pictures. The
Lubbock tornadoes also occurred very late in the day, and only the begin-
ning of this intense activity was visible before nightfall. Fujita has taken
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the ATS pictures of the Lubbock case and produced movie loops of greatly
magnified pictures which, because of the detail inherent in the spin-scan
pictures, give forecasters many clues to look for in tornado development.
Real-time use of the ATS pictures for monitoring antecedent or incipient
conditions and for observing formation and development of the tornado-
bearing cells in conjunction with standard meteorological and radar data
holds great promise for improving short-range tornado forecasting. Even
though cumulonimbus clouds which produce tornadoes grow at tremendous
speeds and the length of time between pictures becomes critical, the huge
canopy-covered cells are, as far as is known, rather mature for thunder-
storms by the time tornadoes form, and continue to exist, so some lead
time for forecasting and warning purposes is still available. Of particular
importance, therefore, in observing severe storm development is the fre-
quent and rapid receipt of high-resolution pictures from the satellite. The
geosynchronous satellite of the ATS type with the spin-scan camera has
helped meteorologists approach this goal. Future manned orbiting observa-
tories, either at geosynchronous altitude for continuous viewing, or in
near-earth orbits for increased resolution, but only periodic observing,
may help us further to approach these goals. The satellite thus promises
to become an important link in the national severe storm warning system,
a system which already has saved many lives since its initiation in the
middle 1950's.
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To get a better idea of the current operational use of satellites in
tornado observing and forecasting at the National Severe Storms Forecast
Center at Kansas City, a visit was made to this center on March 23-25,
1971, and questions were directed at several staff members who were most
cooperative and helpful in showing the research and facilities connected
with the usage of satellite data.
The NSSFC is under the direction of Allen D. Pearson and his principal
assistant Joseph G. Galway. The center consists of three major forecast
divisions which are supported by the National Communications Center.
These three divisions are the Public Forecast Division, the Aviation Weather
Forecast Division, and the Severe Local Storms Forecast Division. The
SELS unit of the latter division has the responsibility for the issuance of
severe weather watches to the general public and aviation interests for the
contiguous United States. This unit maintains a continuous weather watch
for thunderstorm activity and issues once daily an outlook for severe
thunderstorm activity for the following 24-hour period. When conditions
warrant, the unit will issue watches for specific areas and time periods.
A severe thunderstorm is one in which any or all of the following phenomena
occur; 1) hailstones of three-fourths inch diameter or larger, 2) surface
wind gusts of fifty knots or greater, or 3) tornadoes. Adjacent to the SELS
unit is located the Radar Analysis and Development Unit (RADU unit) which
has as its duty the collection of hourly radar data from numerous radars
across the country and display of a composite of these data on a map for
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transmission to users via facsimile or in message form over the national
teletypewriter networks.
The use of real-time satellite data on an experimental basis within the
NSSFC dates back only to 1970 when the center received a drop on the
ATS-III satellite pictures transmitted from Suitland. Mr. William Williams
is the meteorologist in charge of satellite operations. He is assisted by
personnel for the operation of the receiving equipment and the photographic
processing facilities. Pictures on the days of the visit were received at
approximately twenty-five-minute intervals from 8:30 am CST to about 2:00
pm CST. On active days an extended cut-off time of 3:15 pm is allowed.
(This early cut-off time may subsequently have been extended as NOAA ob-
tained increased control over the ATS vehicle, since this is the usual time
of the day when tornado development becomes active.) To increase the
frequency of receipt of pictures, the ATS spin-scan camera can be programmed
to photograph only the northern hemisphere rather than the whole disc of the
earth.
On active thunderstorm days when conventional meteorological data
tell the forecasters on duty that tornado development threatens, these pic-
tures are assembled into movie loops for detailed study of the development
of severe thunderstorms. Pictures are also printed in enlargements covering
the United States portion with a grid overlay for easy identification of
suspect areas. Landmarks used are Lake Okeechobee, Yucatan,
Baja California, White Sands, the Black Hills, etc. The ATS-III pictures
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as yet are only received on weekdays. Forecasters therefore were unable
to follow the large, severe tornado outbreak across the southern states on
Sunday, February 21, 19*71, when more than 100 people lost their lives and
in excess of l, 000 received injuries from a rash of tornadoes which devas-
tated many rural communities in Mississippi.
In summary, meteorologists at the NSSFC rely on conventional data
transmitted over the National Facsimile Network and teletypewriter circuits
from the National Meteorological Center (NMC) for forecast guidance to de-
termine conditions conducive to severe thunderstorm formation. Part of
these conventional data have been improved because of observations from
the meteorological satellites. The twenty-four-hour to seventy-two-hour
barotropic or baroclinic numerical forecast charts are particularly valued
and studied by the NSSFC forecasters. Synoptic weather patterns conducive
to severe thunderstorm or tornado formation are readily recognized. Such
conditions usually involve a deep and wide eastward-progressing upper
trough traversing North America with associated strong upper jets and warm,
moist air at low levels to the southeast of the surface low pressure system.
On mornings of expected tornado outbreaks, very detailed analyses
of the large-scale horizontal temperature pressure, moisture and wind
distribution at the surface and aloft are carried out. Individual balloon
soundings of the vertical distribution of these same parameters are also
analyzed in detail to delineate the areas for which watches may have to be
issued. Additional upper air balloon soundings or reports from pilots may
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be requested. The NSSFC has adopted computer technology to a high degree
for the abundant data-processing and plotting work. The region below a
strongly diffluent flow pattern in which the subtropical jet curves eastward
and the polar jet northward above the surface warm front is usually included
in a tornado watch area. The timing of the issuance of the watch generally
coincides with the climatologically most likely time of day for tornado
development, namely the afternoon and early evening hours between 2:00
pm and 8:00 pm local time. If severe activity persists past 8:00 pm, the
watch areas may be extended in time and space.
It is during these late afternoon and early evening hours until sunlight
disappears from the tops of the tallest thunderheads in the area of concern
that meteorologists search each successive satellite picture for signs of
tornado or severe storm development. Conventional meteorological data
and reports from radar stations, pilots and the public in the area of activity
are used in conjunction with the satellite pictures. If and when a damaging
storm or tornado is confirmed, a tornado warning is issued for areas down-
stream, and neighboring thunderstorm cells, particularly to the south and
east, are watched very closely for signs of tornado formation.
The operational use of satellites in tornado or severe thunderstorm de-
tection or tracking is still in its infancy. Enough tornado cases have been
studied in retrospect with satellite pictures at hand to realize the promis-
ing future that satellites have in this vital observing and warning mission.
There are a number of small, erratic, and less damaging tornadoes with
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short tracks which probably will not be detectable from satellites. On the
other hand, the familiar cloud patterns of the large family-type outbreaks,
which are so damaging to large areas and which cause the most fatalities,
should be readily recognizable, especially as new techniques are developed
and as nighttime infrared capabilities are added. In addition, a continued
gain in theoretical knowledge and insight into the severe thunderstorm
problem will be realized as researchers become able to compare and utilize
satellite data together with conventional data in more and more cases.
APPENDIX
SOUTHERN CORN LEAF BLIGHT ADDENDUM TO THE CASE STUDY:
IMPACT ON CORN PRODUCTION FROM RECENT ADVANCES IN SATELLITE
METEOROLOGY
R. H. Andrew--
Southern Corn Leaf Blight, a corn disease previously of minor importance
and confined to the southern half of the Corn Belt, suddenly in the late
summer of 1970 emerged as a serious malady. Primary cause is a new
race of the fungus Helminthosporium maydis called the T-strain which pro-
duces a new crop of spores within a seven-day period. The disease has
caused serious loss in southern states. With unusually warm, wet weather
in the Midwest in 1970, it progressed northward rapidly and was detected
in Wisconsin in August.
Because of the close relationship of weather to development of this
disease, an addendum to the case study of corn as related to satellite
meteorology was pertinent. To this end representative producers and agri-
cultural extension and research personnel in the blighted area were con-
tacted to document the economic impact of improved forecasting on chemical
control, sanitation procedures, production plans, alternate uses and harvest
of the corn crop.
Dept. of Agronomy, University of Wisconsin.
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Conferences were held with the following representative individuals
and firms, among others, during January of 1971:
T. F. Toohey, Cotton Producers Association (CPA), Atlanta, Ga.
Dr. Norman E. McGlohon, Head, Extension Plant Pathology,
Univ. of Ga., Athens
Dr. D. H. Teem, Extension Agronomist, Dept. Agronomy and
Soils, Auburn Univ., Auburn, Ala.
Dr. Luther Farrar, Extension Pathologist, Botany and Plant
Pathology, Auburn, Ala.
Dr. Gene E. Scott, Agronomy, Miss. State Univ., Starkeville,
Miss.
Dr. M. C. Futrell, Plant Pathology and Weed Science, Starkeville,
Miss.
Mr. W. F. Moore, Plant Pathology and Weed Science,
Starkeville, Miss.
Weather as Related to Movement of Inoculum and Geographic Distribution
of the Disease in 1970
The origin of the 1970 outbreak in the United States apparently was in
the Belle Glade, Florida area where Southern Corn Leaf Blight reached epi-
phytotic proportions during late February and early March. Inoculum from
diseased fields in the Belle Glade area was carried northward by winds from
the south and deposited throughout Florida, southern Georgia, and the coastal
areas of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas.
Between June 13 and July 7, spread of inoculum apparently began to
form two definite paths. One path moved northward up the Mississippi
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River and surrounding areas on into southern Minnesota and Wisconsin.
The second path moved through coastal Georgia, South Carolina, and the
coastal areas of southeast North Carolina where the disease was found on
June 25. During this period, June 13 to the first part of July, a lack of
moisture slowed development of the disease through Alabama and Georgia.
Wisconsin first reported Southern Corn Leaf Blight on July 7 in the
southern part of the state. The initial report of this disease in Michigan
was from the western and central parts where it was observed before it was
reported in northern Indiana, indicating the inoculum had moved from
southern Wisconsin across Lake Michigan.
Georgia reported a rate of movement of the disease of about twenty
miles per day. Spread was temporarily halted in some cases by natural
barriers. Field observations indicated, in some cases, the movement of
inoculum was slowed by forests and mountain ranges. Blight was observed
on the Georgia side of the Blue Ridge Mountains two weeks before it was
observed on the Tennessee side. By August 28, blight had been reported
throughout the eastern part of the United States, and by September 20 it
was as far westward as north central Kansas.
The progressive state-by-state spread from Florida into southern
Canada indicates the possibility that Race T may not overwinter in the area
north of southern Illinois. Field observations indicated very little moisture
was necessary for disease development. In many areas, corn which was
suffering from the lack of moisture had severe Southern Corn Leaf Blight.
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Dew apparently furnishes sufficient moisture for sporulation and infection
to occur. In drought areas with heavy dew corn was severely spotted, but
in other drought areas without dew the corn had few if any spots. The
amount of dew on the foliage and the length of time it was present appar-
ently was a contributing factor in the occurrence of the disease in a few
areas.
Air movement within the corn fields influenced the degree of early in-
fection. High plant populations and the presence of weeds apparently
increased severity.
The rapid spread of inoculum and the subsequent serious development
of the disease in 1970 was brought about by the presence of favorable en-
i
vironmental conditions, widespread inoculum dissemination and the very
intensive acreage planted to corn hybrids containing TMS cytoplasm. Due
to the high inoculum potential if capable of overwintering, it is possible,
given favorable environmental conditions, that future 1971 losses may in-
volve all acreage planted to corn containing TMS cytoplasm. By planting
Texas male sterile seed, experience in 1970 indicates a probable crop
failure, and by planting blended seed, a crop failure to the extent of the
blend. There should be no substitute for use of F seed produced by normal
cytoplasm (hand detasseled) as long as seed is available. Some farmers
will probably plant F (second generation) seed of the tolerant hybrids
Ct
which they produced this year. According to research, yield reductions
of 15 to 25 percent can be expected from use of this seed. In addition to
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yield losses from F seed, there will probably be a reduction in quality.
Li
This yield reduction would be much larger from single crosses.
Expected 1971 Supply of Seed Corn
Companies normally handling about 80% of the nation's seed corn pro-
duction indicate approximately 818 million pounds of seed available for
planting in 1971. The current expected supply consists of 22% normal cyto-
plasm (detasseled) seed, 40% T-cytoplasm seed, and 38% blend seed. Most
corn produced from T-cytoplasm seed proved susceptible to Race T of
Southern Corn Leaf Blight during the 1970 growing season. Planned 1970-
71 winter production of seed makes up about 3% or 27 million pounds of the
total supply. Production from this source has not yet been realized.
Plans for 1971
Research and extension underway in Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi
to ameliorate Southern Corn Leaf Blight in 1971:
1. Determination of disease reaction on commercial hybrids.
2. Use of feeding trials to check for mammalian toxicity.
a. Negative results have been obtained on large animals.
b. Negative results also with mice and guinea pigs, but these
tests are being continued.
3. In greenhouse tests, corn inbreds are being screened for resistance
both in T and N cytoplasm.
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4. Seed treatment chemicals are being screened to see if they will
control internal infection in the seed.
5. Determination of the geography of fungus overwintering.
6. Screening inbred lines and hybrids for resistance to this disease
under field conditions both with and without artificial inoculation.
7. Growing different dates-of-^planting tests to study reaction to
this disease when inoculated at different stages of growth.
8. Detailed plans to trace the epidemic and prepare distribution maps
of the disease in 1971.
It is proposed that the USDA set up a National Corn Blight Information
Center for the 1971 production season:
a. to provide a national center for gathering and dissemination of
information related to blight on the 1971 corn crop.
b. to assist in providing consistent and responsible information on
a timely basis.
c. to help provide producers with information useful in making deci-
sions pertaining to production, harvesting, and storage of the
1971 corn crop.
d. to keep the Department informed and to provide a framework for
national leadership on problems associated with corn blight.
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Corn Seed Summary (November, 1970)*
Maturity Zone
Expected seed corn supply (80%) for 1971
seeding by method of hybridization
N-cytoplasm T-cytoplasm Blend
(1, 000 pounds)
DEEP SOUTH:
Ga., Ala., La., Miss.,
Fla., East Texas
25,320
MID-SOUTH:
Mo., Ky., Tenn., Va.,
N. C. , S. C. 23, 158
EASTERN:
Pa., N. Y., New England 5, 144
EASTERN and CENTRAL CORN BELT:
111., Ind., Ohio, Eastern-
Central Iowa 94,308
WESTERN CORN BELT:
We stern Iowa, Nebr.,
Kans., S. D. 9,993
NORTHERN STATES:
Mich., Minn., Wis.,
N. D. 25.543
Total 183,466
5,095
17,828
11,241
119,893
66.871
4,811
49,488
19,537
105,823 152,718
44, 287
36. 520
326,751 307,361
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